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While technologies for genetic sequencing have increased the promise of personalized 
medicine, they simultaneously pose threats to personal privacy. The public’s desire to 
protect itself from unauthorized access to information may limit the uses of this valuable 
resource. To date, there is limited understanding about the public’s attitudes toward the 
regulation and sharing of such information. We sought to understand the drivers of 
individuals’ decisions to disclose genetic information to a third party in a setting where 
disclosure potentially creates both private and social benefits, but also carries the risk of 
potential misuse of private information. We conducted two separate but related studies. 
First, we administered surveys to college students and parents, to determine individual 
attitudes toward and inter-generational influences on the disclosure decision. Second, we 
conducted a game-theory based experiment that assessed how participants’ decisions to 
disclose genetic information are influenced by societal and health factors. Key survey 
findings indicate that concerns about genetic information privacy negatively impact the 
likelihood of disclosure while the perceived benefits of disclosure and trust in the 
institution receiving the information have a positive influence. The experiment results 
also show that the risk of discrimination negatively affects the likelihood of disclosure, 
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while the positive impact that disclosure has on the probability of finding a cure and the 
presence of a monetary incentive to disclose, increase the likelihood. We also study the 
determinants of individuals’ decision to be informed of findings about their health, and 
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1.1 Problem Statement 
Recent advancements in genetic research and continuous technological progress 
have introduced the possibility of digitizing patients’ health information and using it to 
drive better clinical decision-making. We are on the brink of a new era where individual 
health records can be accessed through electronic databases. Companies have already 
begun marketing products that are designed to minimize the sharing time and maximize 
the availability of this information to health care providers while maintaining a high level 
of security and confidentiality. At the same time, we are also on the verge of gaining 
access to the vital genetic information that uniquely defines an individual’s physiology. 
Many companies have already expressed interest in sequencing human DNA to scope out 
genetic markers that may forecast an individual’s risk for certain disorders. This powerful 
approach can be instrumental in transforming the current landscape of health care and 
crucial in finding new treatments for the myriad diseases currently plaguing our society, 
ranging from high blood pressure to different types of cancer. 
The availability of large databases of genetic information alone may significantly 
affect the health care industry. The more information regarding genetic-based disorders 
that researchers have access to, the more likely they will be able to begin creating new 
treatments and cures. At the same time, if health care providers have direct access to 
patients’ genetic information, then personalized treatments tailored to maximize the 
health benefits for the patients could be more widely administered. While the emerging 
field of personalized medicine promises an array of benefits to patients, it will involve 
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several challenges. These include procedures for efficiently and securely storing and 
sharing personal data, and inducing the public to make these data available to researchers. 
Currently, people are hesitant to share their personal genetic information due to 
concerns about the privacy of this information. This information is highly sensitive and 
can potentially be used to discriminate against individuals based on their genetic profile 
or predisposition towards certain diseases. Health care providers and employers are in a 
special position to abuse such information and selectively prefer certain individuals over 
others (Wilde, Meiser, Mitchell, & Schofield, 2009). This fear of discrimination is 
hindering the research on personalized medicine by preventing widespread sharing of 
personal genetic information. If this continues, then the personalized health care industry 
will continue to struggle to expand, and the development of new clinical applications will 
be impeded (Hogarth, Javitt, & Melzer, 2008). 
At the same time, there are many reasons for individuals to willingly disclose 
their personal genetic information. They may be motivated by financial gain - for 
example, in some cases, groups such as biobanks are willing to pay for someone’s genetic 
information in order to distribute it to researchers. Further, people with increased risk for 
certain health conditions may want to know about their vulnerability in order to best 
adjust their lifestyle. Or, an important driver for sharing personal information could 
simply be the natural tendency for a person to be altruistic. In other words, an individual 
may donate their genetic information voluntarily because they believe it may be helpful 
for the general populace, even though they may not receive any personal benefit. In order 
to understand people’s willingness to share their genetic information, we must 
acknowledge the different factors in play and determine the influential forces behind their 
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decisions and choices. Elucidation of these factors will allow for solutions to be 
implemented that promote disclosure of genetic information and facilitate further 
advancements in this field. 
1.2 Research Questions 
Our research is motivated by the importance of understanding how society can 
collect, store, and analyze personal genetic information. A careful approach will enable 
numerous advances in biomedical science and efficiently regulate and advance the field 
of personalized medicine. The voluntary disclosure of such information is likely to be 
driven by individual-level factors as well as the nature of institutions that will be 
responsible for managing the information. First, we pose the question: what are the 
factors that are significantly associated with an individual’s willingness to disclose 
personal genetic information to different institutions for the purpose of research? We 
hypothesize that individual perceptions of the risks and benefits of disclosure will affect 
their willingness to disclose. Risks include the potential for the information to be 
compromised because of improper security, leading to possible employment and health 
insurance discrimination. Benefits are represented by the value of medical discoveries for 
self, family, the broader society, or financial incentives. Individuals may also be 
systematically different in innate characteristics such as risk propensity, trust propensity, 
altruistic tendency, the extent to which they exhibit rational ignorance, and their 
perception of specific institutions such as the government, insurance companies, and 
health care professionals. We theorize that all these factors likely influence one’s 
willingness to disclose personal genetic information. 
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A second research question we pose attempts to investigate the evolution of 
attitudes towards information privacy across two generations. We hypothesize that there 
are likely to be inter-generational differences in willingness to share personal genetic 
information and that there are systematic differences in the factors related with 
willingness to disclose across generations. We further expect that attitudes of parents will 
likely influence their children’s disclosure decisions (Bandura & McClelland, 1977). It 
may be the case that generational differences are not a result of age but rather a result of 
socialization with technologies, as demonstrated in the Millennial generation’s use of 
social media. 
Our last research question examines the role of incentives in motivating genetic 
information disclosure by altering the circumstances within which disclosure occurs. 
Here we explore the effects of market mechanisms (purchase of information) versus 
disclosure driven by pro-social motivations, by explicitly manipulating risks and benefits. 
We hypothesize that financial incentives will negatively alter how people perceive the act 
of donating their personal information and this may limit the amount of disclosure that 
occurs due to motivational crowding. 
To address these questions, we performed two research studies. In the first study, 
we conducted two cross-sectional surveys to distinguish attitudes toward genetic 
information sharing between the student and parent generations. The conceptual model 
underlying the study had studied subject willingness to disclose their personal genetic 
information to three stakeholders and their desire to be informed of being at risk of 
genetic disease as the focal outcomes. Key predictors of these outcomes included 
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demographic variables, generalized traits, genetic information sharing beliefs, health 
status variables, and trust in institutions. 
The second stage of our research involved an experiment with subjects from the 
college student population. Participants engaged in a multi-treatment experiment that 
presented hypothetical scenarios in which they could donate their personal genetic 
information for research purposes. Decisions made by the participants, along with 
scenario specific parameters, affected their income for the round. The experiment was 
intended to simulate real-world situations where people are presented with the option to 
donate their genetic information. 
Findings from this study shed light on the complex decision of genetic 
information disclosure and its determinants. Our results may be instrumental in the 
design of institutions and policies that will facilitate the manner in which genetic 
information is obtained, used, and protected by determining what factors influence an 












2. Overview of Thesis  
In order to address the issues of genetic information sharing and its subsequent 
effects on the health care industry, two separate studies were conducted. The first study 
was a survey analysis regarding health care concerns and willingness to disclose personal 
information measured across both a student and a parent generation. A portion of the 
student population at The University of Maryland – College Park was asked to complete 
the survey. Upon completion of the survey, students were given the opportunity to ask 
their parents to complete a similar survey. Both surveys contained the same materials, but 
the student version added an additional section about parental influence. This information 
allowed us to compare and contrast the opinions of the two different generations. 
The survey asked questions regarding privacy, trust in people and institutions, 
issue involvement, perceived risks and benefits, and social stigma. The dependent 
variable for this study was how willing respondents were to donate their genetic 
information to a variety of different stakeholders. Responses were amalgamated into 
different constructs to represent all of the factors that would influence a decision to 
donate and the dependent variables were regressed against all of the independent 
constructs.  
The second study was an experiment for college-aged students that explored how 
willing the participants were to disclose genetic information when presented with varying 
risks and rewards. A portion of the student population at The University of Maryland – 
College Park was asked to participate in the experiment.  
The experiment was designed with actions and decisions that may occur in one’s 
lifetime that represent actual issues with donating genetic information. The simulation 
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gave participants a chance of having a hypothetical genetic disease as well as chances 
they would be discriminated against, become sick, and the chance that a cure would be 
found for the disease. Participants were then given three decisions: whether or not to 
donate their genetic information, whether or not they would like to be informed of the 
results of their genetic test, and whether they would like to make a long-term monetary 
investment in themselves. Participants were given an income that represents a salary and 
how much this income increased or decreased depended on their decisions and the 
parameters of the simulation. By regressing each of their decisions against the simulation 
parameters, the importance of each parameter in the decisions could be determined, 
helping to identify what monetary and risk factors influence the decisions made in 














3. Literature Review 
In this section, we discuss important findings in prior work related to our research 
questions. Our research topics encapsulate a number of different disciplines. Therefore, 
we reviewed relevant work in fields such as health informatics, psychology, sociology, 
economics, business, and information technology, among other disciplines. We first 
explore the current legal environment pertaining to genetic information sharing and its 
evolution alongside the advancement of medical science. Next, we discuss studies that 
investigate intergenerational differences and how a child’s attitudes and ideals are shaped 
by his or her parents. Furthermore, we consider how factors such as income, race, health, 
risk perception, and issue involvement influence decision-making processes. Finally, we 
explore previous research pertaining to how altruism, incentives, and trust influence 
social behaviors. The literature discussed in this section provides the conceptual and 
empirical background for the design of the two studies.  
3.1 The Legal Environment for Genetic Information 
Little legal protection from genetic discrimination existed before the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act that was passed in 2008. The first law to prevent 
genetic discrimination was the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Gurd, 1992). While originally 
not designed for this purpose, Title VII of this Act can be used to prevent genetic 
discrimination against racial or ethnic minorities. However, the anti-discriminatory power 
of this 1964 Act on genetic discrimination is limited because it was enacted to combat 
racial and ethnic discrimination; thus, the need to demonstrate a strong connection 
between race and genetics. However, it must be noted that this has never been 
successfully applied to a court case (Gostin, 1991). 
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Next, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 became a source of protection 
from genetic discrimination. While this act provided protection from discrimination for 
people with symptoms of a genetic disease, it has some limitations. One problem is that 
the law does not prevent discrimination against asymptomatic individuals. This makes it 
possible for an employer to decide not to hire an individual because of the potential for 
future medical costs. Another weakness is that the law does not forbid employers from 
requiring genetic testing after an employment offer (Gostin, 1991). This allows 
companies to discriminate based on genetic conditions in pay and job placement. For 
example, individuals with genetic conditions may not be offered higher pay in order to 
offset the future costs stemming from their illnesses. 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 was the next 
major legislation that was passed to protect people from genetic discrimination. This law 
restricts what large group health insurers are able to do with partial medical information 
(including genetic information). The law, in theory, prevents group insurers from using 
medical information to change rates and benefits, but it does not successfully protect 
consumers due to two main flaws: (1) The act does not prevent the insurer from using 
medical information to change the rates and benefits of the entire group and, (2) it does 
not apply to individual or small group insurance (Hudson, Holohan, & Collins, 2008). 
The Genetic Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) was originally conceived to 
prevent genetic discrimination against patients and employees by both insurance 
companies and employers. Under this law, health insurers cannot discriminate against 
asymptomatic people on the basis of genetic information. So even if a health insurer 
gains access to genetic information they cannot use the information to change premiums 
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or eligibility. Employers are also restricted from discriminating on the basis of genetic 
information. For instance, employers are prohibited from using any genetic information 
to influence decisions regarding hiring, firing, and job placement. Along with setting new 
restrictions on the usage of genetic information, the law also prevents health insurers or 
employers from requesting genetic information of an individual or their family members 
(Hudson et al., 2008). This provision is designed to prevent health insurers and employers 
from having access to genetic information and is necessary because it removes some of 
the potential for discrimination to occur. 
GINA has several limitations that limit its ability to completely prevent genetic 
discrimination. Violation of the law’s provisions only results in a civil punishment. This 
could allow companies to fire employees upon accidental discovery of a genetic 
condition in order to save costs in the long-term, assuming that the costs of treating the 
disease exceed the costs of the fine. Secondly, the provisions of GINA do not apply to 
life, disability, or long-term care insurance. Furthermore, GINA does not apply to 
businesses with fewer than 15 employees. Finally, GINA does not mandate that health 
insurers cover the tests and treatments needed by a genetic condition (Hudson et al., 
2008). Even after the passage of GINA, the most comprehensive anti-discrimination 
legislation yet, genetic discrimination continues to be a problem (Williams et al., 2010). 
Recently, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act passed by the Obama 
administration in 2010 eliminated discrimination based on preexisting conditions 
including symptomatic genetic conditions (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act). 
Although more aggressive than GINA, further comprehensive laws will be necessary to 
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ensure proper handling and protection of patient’s medical records and genetic 
information. 
3.2 Inter-generational Differences 
To the degree that public attitudes towards social issues change and evolve over 
time, one of the goals of our research was to investigate how age plays a factor in one’s 
decision to share genetic information. This effect is to be expected, given that parents 
(and other caregivers) represent the primary influence on the development of social 
attitudes and behaviors as dictated through social learning theory (Bandura & 
McClelland, 1977). A number of studies have identified the similarities and differences 
between the parental generation (ages 40+) and the student generation (ages 18-24). This 
may be a result of changing privacy beliefs over the years towards government and 
personal information privacy. Harris Interactive surveys have shown that privacy beliefs 
have evolved since the 1960s, which may explain attitude differences between 
generations. For example, earlier surveys about government surveillance indicate that 
people were generally against any type of wiretapping, which may constitute an invasion 
of privacy (Harris, 1974). However, more recent studies conducted in 2002 and 2003 
found that Americans were for increased surveillance by the government (Taylor, 2002; 
Taylor, 2003). In addition, Americans claimed that they trusted health providers to handle 
their personal information in a secure manner (Fricke, 2009). These types of privacy 
beliefs suggest that privacy is less of a concern to the younger generation. However, these 
types of beliefs do not always transfer to behavior.  
A general consensus exists that risk evaluation is similar between the two 
generations of interest. Both age groups express similar decision-making processes when 
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presented with situations with varying level of risk. A study found that young adults and 
the elderly have similar amounts of skepticism and trust in various risk-level situations. 
Their response times to risky situations were also quite similar between the age groups 
suggesting that elderly people are just as cognitively capable of making risk-based 
decisions as young adults (Ashman, Dror, Houlette, & Levy, 2003). A similar follow-up 
study by Ashman et al. confirmed these initial results. Elderly people respond to 
changing levels of risk similarly to young adults even when exposed to age stereotypes, 
like being primed with words like “senile” and “confused”. However, this study found 
that elderly people tended to take longer in making these decisions, contradicting results 
found by Ashman and colleagues (Ashman et al., 2003).  
A key difference between the two age groups lies in benefit evaluation. While risk 
perception may be similar, younger people tend to value benefits and rewards much 
higher than the older population. A study done on information disclosure by teenagers on 
the internet found that even small increases in potential benefits could drastically change 
risk behavior (Youn, 2005). This suggests that the younger population is more vulnerable 
to the allure of rewards and perhaps more insensitive to risk. We anticipate this type of 
behavior to be reflected in our survey of young adults. 
In addition to differences that may exist between attitudes across generations and 
distinctions between the parent and child generations, the interplay between a parent’s 
influence on a child and the traits identified above is significant. A number of studies on 
parent-child relationships have found that the parent plays a big role in shaping the 
child’s ideals, principles, and behavior. One study confirmed that parent’s attitudes were 
an important predictor in their child’s orientation of religion, politics, and gender roles 
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(Glass, Bengtson, & Dunham, 1986). Furthermore, they found that parental influence 
decreased as the child became older. This suggests that parental influence may diminish 
near the end of adolescence. 
Interestingly, a parent’s influence can sometimes be variable. There are several 
factors that can make a parent more or less influential. One of these factors is the nature 
of the relationship between the parents. Higher marital quality correlates with stronger 
transmission of attitudes and behavior from parent to child (Cunningham & Thornton, 
2006). Religious orientation and immigrant status also are two major factors that 
determine attitude transmission. First-generation immigrants and families that associate 
with a religion have greater transmission of behavior regarding social involvement than 
those who do not (Merz, Özeke-Kocabas, Oort, & Schuengel, 2009). We expect to see 
some sort of convergence of attitudes between our two age groups based on factors 
mentioned above such as the quality of the parent-child relationship and religious 
affiliation. 
 Another aspect that needs consideration is how these attitudes are transmitted 
from parent to child. The family unit has long been considered the primary factor in the 
socialization of children (Heilbrun Jr, 1965). Attitude transmission can generally be 
broken down into two models: direct transmission models and indirect transmission 
models. Direct transmission models are dictated by the social learning theory. Social 
learning theory asserts that people often rely on the actions of others in order to learn 
what to do (Bandura & McClelland, 1977). Essentially, a person’s behavior is learned 
through modeling by another source. This source can be parents, peers, or social media. It 
is important to note that the range of behavior included in social learning theory also 
	  
	  14	  
encapsulates prosocial behavior; voluntary behavior that is intended to benefit the 
population as a whole (Eisenberg, 2007). These actions may include volunteering, 
sharing, and donating. More research is necessary into whether this type of behavior is 
transmitted from parent to child, and if it is, how the behavior is transmitted.  
  As stated above, one of the methods of direct transmission of prosocial behavior 
involves role-modeling. Studies have shown that this is possible through a reward system, 
where parents commit prosocial acts and reward their children for joining with them. This 
is true for volunteering with religious organizations (Bekkers, 2007) and donating money 
to both secular and religious organizations (Willhelm, 2008). These studies have 
demonstrated that children will likely carry these behaviors on to adulthood because they 
were immersed in them as a child. There is significant survey evidence that backs this 
claim. In one study, people were asked whether they make charitable contributions. They 
were then asked whether they had family members in the past who had made charitable 
contributions. 74% of people who said they had family members make charitable 
contributions in the past currently make charitable contributions. This is in contrast to 
50% of people without charitable family who currently make charitable contributions 
(Hodgkinson and Weitzman, 1996). Similar results were seen in a study on blood 
donation. A moderate relationship was found between 23 parent-child pairs in the 
charitable behavior of giving blood (Peters, Ünür, Clark, & Schulze, 2004). However, it 
is unknown how much of this relationship, in all of these studies, is due to similarities in 
the traits of the parents and children rather than behavior modeling and transmission.  
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3.3 Gender, Income, Race and Health Care Decisions 
Prior research has identified a variety of individual level factors that can affect the 
healthcare decisions that individuals make. Socioeconomic status, gender and racial 
background are such factors. 
3.3.1 Income 
 Socioeconomic status as represented by income may exert some influence on the 
decision to share one’s genetic information. Numerous studies indicate that there is high 
correlation between health status and socioeconomic status. That is, greater wealth 
translates to better overall health status (Adler & Ostrove, 2006; Regnerus, Smith, & 
Sikkink, 1998). Furthermore, limitations imposed on low income individuals, such as 
lack of access to quality regular health care, leads to a greater hospitalization rate 
(Billings et al., 1993). Indeed, this suggests that lower income families often visit health 
care facilities and interact with health care professionals under more dire and stressful 
circumstances. Therefore, this higher frequency of exposure to the health care industry is 
tempered with lower overall health quality. If true, this may cause those in lower-income 
demographics to distrust the health care system and health care professionals; thus, 
leading to less willingness to cooperate with health care organizations and its personnel.  
  Further, lower socioeconomic status is also indicative lower college attainment 
rate and diminished college graduation rate (Sewell & Shah, 1967). Indeed, individuals 
who do not attend college may underestimate the importance of scientific research and, as 
a consequence, not be involved with the issue of genetic information disclosure at all. 
Hence, low socioeconomic status may lead to an under-appreciation for the necessity of 
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genetic information in medical research and lower the likelihood of being willing to 
donate one’s genetic information for the progress of science.  
3.3.2 Gender 
There is a general consensus in the psychology literature that there are significant 
gender differences in risk aversion and decision making (Eagly, 1995). However, these 
differences can arise in two different ways: inherent differences between genders and 
social and contextual influences. It is not yet clear which is predominant over the other, 
but differences are still present. Furthermore, the level of difference between genders has 
changed over the years. Early studies before 1980 recorded women as being more 
cautious, less confident, less aggressive, and having inferior leadership and problem 
solving skills (Johnson & Powell, 1994). Some of this may be attributed to the gender 
bias of the time period, yet there is some merit to how social roles can affect decision 
making in risky situations. 
A study done by Powell and Ansic examined this distinction between social 
context and inherent differences (Powell & Ansic, 1997). Specifically, they analyzed 
methods used by both genders when faced with financial decision-making. Their subject 
population consisted of students from a business school to maximize familiarity and 
experience with financial decisions. Through a computerized simulation, participants 
were asked to respond to different situations of financial risk. As they had predicted, 
females tended to be more risk averse than males. This suggests that the behavior stems 
from inherent differences rather than familiarity with financial situations. 
Females also tend to be more conservative in situations dealing with information 
collection and privacy. Results from a survey of 898 participants found that women and 
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men differ greatly in their attitudes toward information gathered online (Bartel Sheehan, 
2000). Women were more concerned with how the practice could negatively affect them 
while men are more concerned with how they can protect themselves after the fact. This 
type of behavior appears consistent with women’s tendency towards risk aversion. 
Disclosure of information is seen as a risk and the act is generally avoided. In relation to 
our study, this tendency might result in a lower willingness to disclose genetic 
information among women than men. 
3.3.3 Race 
Willingness to participate in genetic scientific research is associated with one’s 
ethnic background: research has shown racial and ethnic minorities are less willing to 
participate. A 2003 study found that trust in different components of the U.S. health care 
system differ by race (Boulware, Cooper, Ratner, LaVeist, & Powe, 2003). Specifically, 
non-Hispanic white respondents were more likely than those of another race to trust their 
physicians, hospitals, and health insurance plans (Boulware et al., 2003). In addition the 
analysis of the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey of 1999-2000 
determined that females and black participants were least likely to consent to give their 
blood samples to a national repository for genetic research (Mcquillan, Porter, Agelli, & 
Kington, 2003). 
Racial discrimination toward African Americans has been documented throughout 
the advancement of medical research. From the infamous U.S. Public Health Service 
Tuskegee syphilis experiment in 1932 to recent independent studies on perceived racial 
discrimination in health care studies, it is evident that there are racial disparities in the 
health care system and these problems stem from the history of discrimination in the 
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industry (Hausmann, Kressin, Hanusa, & Ibrahim, 2010). Evidently, racial background 
plays an important role in personal information sharing.   
3.4 Prosocial Motivation and Incentives 
The act of disclosing personal information voluntarily for a social cause is 
fundamentally a prosocial behavior.  One of the main drivers of prosocial behavior is the 
individual trait of altruism, originally defined by Auguste Comte as “a motivational state 
with the ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare” (Batson & Shaw, 1991; Homans, 
1958). Social exchange theory, developed in the 1950s by George Homans, suggests that 
humans make all decisions after determining the costs and benefits of the decision, which 
would imply that altruism only occurs if there are more incentives to act altruistically 
than consequences (Homans, 1958). The other theory underlying motivation for altruism 
is Batson’s empathy-altruism hypothesis, which argues that if one individual feels 
empathy towards a second, then the first will act altruistically regardless of the costs or 
benefits of acting in such a manner (Batson & Shaw, 1991). Currently, there is a debate 
in the academic psychology and sociology communities regarding which theory more 
accurately describes altruism.  
Although altruism is commonly regarded as a key motivation for prosocial 
behavior, studies have shown that there are other underlying motivations. In a study 
performed in Switzerland using game theory simulations, the researchers found that 
participants acted prosocially if they expected reciprocity from the other players (Gintis, 
Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003). This may be thought of as a quid pro quo: if a player trusts 
that others will participate then they will participate as well; if there is a lack of trust, then 
the process breaks down and very few people will participate or cooperate. Another study 
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done in the United States regarding why people donate blood found that social pressure is 
as strong a motivating factor, if not stronger, than any altruistic feelings in an 
individual(Condie, Warner, & Gillman, 1976). The same study also found that people 
who donated blood showed less of a tendency to “free ride” through the system than 
those people who choose not to donate. This indicates that the “free rider” explanation 
may be important in how people decided whether or not to participate. 
Recent studies investigating cooperation and altruism revealed that spontaneous 
decisions lead to greater frequency of selfless acts while delayed decisions lead to greater 
frequency of selfish acts (D.G. Rand, et al., 2012). This would suggest that instinct 
actually leads to greater altruism. Indeed, the author of this study suggests that the social 
advantage of cooperation can be the cause for this spontaneous altruism (D.G. Rand et 
al., 2012). 
Oftentimes, organizations in search of donors use monetary or other incentives to 
attract and convince individuals to donate. However, there has been evidence that shows 
that incentives can actually backfire in cases where altruistic motivations exist. In 1970, 
Richard Titmuss introduced a theory of motivational crowding, which suggests that 
monetary incentives attract fewer individuals overall because some individuals assume 
that others will donate and that their contribution is no longer needed (Titmuss, 1970). 
When this happens on a large scale, the end result is everyone thinks someone else will 
donate and nobody ends up donating at all (Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). Motivational 
crowding was originally applied to the concept of blood donation, but the authors showed 
how the theory also explained why financial incentives actually decreased support among 
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citizens in towns in Switzerland where important buildings with negative consequences 
(such as power plants or factories) were to be built.  
Interestingly, some recent experiments have demonstrated that reward as well as 
punishment driven by reputation can significantly increase cooperation in economic 
games ( Rand at al., & Nowak, 2009). Furthermore, the cooperation observed when 
rewards are given actually persists longer than cooperation observed when punishments 
are served (Rand et al., 2009). Of course, reputation is a major factor that exerts 
substantial influence on the social interaction and resulting cooperation of the participants 
(Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002). All in all, the current view of prosocial 
behaviors is still incomplete but it is tempered with fragmented understanding coming 
from numerous studies analyzing a vast number of theories on altruism and cooperation. 
We anticipate that our studies will reveal how perceptions of and actual altruistic acts that 
promote cooperation will factor into the context of genetic information sharing.  
3.5 Issue Involvement, Perceived Benefits, Perceived Risks, Risk Aversion 
  How comfortable do people feel about the sharing and distribution of their 
personal genetic information? Overall, people are willing to share their personal 
information given the right set of conditions. In this section, we will explore what these 
conditions may be. 
  Privacy concerns have risen to the forefront of the public’s recent discourse 
especially with the expansion of digitized social networks employing specific marketing 
techniques to mine both the informed and unaware user for personal information 
(Ashworth & Free, 2006). Research found that people are uncomfortable with the amount 
of information that for-profit companies are collecting about them (Nowak & Phelps, 
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1992). Some of this discomfort stems from the covert manner in which this data is 
collected and some from the nebulous purpose of the collection (Phelps, Nowak, & 
Ferrell, 2000). People may feel uncomfortable with sharing their private information with 
these for-profit and commercialized companies, but are they unwilling to disclose their 
personal genomic information to other organizations as well? Our research seeks to shed 
further light on this question. 
There are many factors that could further discourage individuals from 
participating in genetic testing. The theory of rational ignorance suggests that, in certain 
situations, people may wish to remain ignorant – knowledge may offer more drawbacks 
than benefits (Hite, 1997). For example, if a patient is at risk for a condition such as 
Huntington’s disease, which genetic testing can accurately identify, knowledge of a 
positive test may weigh heavily on the patient and seriously hinder his or her outlook on 
life. Without agreeing to genetic testing, widespread sharing of genetic information is 
unlikely. Even if such information exists, distrust in the security of information storage 
methods may further impede advances in personalized medicine. 
3.5.1 Institutions for Genetic Research: Biobanks 
In order to understand the motivations behind the privacy concerns of individuals, 
examining biobanks and their current practices in handling genetic information is useful. 
Although generally, consumers are distrustful of the corporate and government collection 
of genetic information, they are more willing to disclose the same information to 
biobanks, “the organized collection of biological samples and associated data” (Cambon-
Thomsen, 2004). We discuss the public opinions towards biobanks, and issues of concern 
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people have when faced with the choice to share their private information with these 
research collections.  
According to one finding, people’s perceived risk and discomfort in disclosing 
personal genomic information to biobanks decreased to the point of disappearing given a 
small monetary incentive. Close to 60% of participants would donate to biobanks after a 
monetary incentive, regardless of their preconceived reservations towards privacy 
(Kaufman, 2009). 
The publics’ attitude towards donations to biobanks is positive when individuals 
are educated and well-informed citizens. In general, education increases an individual’s 
awareness of critical issues in their environment and they may be more engaged with 
public debates. A Swedish study found that well-informed potential donors were high 
consenters to entrusting their genetic information for genetic research. Approximately 
86% of the Swedish public was willing to donate a tissue sample for research purposes 
while only 42% of the American general public consented to do the same (Kettis-
Lindblad, Ring, Viberth, & Hansson, 2006). Swedish citizens are some of the best-
informed in the European Union about biotechnology, and they also have a high 
willingness to donate – this poses the question of if the American public were to be more 
informed about biotechnology, would the willingness to disclose for this group rise in 
numbers? We see that the more involved the individual is with the issue at hand, the more 
willing he is to donate. 
Since biobanks appear to be the most promising institutional arrangement for 
personal genetic information collection, much discussion has occurred about what kind of 
rules and regulations must be implemented in order to ensure the safest experience for 
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donors to these biobanks. Of particular interest is the privacy of the donors and the 
relation between donor and biological material. Should donations be linked to a donor? 
Should donations be completely independent of the donor? How often does the donor 
have to approve the use of his or her genetic information? Several schools of thought 
have arisen to address these general questions. 
 Legality and the moral imperative of attaining informed consent forces biobanks 
to contact donors and obtain express permission for each and every test performed with 
donated material. The basis for this idea comes from the outcome of the Nuremberg 
trials, with the conviction that “any risk associated with a research protocol must be 
accepted on a voluntary basis,” (Hansson, Dillner, Bartram, Carlson, & Helgesson, 2006). 
On the other side of the spectrum is the idea of continuous consent. Under this kind of 
consent, individuals will disclose personal information to biobanks with the agreement 
that the information may be used for any biomedical research in the future (Elger & 
Caplan, 2006). Donors in this scenario will not be re-contacted for future use of their 
material. Though the two ideas discussed here represent the two extremes of consent in 
biobank research, most biobanks are following paths somewhere between the two. 
In addition to the issue of consent, engaging patients more deeply with the 
processes involved in medical research is important for advancement in the field of 
medicine and research and development. Patients can be involved in various ways, from 
being elected members of review boards, to having the option of an opt-out mechanism 
(Douglas, van El, Radstake, van Teeffelen, & Cornel, 2012). 
According to the De Gruyter study of Dried Blood Spot (DBS) Cards, patient 
involvement should be present throughout the entire research process, from conception to 
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evaluation. This particular study surveyed American parents and found that parents were 
more willing to have their baby’s blood spots collected for research if they were asked for 
permission, which is an act of participation. Another American study conducted in 
Michigan concluded that the more specific the description of the object of research that 
was provided, the more support and participation from individuals was obtained In order 
for a biobank to be maximally useful, the information it captures must be available for 
access over a long period of time, potentially over several years and possibly even 
decades. Results suggest that storage of DBS information over time does not have much 
support, and storage for over a decade is unsupported, even for research purposes. 
(Douglas et al., 2012).  
Over the years, biobanks have implemented various structural mechanisms to 
collect, store, and process the reservoir of genomic information. But it appears that 
people’s willing to disclose is not strictly dependent upon the operational structure of a 
given biobank. It has even been found that people are willing to donate without proper 
informed consent or even full knowledge of how their information will be used (Hoeyer, 
Olofsson, Mjorndal, & Lynoe, 2005). 
Overall, it is evident that individual disclosure concerns exist. However, they 
seem to be potentially be overcome when organizations collect the information privately 
and conscientiously amongst a well-informed public.  
3.6 Social Stigma, Number of Diseases, Positive and Negative Health Emotions 
Individuals may harbor a variety of beliefs about the consequences of having a 
genetic condition that are likely to influence how willing they are for the condition to be 
broadly known. In addition, there are variations in the health status of individuals that 
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could generate specific behaviors in regard to health related decisions. We discuss these 
influences next. 
3.6.1 Social Stigma and Genetic Determinism  
Social stigma toward persons with physical, mental, behavioral and genetic 
deviance from societal norms causes these individuals to struggle with the negative labels 
given to them (Ablon, 2002). Having such a negative label attached to their identity 
encourages people to act according to how they are perceived by society.  
Stigma not only affects people’s personal and professional life, it also impacts 
their health and medical care decisions. During the final stages of the Human Genome 
Project, critics brought up the risk of social stigma deterring future participation from 
gene donors. The fear of stigma if this private information is leaked could prevent people 
with genetic markers for certain diseases from being willing to participate in genetic 
research (Sanbar, 2007). This was evident during the initial outbreak years of HIV and 
AIDS, individuals with HIV were highly stigmatized in society; the government and 
health care officials framed negative connotations around venereal diseases with the 
intention of discouraging risky sexual behavior, but these public dialogues also 
influenced the HIV community to be less willing to disclose their status especially to 
health care providers (Madru, 2003). Even in the present, the social stigma toward 
sexually transmitted infection tests discourages college students from seeking testing, due 
to fear of being perceived as an infected person (Barth, Cook, Downs, Switzer, & 
Fischhoff, 2002).  
Social stigma arises from group mentality that has been documented since the 
Middle Ages. This concept is called “quarantine mentality” which occurs when healthy 
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society wishes to distance itself from individuals who are “ill” or abnormal (Markel, 
1992). People’s first instinct is to stop the spread of disease or infection and, in the 
process, neglecting those who need service and medical attention. This mentality persists 
through modern medicine even when many diseases are not transferable from person to 
person (Crandall & Moriarty, 2011). As a result, having a disease made public can place 
a person in a very dire situation. All of the above studies suggest that should there be risk 
of information leakage, avoiding to disclose of genetic information when having a 
disease or risk of one could be a serious consideration. 
 In addition to how stigma surrounding genetic disease is shaped by others, it is 
important to consider how someone would perceive a genetic disease they suffer 
themselves. This could have great implications on decisions based around that genetic 
disease. Genetic determinism, within the context of behavior psychology, is a belief that 
individual action and behavior is determined solely by genetic makeup. Furthermore, 
behavior and status cannot be changed by individual influence or control. Initially, there 
was a strong belief that the media’s portrayal of genetic status being deterministic 
contributes to this way of thought in the public (Condit et al., 2009) However, there has 
been much empirical evidence to suggest that the attitude of the general public in 
Western nations tends to lie towards the middle, acknowledging the influence of both 
genes and the environment in shaping who they are (Hubbard and Wald, 2003) 
(Rothman, 1998). Despite this, the belief of genetic determinism to some degree can still 
have an effect on how people perceive genetic conditions. For example, 
hypercholesterolemia is a disease caused by a combination of genetic predisposition and 
diet. A study done by Senior et al. (1999) found that when respondents perceived the 
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disease as more genetic than lifestyle-based, they saw it as more uncontrollable and 
threatening. Furthermore, in another study conducted by Senior et al. (2000), presenting 
conditions like arthritis and heart disease with genetics as a possible cause, lead to them 
being perceived as less preventable. In relation to our study, we may see effects of 
genetic determinism whenever people self-report themselves or their family as having a 
history of disease. They may show greater negative health emotions than those who do 
not. Additionally, this may be another deterrence to donating genetic information.  
3.6.2 Positive and Negative Health Emotions 
 Positive and negative health emotions refer to how a person feels about their own 
health. In psychology, this experience of emotion towards oneself is known as affect. 
Positive affect, within the context of our study, is when a person has an optimistic 
outlook on their health while negative affect or negative emotion means they have a 
pessimistic outlook on their health. Research has shown that positive affect can have 
benefits in both a patient’s health and the quality of care received. Evidence has shown 
that positive affect is correlated with lower morbidity and increased longevity in the older 
population (Pressman & Cohen, 2005). Furthermore, exciting the body with bouts of 
positive affect triggers physiological arousal in immune and cardiovascular function. 
Interestingly, this suggests that a person who feels better about their health may be better 
able to maintain their health. This can have a major effect on perception of risk when 
donating genetic information. In general, there is a delicate balancing act between risk 
and benefit in decision-making. Healthier well-being may lean towards a greater risk 
when deciding to donate information.  
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 Following the previous statement, it seems logical to conclude that having 
negative health emotions would lead to poorer health and a greater incentive to donate 
genetic information (or a lesser incentive to donate if negative health emotions translate 
to belief of conditions which could then have a negative effect through stigma). However, 
this may not be the case. Negative emotions about health can lead to denial of harmful or 
life-threatening situations (DeNeve, 1999), thereby reducing the likelihood of donating 
genetic information.  
3.7 Trust in People and Institutions 
In a world completely dependent on constant social interactions, trust exists to 
reduce uncertainty and simplify the social world (Luhmann, Davis, Raffan, & Rooney, 
1979). “If, in a given situation, the social actors involved are in a position to assess the 
consequences of their decisions in very exact and reliable terms, trust will no longer be 
needed” (Bachmann, 2001). But since this is not the case, trust reduces uncertainty by 
fostering cooperation, dependability, and confidence between individuals. Paradoxically, 
the perception of these dependable and positive characteristics must be present in order to 
promote trustworthiness. Indeed, trustworthiness is often seen as the “perceived goodness 
or morality” of an individual or institution (Fogg & Tseng, 1999). Therefore, increasing 
trust between individuals or between individuals and institutions can fundamentally 
change the interactions between the two parties such that cooperation and willingness to 
endure risk will occur more frequently. 
Allowing trust to flourish, especially towards institutions and companies, depends 
on several factors that would improve one’s perception of their honesty and integrity. The 
past records, actions, and images of any given institution are important in promoting trust 
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in their target audience and customers (Shneiderman, 2000). This suggests that 
governmental entities and not-for-profit organizations would invoke more trust than their 
for-profit counterparts because their past records and actions are often made available to 
the public. Whereas, for-profit companies such as insurance companies would be less 
willing to disclose their past records and this may lead to lower trust between them and 
their constituency.  
Further, any given social interaction will be interspersed with both trust and 
power (Bachmann, 2001). Both are able to reduce uncertainty and simplify the social 
world. However, if one party possesses more power than the other, it may decrease the 
proliferation of trust, as trust would no longer be necessary to promote cooperation. 
Finally, trust may not be possible if the associated risk is “seen as intolerably high, and 
social actors might not be able to find enough good reasons to base a relationship on the 
assumption that a potential trustee will behave trustworthily” (Bachmann, 2001). In the 
context of sharing one’s personal information, if the associated risk of information 
privacy is too high, the likelihood of information disclosure to institutions perceived as 
less trustworthy would be lower.  
In summary, our consideration of the current literature across numerous 
disciplines regarding the complex issue of genetic information reveals a host of factors 
that may potentially be at play. A broad examination of the current legal environment 
suggests that public policy is still evolving in order to effectively address the increasingly 
unique problem of genetic information privacy and security. Against the backdrop of the 
legal environment, individual’s willingness to contribute their genetic information for 
research is evidently influenced by a multitude of factors. Such factors can be broadly 
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organized into specific categories. These categories include demographics, information 
privacy, perception of well-being, trust in people and organizations, and altruistic versus 
incentivized behaviors. A thorough consideration of every variable is necessary to 

























4. Study 1: Survey 
4.1 Theoretical Background 
Based on the literature review in Chapter 3, we developed constructs for the 
factors influencing an individual’s willingness to disclose personal genetic information to 
private and public stakeholders for the purpose of medical and genetic research. A 
conceptual model of the independent variables predicted to influence willingness to 
disclose was generated as shown in Figure 8.1.1. Our independent variables include five 
categories of factors: Demographics, Generalized Traits, Genetic Information Sharing 
Beliefs, Health Status Variables, and Trust in Institutions. We measured the effect of 
these independent variables on student willingness to disclose with and without parent 
predictors and on parents’ willingness to disclose. Finally, a binary question measured 
student and parent desire to be informed of their risk of genetic disease after testing. 
Four research questions guided the design of the survey. First, what are the factors 
that are significantly related to an individual’s willingness to disclose genetic information 
to different stakeholders? Second, are their inter-generational differences in the 
influential factors across two generations: students and their parents? Third, what is the 
effect of parent’s perceptions and attitudes on their children’s decisions? And finally, 
what factors affect student and parent generations’ desire to be informed of the results of 
a genetic test that revealed the existence of a genetic disease? 
4.1.1 Research Methodology 
  We conducted two cross-sectional surveys of students and parents. With the 
exception of one section measuring the degree of parental influence through 16 additional 
questions in the student survey, the student and parent surveys were identical. The 
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surveys were designed using validated scales from prior work to the extent they are 
available, for all research constructs. We conducted a pilot study prior to the main study. 
In this section we describe the variables included in the survey, how they were measured, 
and present results from the pilot.  
4.1.2 Dependent Variables 
The survey conceptual model can be found in Appendix 8.1.1 and a summary of 
all research constructs and their descriptions is provided in Appendix 8.1.2.The first 
dependent variable in this study was measured by a person’s willingness to disclose 
genetic information to different stakeholders. It is the arithmetic average of the responses 
to three items: the likelihood, probability, and willingness to donate to the specified 
stakeholder. These items were measured on a 1-7 Likert scale with anchors Unlikely/Not 
Probable/Unwilling to Likely/Probable/Willing. These stakeholders included 
government, insurance companies, pharmaceutical companies, and health care 
professionals. For the second dependent variable, respondents were asked if they would 
choose to be informed if a hypothetical test revealed they were at risk for a genetic 
disease. This was measured on a binary scale where 0 meant “choose to not be informed” 
and 1 meant “choose to be informed”.  
4.1.3 Independent Variables 
  The independent variables were categorized into five conceptual blocks: 
demographic variables, generalized traits, genetic information sharing beliefs, health 
status variables, and trust in institutions. The demographic variables include factors 
shown in prior research to influence health related decisions. We considered gender, 
income, and ethnicity. The generalized traits block included constructs to measure broad 
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propensities and attitudes of individuals that are likely to be relevant to the genetic 
information disclosure decision. Constructs measured included warm-heartedness and 
altruism (WHA), trust in people (TIP), and information privacy (IP). The warm-hearted 
and altruism (WHA) construct measured one’s level of concern for the welfare of others. 
Trust in people (TIP) measured one’s trust in new acquaintances and strangers, as well as 
the contingencies of trusting others. Information privacy (IP) measured one’s concern for 
identify theft as well as their tendency to safeguard their personal health and financial 
information.  
Additionally, respondents were asked questions regarding factors that prior 
research has suggested would have an effect on one’s willingness to share personal 
genetic information. These genetic information sharing beliefs variables included issue 
involvement (II), genetic information privacy concerns (GIPC), perceived risks (PR), and 
perceived benefits (PB). Issue involvement tested the subject’s interest in relevant issues, 
genetic information privacy concerns addressed risks involved with the electronic storage 
of data, and perceived risks and benefits outlined the potential advantages or dangers 
associated with genetic information sharing. Items for the perceived risks and benefits 
constructs were developed specifically for this study, drawing on prior literature. 
A fourth block of independent variables measured health status variables. 
Positive health and emotions (PHE) and negative health and emotions (NHE) revealed 
how participants felt about their own mental and physical health. Social stigma (SS) 
referred to the participants’ perception of the social opinions regarding issues related to 
their health. Number of diseases measured family history of disease.  
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Finally, trust in institutions to which genetic information could be hypothetically 
donated in the survey included government, health care professionals, insurance 
companies, and pharmaceutical companies. We measured an individual’s trust in each of 
the four institutions. Trust was measured in two sub-dimensions: perceived benevolence 
and perceived integrity.  
4.2 Survey Methodology 
The populations for the survey are two distinct generations: parents, in the age 
group of 35-70, and college students aged 18-24. We recruited survey samples from 
students enrolled at the University of Maryland and their parents.  
4.2.1 Subject Recruitment and Incentives 
Students were recruited to complete the online survey via email using a randomly 
generated listserv of 5000 undergraduate and 3000 graduate students at the University of 
Maryland, College Park, which was generated for our research by the university’s Office 
of the Registrar. At the conclusion of the survey, students were offered the opportunity to 
forward the survey to one of their parents. If the selected parent completed the survey, the 
student and parent responses were matched with a randomly generated ID that contained 
no identifiable information; its sole purpose was to allow the two survey responses to be 
linked. 
Students received a $5 Amazon gift card for completing the survey and an 
additional $5 if their parent completed the survey as well. The distribution of reward was 
done by the survey company, Qualtrics, that hosted the survey. 
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4.2.2 Survey Procedures 
The student and parent surveys were accessible through an email link sent out to 
participants via the randomized listserv. The survey was available online for five days of 
data collection before participation in the study was closed due to the sufficient sample 
size acquired. Survey completion time was approximately 25 and 30 minutes for student 
participants and adult participants, respectively. 
The participants were first asked to read and accept the consent form and sign the 
University Honor Code to ensure honesty and accuracy of data. Once confirmed, the 
survey proceeded to a page with the purpose of the research as well as general directions 
to guide the participants through the survey. The participants were then asked a number 
of Likert-scaled questions and binary questions dealing with genetic information and 
information privacy in addition to demographics questions. The student and parent 
surveys (Appendix 8.3.1) were identical except that the former contained 15 additional 
items (questions 150-164) to assess the degree of parental influence. While we composed 
and validated select survey questions, many of the questions were adapted from the thesis 
“IT is Risky Business: Three Essays on Ensuring Reliability, Security, and Privacy in 
Technology-Mediated Settings” (Anderson, 2010).  
4.2.3 Risks, Confidentiality, and Benefits 
While subjects may have experienced some hesitation about sharing their 
opinions about potentially sensitive subjects such as genetic information, subjects faced 
no risks greater than sharing unidentifiable demographic information. Participation in the 
study was entirely voluntary. Participants’ responses were kept confidential in a 
password-protected section of the Qualtrics software and only the researchers of this 
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study had access to the information. Since no identifiable information was obtained, there 
was no risk associated with our research. Further, subjects were informed that no direct 
benefits would result from taking the survey other than improved understanding of 
attitudes towards genetic information sharing. 
4.2.4 Pilot Study 
Prior to administering the main survey, we conducted a pilot study to ensure that 
the survey instrument was reliable and valid, and to address any issues with the 
procedure. Our pilot survey was administered to a convenience sample of freshman 
undergraduate students enrolled in the GEMS100 Freshman Honors Colloquium: 
Introduction to Gemstone. A paper copy of the survey was administered and 10-12 
students were seated in a classroom at a time and they were asked to complete the survey. 
Respondents were asked to leave comments and feedback regarding the design, 
wording, and instructions of the survey. We assessed the properties of the scales using 
factor analysis and reliability analysis (all procedures were performed in SPSS). After 
administration of the pilot study, it was clear a dependent variable measuring one’s 
decision to be informed of their risk involving the genetic disease was needed. The 
following question was added after the pilot study: 
Unless you specifically choose NOT to be informed, if testing reveals that you are 
at risk for a genetic disease, you would be informed about it. 
○ I would choose to be informed if I am at risk for a genetic disease 
○ I would choose NOT to be informed if I am at risk for a genetic disease 
 Since the pilot study was not administered through the Qualtrics software, 
respondents’ answers were kept locked in the principal investigator’s office. 
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4.2.5 Main Study 
At the conclusion of the pilot, the entire survey was put online with the help of 
Qualtrics, an online-based survey hosting and survey analysis company. Qualtrics 
allowed us to create our survey on their website and ensure that respondents had 
completed all of the items on the survey before continuing. In addition to simply hosting 
the survey online for ease of access, Qualtrics performed two important functions. First, it 
allowed students to send a link for the parent survey to a user-specified email address. 
Thus, students were able to ask their parents to complete the survey, and Qualtrics 
generated a random ID that linked the student and parent responses without any other 
identifying information. Second, Qualtrics had begun piloting a new feature that would 
allow Amazon gift cards of a specified value to be given to survey respondents upon the 
completion of the survey. This allowed for $5 Amazon gift cards to be distributed 
without the need for collecting emails from respondents and linking those emails to 
specific responses. 
 Due to the fact that Qualtrics was starting their own pilot program of distributing 
Amazon gift cards, they had not yet implemented measures to prevent the same 
respondent from completing the survey multiple times. This became an issue with the 
parent survey responses as discussed in section 4.3.2.  
4.3 Analysis and Results 
In this section we describe the results of the pilot study, including how the final 
sample for analysis was constructed. This is followed by a discussion of the procedures 
used for scale validation. We used multivariate linear and logistic regression for our 
analyses. Results are presented for these analyses.  
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4.3.1 Pilot study and initial scale validation 
 Most constructs on the survey were measured using multi-item scales. After the 
pilot survey was conducted, we performed a reliability analysis to ensure that the items in 
a scale were logically assessing the same conceptual construct. We also performed a 
factor analysis to determine if the scales exhibited convergent and discriminant validity 
and if any refinement was needed. Items were removed from constructs if they were 
answered differently than the other questions contained in the construct, ensuring that all 
of the items in a construct represented the same underlying concept. 
In order for the variables to be valid for analysis, the questions included in each 
construct had to be strongly associated. We did not perform factor analysis on all the 
constructs due to the small sample size of the pilot. This analysis was only preliminary 
and was done to ensure the survey was ready for the main study. 
 While the number of respondents included in the pilot study was not large enough 
for the results to be significant, the results we observed were consistent with what we 
expected. These results also helped ensure that the survey was ready for the actual run. 
An important finding from the pilot was that Willingness to Disclose to Insurance and 
Willingness to Disclose to Pharmaceuticals factored together. This indicated that 
respondents felt the same way about donating to insurance companies or pharmaceutical 
companies, and therefore, we combined these two institutions in our final analysis. 
4.3.2 Data Tampering  
 After receiving our final results, Qualtrics notified our team that there were 
multiple parent survey results from the same IP addresses. This indicated that there had 
been instances when participants took the parent survey more than once. In order to 
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remove these invalid responses, we analyzed the IP addresses of all parent survey 
attempts. When an IP address appeared more than once, we removed all responses 
associated with it. We then cross referenced the IP addresses from the parent survey with 
the student survey results to remove the results of the students who also took the parent 
survey. The removal of these flagged results ensured that all survey results used in our 
analysis were valid. 
4.3.3 Sample Representativeness and Response Bias 
We wanted to generalize our results to all undergraduate and graduate college 
students ages 18-24 and parents of such populations. To establish the representativeness 
of the sample with respect to the national population, we compared the demographics of 
the both the student and parent respondents to the University of Maryland, College Park 
demographics and National Census data. Demographics captured in the survey include 
sex, age, marital status, race, religion, political beliefs, education level, and income. 
Other factors in consideration included computer usage, computer skills, and history of 
chronic and genetic illness in family. However, there was limited data to compare to with 
the overall University of Maryland demographics. 
The pool of respondents included undergraduate college students (ages 18-24) at 
the University of Maryland, College Park and their parents (ages 35-70) which comprised 
our adult population. Our student sample was fairly similar to the population of 
undergraduate students at the University of Maryland. While our sample was 61% 
Caucasian, the University’s population is 57% Caucasian. Our sample is 6% African 
American compared with 13% for the university population. Finally, the Asian 
population in our sample was 24% compared with 15% at the University. Our male 
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percentage was 50.1% while the University male population is 52%. Finally all other 
demographics published by the university were within 1% of our demographic 
information. Data was only analyzed for released demographic information from the 
university. This data is shown in Appendix 8.1.5. 
The survey student sample was not as similar to national demographic 
information. Asians were overrepresented (24% sample versus 4.8% national) and 
underrepresented in Whites (61% versus 72%) and African Americans (6% versus 
12.6%) (2010 Census Data). However, the gender breakdown was very similar to the 
national split (50.1% males in sample versus 49.2% nationally).  
Unfortunately, the parent survey was less nationally representative than the 
student sample was. Asians were overrepresented (33% versus 4.8%) while Whites and 
African Americans were underrepresented (56% and 3.5% respectively). In addition, the 
gender breakdown was not congruent. (37.6% males in sample versus 49.2% nationally). 
This may be due both to the smaller parent sample size and the nature of the survey 
design where students had to recruit their parents to complete the survey for them.  
Out of a potential 8,000 student responses, only 379 unique student responses 
were received after purifying the data, yielding a response rate of 4.73%. The potential 
parent sample size was approximately 16,000 parents, however after removing tampered 
results only 85 records remained, yielding a 0.5% response rate. Neither of these rates is 
very large, so Wave Analysis was run to detect non-response bias (Rogelberg & Stanton, 
2007). Using a 2-sample T test to detect if surveys completed earlier had statistically 
different results from surveys completed later, we found that there was no statistically 
significant difference for any dependent variable for either parents or students. 
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 4.3.4 Scale Validation 
After cleaning the data for the main study as described previously, we ran the 
same reliability and validation tests and obtained similar findings. As was seen in the 
pilot, the factor analysis showed that insurance and pharmaceutical industries grouped 
into one dependent variable, so we settled on three final willingness to disclose variables: 
government (WDG), health professionals (WDHP), and insurance and pharmaceuticals 
(WDIP). Summary statistics for the variables can be found in Appendix 8.1.3 – 8.1.4. 
Reliability analyses and correlation tables can be found in appendices 8.1.7 – 8.1.11. 
Items that did not correlate well with the constructs were not used in the final analysis 
4.3.5 Results 
 We used regression analysis to answer the research questions. Three regression 
models were used to analyze the impact of a variety of factors on the willingness of 
students, parents, and students with parent predictors to disclose their genetic information 
to the government, health care providers, and the insurance and pharmaceutical industry. 
In this section we present the results of the student regression first, followed by the parent 
regression, and we conclude with a regression of student results with parent predictors.  
4.3.5.1 Student Sample Results for Willingness to Disclose 
Results for willingness to disclose for the student sample can be found in 
Appendix 8.1.12. Increases in income were inversely related with disclosing to the 
government. African Americans were less likely disclose to all three institutions: the 
government, health professionals, and insurance and pharmaceutical industries. Warm-
hearted altruism was positively associated with disclosing to health professionals but 
negatively associated with disclosing to insurance and pharmaceutical industries. Issue 
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involvement was positively associated with disclosure to the government. Genetic 
privacy concerns were strongly significantly negatively associated with all three 
dependent variables but perceived benefits were positively associated with all three. 
Perceived risk was significantly negatively associated only with insurance and 
pharmaceuticals. Social stigma was negatively associated with government and 
significantly negatively associated with health professionals. Positive health and 
emotions were positively associated with willingness to disclose to insurance and 
pharmaceuticals. Trust in each institution was strongly positively related to willingness to 
disclose to the same institution. 
4.3.5.2 Parent Sample Results for Willingness to Disclose 
 Information Privacy was negatively associated with willingness to disclose to 
government and very significantly negatively associated with willingness to disclose to 
insurance and pharmaceuticals (Appendix 8.1.13). Warm-hearted altruism was strongly 
significantly positively associated to disclosure to health professionals while issue 
involvement was negatively associated with insurance and pharmaceuticals. Genetic 
privacy concerns were negatively associated with health professionals in addition to 
insurance and pharmaceuticals. Increases in both the number of diseases and positive 
health and emotions increased the likelihood of willingness to donate to health 
professionals. Negative health and emotions were positively associated with insurance 
and pharmaceuticals. Further, trust in government and trust in health professionals were 




4.3.5.3 Results for Parental Variables on Student Willingness to Disclose  
 The parental variables that were associated with the student willingness to 
disclose variable can be found in Appendix 8.1.14. The adjusted r-squared value was 0 
for government and negative for insurance and pharmaceutical companies. Because the 
adjusted r-squared values compensate for the addition of independent variables to the 
model, the zero and negative values were expected. Parental genetic privacy concern was 
negatively associated with a student’s disclosure to insurance and pharmaceuticals. 
Parents’ perceptions of social stigma associated with genetic disease were negatively 
associated with student’s willingness to disclose to government and insurance and 
pharmaceuticals. Finally, parent trust in health professionals was very significantly 
positively associated with student willingness to disclose to the government and health 
professionals.  
4.3.5.4 Student Decision to be Informed Results 
 The association of different variables with student’s decision to be informed can 
be found in Appendix 8.1.15. Larger scores for information privacy increased the 
likelihood of choosing to be informed. Social stigma increased the likelihood while the 
number of diseases in the family decreased the likelihood. Negative health and emotions 
was negatively associated with the student’s decision to be informed (Appendix 8.1.15). 
It was the only significant relationship in the regression.  
4.3.5.5 Parent Decision to be Informed Results 
 The table that described the associations between parental variables and parental 
decision to be informed can be found in Appendix 8.1.15. Information privacy was 




4.4. Discussion of Findings Related to Willingness to Disclose 
Our analyses offered answers to the research questions guiding the survey: first, 
what are the factors that are significantly related to an individual’s willingness to disclose 
genetic information to different stakeholders? Second, are there inter-generational 
differences in the influential factors across two generations: students and their parents? 
Third, what is the effect of a parent’s perceptions and attitudes on their children’s 
decisions? And finally, what factors affect students’ and parents’ desire to be informed of 
the results of a genetic test that reveal the existence of a genetic disease?  
We first discuss the regression results for both parent and student willingness to 
disclose genetic information to the three stakeholders: government, health professionals, 
and insurance and pharmaceutical companies. The discussion is grouped into the five 
classes of independent variables: Demographics, Generalized Traits, Genetic Information 
Privacy Concerns, Health Status Variables, and Trust in Institutions. Interpretation of the 
student and parent regressions is followed by regression results for parental influence 
where students’ willingness to disclose was regressed on parent predictors. Finally, we 
discuss the binary logistic regression for student and parent desire to be informed of 
potential risks identified during genetic testing. 
4.4.1 Demographics 
Our study included three key demographic variables that have been associated 
with a range of attitudes and behavior in prior work: gender, income, and race. Men and 
women have been found to behave differently in a variety of settings; for example, in 
situations involving financial risk, females are less likely to participate regardless of the 
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circumstances (Powell & Ansic, 1997). Due to the financial risks involved with sharing 
genetic information, we expected that females would be less willing to share their genetic 
information than males; however, we found no significant difference (Appendix 8.1.12). 
One explanation for the lack of significance for gender is that sharing genetic information 
is not considered a financial risk by individuals simply because the financial costs and 
benefits are not always clear. For example, some individuals may believe that current law 
protects them sufficiently from genetic discrimination and that the risk is non-existent. If 
the decision is not viewed as a financial risk, participants would not be expected to act 
differently based on their gender. However, this result should be interpreted with caution 
because it could also reflect a low level of general understanding of the costs and benefits 
of sharing genetic information. If this is the case, then gender differences could be 
expected to emerge over time as the public becomes more informed. 
Although higher income has been associated with decreased confidence in 
government (Peters et al., 2004), the influence of income on confidence in non-
governmental groups, such as insurance companies, pharmaceutical companies, and the 
medical community is less clear. We find that among students, higher income has an 
inverse relationship with willingness to share genetic information with the government. 
Unexpectedly, there were no significant effects for the parent sample or the other 
institutions. Non-significance for income of parents could be due to the small sample size 
or some other unknown reason. The lack of significance for the other institutions was not 
unexpected, as prior research has not indicated income would affect confidence in these 
groups. The relationship between income and willingness to contribute to stakeholders 
other than government merits further investigation. 
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African American students were unwilling to disclose their genetic information to 
any of the institutions included in the study. This result, while perhaps surprising in the 
second decade of the 21st century, is nonetheless consistent by the history of African 
Americans in the United States where African Americans have experienced centuries of 
systemic and institutionalized discrimination. Examples of this include incidents such as 
the Tuskegee experiments purposefully harming African Americans, all the way back to 
slavery issues (Gamble, 1997). While current levels of institutionalized discrimination are 
orders of magnitude less than historical levels, the distrust engendered by this 
mistreatment may still be evident, resulting in a lower willingness to disclose potentially 
sensitive information.  
Due to the potential health benefits of sharing genetic information, this finding is 
somewhat disturbing. It may take a long time before African Americans trust institutions 
with their personal genetic information. Therefore, medical advances based on shared 
genetic number risks may have a reduced impact on the African American community. 
Since a small amount of African Americans were surveyed, this relationship should be 
reevaluated with a larger sample size of African Americans in order to strengthen the 
evidence base. 
4.4.2 Generalized Traits 
 Our study included three generalized traits and attitudes that can 
potentially influence an individual’s willingness to disclose: trust in people, information 
privacy concerns, and warm-hearted altruism. In general, we expected a positive 
association between willingness to donate their genetic information and an individual’s 
tendency to being warm-hearted and altruistic. Altruistic individuals are concerned about 
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the welfare of others, without expecting or desiring any sort of pay-off for themselves. By 
donating their genetic information, people are allowing researchers to gather more 
information, which could further the social cause of personalized health care. 
  We found a significant positive relationship between altruism and willingness to 
disclose for the parent sample only for the stakeholder of insurance and pharmaceutical 
companies. Surprisingly, when examining the student results, the relationship is negative: 
altruistic students are significantly less likely to donate their information to insurance and 
pharmaceutical companies. 
This finding may be an outcome of the fact that students scored themselves as 
being more altruistic than they really are. Many people would like to believe they are 
altruistic, especially when they are directly asked. Such inaccurate self-ratings would 
help to make students feel better about themselves regardless of how altruistic they may 
be. If this occurred consistently throughout the survey, the average score and the 
distribution of scores for a student’s self-reported altruism would be skewed towards 
being more altruistic. If the true average of students’ altruism were lower than the sample 
average, the association between altruism and willingness to disclose would weaken. This 
appears to have happened when compared with the parent results, as the coefficient for 
this variable is much smaller for the students as compared to the parents. Additionally, if 
the students consistently scored themselves too high, the sample average may influence 
willingness to disclose in a negative way. For example, people who actually are not 
altruistic, but respond that they are moderately altruistic will be less likely to donate their 
genetic information, causing the coefficient for the construct to become negative. 
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A second explanation for the discrepancy between students and parents is that 
students may believe that insurance and pharmaceutical companies will not use their 
information in an appropriate way. If students perceive the companies as using their 
information in a harmful way, or at least in a way that is beneficial only to the companies, 
they may not be willing to donate their information. In this light, they may not donate 
their information in order to prevent another group from misusing it. In this case, students 
may actually be as altruistic as they report, but simply are shielding the misuse of their 
information by not donating at all. This could then cause a difference in the association 
between the students and the parents. 
Finally, for both students and parents, results indicate that being warm-hearted or 
altruistic does not influence willingness to disclose to government or health care 
professionals. Perhaps these stakeholders are viewed as less threatening to privacy 
violations than insurance and pharmaceutical companies, thereby rendering the effect of 
altruism insignificant.  
Privacy concern originates from multiple sources and is a function of the 
experiences an individual has with personal and sensitive information over time. A 
general concern for information privacy may affect attitudes towards genetic information 
as well. Drawing on findings in prior literature, initially, we hypothesized that a greater 
concern for privacy information would be associated with decreased willingness to share 
genetic information. After all, the most effective method of protecting one’s personal 
information is simply to not share it. Interestingly, we found no significant association 
between students’ concern for information privacy and their willingness to share their 
genetic information to any of the three institutions. Although counter-intuitive, we 
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attribute such lack of association to the students’ apathetic attitudes toward personal 
information as a whole (Malhotra, Kim, & Agarwal, 2004). Since they are the generation 
that grew up in an environment saturated with technology in which not sharing one’s 
personal information online appears almost unavoidable (shopping online, social 
networking, online applications, etc.), it is likely that sharing their genetic information 
would make little difference to this generation of digital natives (Mann, and Hoffman). 
Further, their concern for information privacy certainly would not increase their 
willingness to share their information (Kang, 1998). As a result, their concern for 
information privacy neither increased nor decreased their willingness to share such 
information.  
  The results for the parent sample are similar to the student sample with one 
important exception: parents’ concern for information privacy is negatively associated 
with willingness to share their genetic information with insurance and pharmaceutical 
companies. It appears that the parental generation has dealt more with the complexity and 
financially motivated self-interest of insurance and pharmaceutical companies simply by 
having more interactions with and a longer exposure to these institutions. As a result, the 
parent population in our sample who are concerned about their information privacy 
would be less likely to share their genetic information with private, for-profit 
organizations such as insurance and pharmaceutical companies. Since the other two 
institutions in our studies are non-profit entities or actively involved in our health care, 
the concern for information privacy in the parental population is not a significant factor in 
influencing their willingness to share their genetic information. 
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 Trust, in a general sense, is a tendency to regard others as benevolent and 
competent. Usually, this is directed into the future where a trustor gives control of a 
situation to a trustee such that the trustor must rely on the decisions made by the trustee. 
Based on this idea, it was expected that trust in people would be a strong indicator of how 
willing someone would be to donate their genetic information. If someone is generally 
trusting towards individuals, they would continue to be trusting towards institutions and 
therefore would give control of their genetic information to institutions. Instead, there 
was no significance found between trust in people and willingness to donate information.  
 Trust in people did not show significance for any of the institutions when looking 
at student response, parent response, or student responses with parent predictors. This 
lack of significance could potentially be a result of the fact that the trustee in this 
situation is not an individual, but an institution. With the point of view taken above, 
sharing personal genetic information is not being directed as trust in a single person but 
an entire group of people that operate under a specific institutional arrangement and set of 
norms. Trust in people may influence relationships at the inter-personal level, but this 
lack of significance suggests that the respondents to the survey perceive institutions as a 
distinct social structure from individuals. Respondents may also believe that because 
institutions are comprised of large groups of individuals, their information is not as 
secure since only one individual is required for their information to be misused.  
4.4.3 Genetic Information Sharing Beliefs 
The third block of hypothesized influences on willingness to disclose, issue 
involvement, personal genetic privacy concern, and perceived benefits and risks, captured 
individual attitudes and beliefs about issues that are more proximal to the outcome. Issue 
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involvement indicates how aware or how relevant an issue is to a subject, usually through 
the individual’s previous life experience. The issue involvement construct was composed 
of three questions involving the relevance of invasion of privacy, potential misuse of 
electronic health records, and computer security concerns for an individual. We found 
that the student’s perception of issue involvement is a marginally significant influence on 
willingness to disclose to the government, but not significant for other institutions. 
Perhaps students perceive government as an institution that is competent in ensuring the 
security of sensitive information.  
For the parent sample, issue involvement did not significantly affect their 
willingness to disclose to any of the institutions. It may be the case that the issue was not 
salient to this generation because they had no previous exposure to privacy invasions. 
However, given the small sample size, this finding should be interpreted with caution 
Survey participants were asked to respond to five questions regarding perceived 
benefits of genetic information sharing. Potential benefits of genetic information sharing 
addressed in the survey included medical advancement and discoveries, developing 
research for treatment of diseases, improvements to the current health care system, and 
the use of genetic markers as a tool in the future of medicine. For students, there was a 
strong positive relationship between perceived benefits and willingness to disclose 
genetic information to government, health professionals, and insurance and 
pharmaceutical companies. This indicates that the more students believe that genetic 
information will yield social benefits, the more likely they are to share it.  
The perceived risk construct included discrimination based on genetic information 
and how poor health could influence an employer’s view of an individual. In general, we 
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would expect people with a high perception of risk to be less likely to entrust their 
genetic information to the government, health professionals, and pharmaceutical and 
insurance companies. For students, these perceived risks were significant only for 
pharmaceutical and insurance companies. This indicates that students who believe that an 
employer’s knowledge of a genetic disorder or poor health would put them at risk are less 
likely to entrust their genetic information to pharmaceutical and insurance companies. 
This comes as no surprise because it is common belief that insurance companies may 
charge higher premiums for customers who are at a higher risk of poor health. On the 
other hand, the student values were insignificant for the government and health 
professionals, indicating that perceived risks are not a barrier to the disclosure of genetic 
information to these institutions. For the parent sample, perceived risks were not 
significantly associated with the disclosure decision for any of the three institutions. 
4.4.4 Health Status Variables 
Factors reflecting an individual’s health condition and associated beliefs were 
hypothesized to have an effect on the decision to disclose. We included four variables in 
this fourth block: perceptions of social stigma arising from a genetic condition, the 
number of diseases an individual is suffering from, and positive and negative health and 
emotions. Results from the survey demonstrated that the more students perceived the 
social stigma of a genetic disease, the less likely they were willing to donate their genetic 
information to the government. From a historical perspective, government policies 
regarding healthcare have led to stigmatization of certain populations. For example, the 
city of Chicago passed a law in 1901 that did not allow disabled or mutilated people to be 
in public areas. This was only recently repealed in 1974 (Ablon, 2002). On a national 
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level, the AIDS epidemic of the 1980s led the CDC to publicize at-risk populations such 
as homosexuals and Haitians without concrete evidence regarding the cause of this 
disease. Subsequently, members of these groups were greatly stigmatized (Madru, 2003). 
Given their checkered past, awareness of social stigma would indeed decrease 
willingness to donate information to the government. Interestingly, social stigma did not 
significantly affect the willingness to donate to health professionals or insurance and 
pharmaceutical companies. These entities generally hold objective perspectives regarding 
diseases and have little direct influence on shaping public policy that may promote social 
stigma. Such views may explain why there is no statistical significance between 
perception of social stigma and willingness to disclose to health professionals, insurance 
and pharmaceutical companies. 
  In contrast to the significant effect for perceived social stigma for students, we do 
not find a significant effect in the parent population. One explanation for this difference 
may be that the younger generation is more influenced by what “others think” and may 
worry less about losing social approval. Older adults may be less susceptible to the need 
for social approval and therefore, social stigma is not a significant factor in their 
disclosure decision. 
The number of diseases in the family did not affect the students’ willingness to 
donate to any of the entities. One explanation of this finding is David Elkind’s concept of 
the personal fable. This phenomenon describes how many adolescents believe that 
“[they] will not die, that death will happen to others but not to [them]” (Elkind, 1967). 
This belief is inherently false, but the perception can lead to adolescents to take more 
risks that they might not have as they grow older. In this case, they are not concerned that 
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there is a family history of disease because they believe that they will not contract the 
diseases. If they are not worried about disease, they may not feel the same compulsion to 
donate their genetic information. 
An individual with a family history filled with hereditary diseases should be 
reasonably expected to donate their genetic information more than an individual with a 
family history with no or few hereditary diseases. Indeed, our survey shows that parents 
with a high number of diseases in their family are more likely to donate their information 
to health institutions, though less likely to donate to the government and insurance 
agencies. As discussed subsequently, our survey discovered that parents place a high 
degree of trust in health professionals. When an adult knows that they can be potentially 
afflicted with a genetic disease, it makes sense for them to donate their information to a 
group that they trust and can help them-- health professionals. Even though we also 
discover that parents of college students trust the government and generally do not trust 
insurance agencies, neither of those two institutions is found to be significant for people 
with a high number of diseases in the family. 
Positive health and emotions in the context of our research describes how 
positively people look at their life and their health in the present moment. That is, 
someone who is in high-spirits and is healthy will answer questions in this section higher 
than individuals who are lonely or are sick. Student respondents who felt more positive 
about their current physical and mental health were more likely to donate their 
information to the insurance and pharmaceutical industries. One reason for this result is 
that patients could try to use their positive image to try and negotiate better care or better 
rates. A 2004 study found a perception among patients who presented an optimistic view 
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of themselves to insurance that they could obtain better medical care. This belief was 
especially found in ethnic minorities and lower socioeconomic positions (Malat, van Ryn, 
& Purcell, 2006). This idea could convince students to donate their material because if 
they present a good image to the insurance company and back it up with genetic material, 
they could potentially receive a monetary gain or better care because the company views 
them as less risky. Presenting themselves in this manner to their doctors or the 
government yields no advantage to the students, which could be why they do not play a 
significant role in the model. 
We also found that parents of college students who view their health better are 
more likely to donate to health professionals but not to insurance and pharmaceutical 
companies like their children. When an adult feels that they are healthy, they may feel 
more magnanimous and believe that donating their genetic information will have a 
positive impact on research. This mindset is unique to the parents and does not reflect in 
the regressions for the students. 
Negative health and emotions in our research describes how negatively people 
look at their life and health in the present moment. Someone who is worried about their 
health or someone who is sick will score high on this variable. Interestingly, we find that 
people negative health and emotions is positively associated with donating to health 
professionals. A student’s negative perception of their mental and physical health had no 
significant impact on donating to any of the organizations. One rationale is that the 
negative self-image is something that is too day-to-day to want to report to any of these 
entities. Respondents presenting a negative image could put themselves in a worse 
situation, so there is no incentive to donate to insurance like there is with positive self-
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image. There is no disincentive to donate, however, because the next day they could feel 
more positive about their situation. 
 On the other hand, parents of college students who are sad and despondent about 
their health may believe that sharing genetic information with health professionals would 
increase the likelihood of better treatment, and the alleviation of their poor health 
condition. In other words, when people are sick, they may believe their doctor may help 
them. Likewise, to the degree that insurance and pharmaceutical companies can be 
instrumental in finding cures for ailments, negative health and emotions increases 
individuals’ willingness to provide information that may contribute to the cure. Since this 
despondency can be expected to increase with age, it makes sense that negative health 
and emotions is significant only for parents and not with their children in the context of 
health professionals and the insurance/pharmaceutical industries. 
4.4.5 Trust in Institutions 
The final block in our conceptual model include a single variable that we 
believed, a priori, to be the single most potent influence on willingness to disclose highly 
sensitive personal information. The measurement of this construct tapped into 
individuals’ perceptions that the target institution would act in their best interest, would 
be willing to help the individual, was interested in the individual’s well-being, was 
truthful, would keep its commitments, and was sincere and genuine. For both samples we 
found highly significant effects of trust in government and health professionals on 
willingness to share genetic information. These results are consistent with a large body of 
prior research noting that a willingness to expose oneself to the risk of opportunistic 
behavior by another party is highly dependent on how much trust exists between parties 
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(Lars et. al). Institutions can garner trust through three mechanisms: community, 
frequency of use, and authority (Luo, 2002). Both students and parents are likely to have 
had multiple interactions with the government and with health professionals, and both 
institutions reflect varying degrees of authority. 
Whereas trust in insurance and insurance and pharmaceutical companies is 
positively associated with willingness to disclose for students, that is not the case for the 
parent sample. There are two plausible explanations for this result. One is that the small 
sample size for parents may have reduced our ability to detect a significant effect. 
Alternatively while parents may trust insurance companies due to authority and 
frequency of use, they may not be comfortable with what the insurance company could 
do with their information (Norberg, Horne, & Horne, 2007). For example, people 
perceive that an insurance company could deny coverage if they are genetically screened 
for a disease. This is different from government and health professionals because they are 
limited in how they can negatively affect a person with that information. Thus, trust in 
this institution does not influence their willingness to share sensitive information. In fact, 
it may even benefit a person for a health professional or the government to have that 
genetic information about them. 
4.5 Student with Parent Predictors 
One of our research questions sought to understand inter-generational transfer of 
attitudes.  To address this, we regressed the child’s willingness to disclose to the different 
institutions on parent’s perceptions and attitudes. In the following section, we discuss 
which parent variables were significant in student willingness to disclose and whether 
they shared a positive or negative relationship. In addition, we discuss parent variables 
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that were not significant in our study but we expected to be transmitted based on previous 
literature. 
Three attitudes that were transmitted based on parent predictors were warm-
hearted altruism, perceived benefits, and trust in institutions. Essentially, if a parent was 
altruistic, if they perceived benefit in donating their genetic information, or if they trusted 
health professionals, the student was more likely to donate information. This was only 
significant in predicting information disclosure to health professionals. The reason why 
these three variables are only significant for health professionals, as opposed to 
government or insurance/pharmaceutical companies, is because altruism and perceived 
benefit may only be relevant to health professionals. It is logical to think that there is no 
benefit in being altruistic towards the government or insurance companies as there is 
nothing to gain from donating information to those organizations. Historically, people 
have been very wary of giving up information to both these institutions (Harris 1974). 
However, with health professionals, people may see a benefit of being altruistic. 
Donating information could perhaps lead to a cure or better treatment for the greater 
population. This explains why the transmission of these variables did not explain student 
disclosure to government or insurance and pharmaceutical companies.  
It makes sense that altruism would be passed from one generation to another. 
Previous literature has demonstrated that levels of volunteering and donating in children 
are associated with the same behavior of their parents (Hodgkinson and Weitzman, 1996; 
Willhelm 2008). However, we also found in our literature review that perceived benefits 
differ between age groups (Youn, 2005). The method in which the older generation 
assesses rewards is much different from the younger generation. This contradicts our 
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findings that perceived benefits are transmitted from parent to child. To explain this, we 
believe that behavior relating to perceived benefits can be transmitted intergenerationally, 
but these alone do not make up a child’s method of benefit perception. Perhaps other 
social cues and developmental factors play a larger role than parental influence in 
developing this behavior.  
Another factor that we found to be significant for students with a parent predictor 
is perceived social stigma. Specifically, there is a negative correlation between a 
student’s perception of social stigma should they donate and their eventual decision on 
whether or not to donate their genetic information. This means that when parents perceive 
social stigma, their children’s views on stigma are negatively correlated with their 
donation decision. This can be explained through the students’ identification as part of a 
stigmatized group. In this case, the students see their parents’ perception of a stigma that 
negatively affects them, and thus feel like they are affected by the stigma as well. 
Crocker and Major find that when individuals identify with a stigmatized group, in this 
case a group with some sort of genetic disease, their perception of a stigma lowers. 
However, that lowered stigma is accompanied by a decrease in motivation to help out the 
stigmatizing group, even when they have the ability (Crocker and Major, 622). For the 
context of this research, the stigmatizing group is any of the three institutions: 
government, health care, and insurance. 
There were also certain parent variables that we expected to be transmitted to 
students, but were not within our study. One of these variables was perceived risk. 
Previous literature on the topic finds that both parents and their children perceive risky 
situations to the same degree adults (Ashman et al., 2003). However, this was not 
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apparent from the results of the survey. It is interesting that perceived benefit was 
transmitted and perceived risk was not, when the literature says the opposite. Again, this 
is attributable to the role that parental influence plays in the development of these 
behaviors. Parental influence may have a larger role in developing a child’s altruism and 
social stigma than it does in risk-benefit evaluation.  
4.6 Discussion of Results for Desire to be Informed 
An unresolved question related to the ethics of genetic research is whether 
individuals who are found to be at risk should be informed or not (Knoppers, Joly, 
Simard, & Durocher, 2006). Individuals may also choose not to be informed in the fear 
that such knowledge may require radical lifestyle or other changes. Acknowledging the 
conceptual similarity between the desire to be informed and willingness to disclose 
personal genetic information for research, we modeled the predictors of this outcome 
using similar logic, but eliminated variables that were likely to be not important to this 
decision. We included the demographic variables of income, race, and gender. Among 
the generalized traits, we only included information privacy. Genetic information sharing 
beliefs variables were genetic information privacy concerns and electronic genetic 
information privacy concerns, while the same health status variables were included as in 
the previous regressions. Finally, we did not include measures for trust in the various 
institutions as that is not relevant to this particular choice that individuals are making. 
Both students and parents who are concerned with information privacy want to be 
informed. When people are vested in the privacy concerns of their personal genetic 
information, they are more likely to want to learn about what that information consists of. 
People wish to take proactive steps to protect their personal health or financial 
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information, and being informed is part of the process. In order to protect a certain set of 
personal information, people first need to know what this information is. Arthur Miller 
says, “...the basic attribute of an effective right of privacy is the individual’s ability to 
control the circulation of information relating to him..” (Miller, 1971). In order to have 
full control of their information, people must fully understand what they are working 
with.  
 Social stigma has some impact on the desire individuals have to be informed. This 
was marginally significant for student, but not significant for parents. For students, there 
was a marginally positive association between perceptions of social stigma associated 
with genetic disease and their desire to be informed. This finding is plausible in that 
individuals with social stigma would probably find it beneficial to know about any 
potential health issues they might have before others can find out. They can then use the 
information to prepare themselves for any social consequences relating to their future 
health status.  
 The number of diseases in an individual’s family has some effect on students’ 
desire to be informed. For students, there is a slight negative association; the more 
diseases in a student’s family, the less desire they have to be informed. 
It is not surprising that a young person wishes to remain ignorant of potential 
health problems that plague their families. Rather than living with the knowledge of a 
potentially far-off disease, the student can live safely in the dark. This finding echoes the 
core tenets of the theory of rational ignorance, which suggests that people will choose to 
remain ignorant of some knowledge that will impart no utility or may involve some sort 
of drawback (Hite, 1997). In this case, a student could perceive no additional benefit to 
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his or her life if they learn they have the same disease as someone in their family, and 
may in fact perceive negative outcomes. Specifically, a student may feel that if they knew 
they had some disease like Alzheimer’s that will not affect them for many years that their 
quality of life will decrease. 
Students with negative health and emotions showed a strong desire not to be 
informed of being at risk for a hypothetical genetic disease. This means that students who 
felt negatively about their mental and physical health did not want to know whether they 
were at risk of a genetic disease. This finding reinforces the theory of rational ignorance, 
as explained above. Students with negative health and emotions rather live in ignorance 
of potentially life-threatening conditions because they feel that they have limited control 
















5. Study 2: Experiment 
5.1 Background 
As with all decisions in life, people weigh various factors when deciding whether 
or not to donate their genetic information to some organization. Potential benefits for 
doing so would be learning about personal health issues before they become a problem or 
contributing data for scientific progress towards finding a cure. A potential risk would be 
some unwanted group, such as the government, an employer, or an insurance company, 
gaining access to genetic information, which can potentially lead to discrimination. The 
decision to donate may be driven by intrinsic altruism, aversion to risk, and perception of 
their health status. These factors and a number of others, to varying degrees, drive an 
individual’s decision to donate their genetic information. 
The motivation for the experiment was to understand how factors such as 
altruism, risk aversion, and perceived risks impacted the decision to donate in a causal 
way. The experiment presented participants with hypothetical health scenarios and the 
risks they represent. Although the situations and scenarios were hypothetical, choices 
were incentivized through monetary payments. Gains and losses in real life had 
corresponding monetary payments in the experiment. Through the experiment, we 
expected to understand how variables such as having a genetic disease, existence of a 
cure, risk of insurance or job discrimination, and financial incentives would influence a 
person’s decision to donate his or her genetic information. In order to find further nuance 
in the donation decision, participants were also given the option to be informed of the 
results of their genetic testing and to invest some portion of their income in an asset that 
pays off if the subject remains free of disease, but not if they become afflicted by the 
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disease. Choosing to be informed directly increased a participant’s chance of being 
discriminated, but also allowed the participant to fully understand their risk level. This 
decision, then, measured an individual’s balance between wanting to understand their risk 
and minimizing that same risk. If a participant chose to invest their income, they lost 
some income if they fell sick, but gained some if they did not. Investing, therefore, 
measured an individual’s perception of their risk. 
Participants were presented with the opportunity to earn real monetary income 
based on the decisions they made throughout the experiment. In each round of the 
experiment, participants earned a fixed amount of income, $8, which could increase or 
decrease based on a number of factors. Most notably, this number would drop 
dramatically if the participant fell sick from some hypothetical disease. The first decision 
a participant made was whether or not to donate their genetic information, and when 
there is an incentive to donate, their income for the round would increase if they donated. 
However, subjects who donated risked the chance of discrimination, which could lower 
their income. Another decision a participant could make was to invest some portion of 
their income. Participants would lose this investment if they fell sick, but they would win 
their investment back if they were healthy or a cure were found for the disease. A cure 
can be found if no participant donates during a round, but the chance of the cure being 
found increases dramatically with each additional donation. 
Since a participant’s ultimate goal is to weigh their options and maximize their 
payout at the end of the experiment, making decisions based on available incentives is an 
important aspect of the experiment. Each health state had a corresponding monetary 
consequence, influencing these decisions even further. The overall design of the 
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experiment was to present participants with a series of scenarios that would determine the 
causal impacts of the various factors previously discussed. 
5.1.1 Variable Selection 
The purpose of using a game theory based experiment was to closely mimic a 
person’s working life through the money earned, health events, and the decisions that 
needed to be made. All of the variables used can be found in Appendix 8.2.2, and this 
section will discuss the meaning of each variable as well as the reasons it was used in the 
experiment. 
The first variable selected was whether or not a participant would be afflicted by a 
disease. The affliction would be represented by two variables: the first was the affliction 
risk, which was a probability that the participant would have the disease, and the second 
was a Boolean value representing whether or not the participant ended up afflicted. The 
affliction rate was affected by both the treatment and the participant’s constant risk level. 
That is, each participant was either designated as being at “low risk” or “high risk” for 
being afflicted, and kept that risk level for the entire experiment. However, this risk level 
designation was nominal only—the experiment was designed in such a way that subjects 
who were designated “high risk” had the same risk level as those who were “low risk.” 
However, they were led to believe that high-risk subjects were twice as likely to fall sick 
as low risk subjects. In each treatment, that risk level and some treatment-specific 
variables determined whether or not that individual was afflicted. 
Paired with the affliction variable was a marker status variable. Everyone had a 
75% chance of having a genetic marker and a 25% chance of not having the marker. The 
presence of a marker indicated that it was likely that the participant was afflicted, though 
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the marker could be a false positive. That is, a participant could conceivably have the 
marker but not be afflicted. This additional piece of information was intended to help 
people make further informed choices based off of their health status. Since participants 
did not know that they would always be afflicted, the marker had meaning, whereas if 
they knew they were always afflicted, it would have none.  
The next variable to be included was a monetary incentive for deciding to donate 
genetic information. Half of the treatments played had a monetary incentive associated 
with donating information, and half of the treatments had no monetary incentive 
associated with donating. The purpose of this variable was to determine if there were 
participants who were altruistic. In general, if a participant donated their information 
when they were at low risk and there was no opportunity for monetary reward, they were 
likely to be considered more altruistic than if they withheld their information. This is 
based on the fact that donating their information increases their personal risk, but there is 
no benefit to the participant if they donate their information (Batson & Shaw, 1991). 
There was also the possibility of motivational crowding, where a participant who would 
normally donate in an altruistic way actually chose not to donate when there was an 
incentive to donate (Titmuss, 1970). 
There were three additional variables added to the experiment in order to reflect 
the lifespan of a working individual. The final three variables chosen were all selected 
together due to the interactions they had and the ways they could affect risks and sickness 
chances. When a person is afflicted with a disease, this disease can often go unnoticed 
and not have any negative effect on an individual’s life. Therefore, the first of the three 
variables added to the experiment was whether or not a participant would become sick. A 
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person must be afflicted with the disease in order to become sick. However, there will be 
no negative effects until they become sick. Once the sickness starts, there is some loss of 
income in order to represent the increased insurance and medical costs in addition to the 
discomfort associated with the disease. This variable works in the same way as affliction: 
there was a probability that a person became sick, referenced as sickness chance and an 
associated Boolean variable that actually controls whether or not a participant was sick. 
The next variable was whether or not an individual would be discriminated 
against due to their disease. An individual who donated information, and then was found 
to have a marker for the disease, could find that this information fell in the wrong hands, 
and led to their being discriminated against. This discrimination is not necessarily on a 
moral basis or due to prejudices, but may simply be due to the facts of the disease. For 
example, a person with multiple sclerosis cannot perform a construction job. This is not a 
reflection of their intellectual ability or their personality, but it is still a limitation on what 
types of jobs are available. As stated before, most people are generally not discriminated 
against due to their disease unless they are sick, but it is possible to be discriminated 
against even if they are not sick. For example, people with an Alzheimer’s marker can be 
discriminated against even before they get the disease. Therefore, being sick greatly 
increases the chance that a person is discriminated against. This variable is also 
controlled with a probability and an associated Boolean variable: the probability of being 
discriminated is the discrimination chance. If someone is discriminated against, they have 




Based on this model, it was possible that participants could be discriminated 
against without being affected by the disease. Choosing to donate would cause 
information to become privately known, increasing the chance of an information leak as 
well as the resulting discrimination. Additionally, choosing to be informed about the 
marker status would increase the chance of discrimination. These affects were added 
because it has recently been shown that with a very limited amount of information, 
genetic information can be traced back to a specific individual. Therefore, simply 
choosing to donate or being informed would increase the likelihood of discrimination.  
The final variable that was added was the presence of a cure for the disease. There 
are many diseases that no longer have much of a negative impact on society due to the 
fact that a cure has been found. The discovery of a cure requires voluntary contributions 
of many individuals’ genetic material. In order to incorporate this into the experiment, the 
chance that a cure was found was made to be a function of how many people have 
donated their genetic information in the game itself. There was a base probability that a 
cure would be found for a disease, known as the cure chance. As each participant donated 
his or her information, the chance that the cure was found was increased by a set amount, 
the “impact to cure”. It was this amount that was varied between the 16 different 
treatments of the experiment. Participants were told that if they donated their information, 
the cure chance would be increased by the impact to cure amount. Because simply 
donating their information was enough to increase the chance of discrimination, those 
who were not at a high affliction risk but still donated were expected to be more altruistic 
than those who did not donate their information under the same circumstances. After all 
of the participants decided whether or not to donate, the cure chance was finalized and 
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whether or not a cure was found was calculated. The difference with this variable was 
that all participants would have the exact same value for their cure variable; either a cure 
was found for all participants, or a cure was not found. Finally, if a participant had 
become sick and a cure was found, they would lose some money, but not as much as if a 
cure had not been found. This loss of income with a cure represents having to pay for the 
cure and take any necessary time off of work. 
Together, the four disease-dependent variables act to modify each other. In order 
to have any effects on the treatment, a person must first have a disease, calculated at the 
beginning of each treatment by the affliction variable. Once a person has a disease the 
affliction variable cannot be changed. At this point, a person must develop the sickness, 
again a Boolean variable calculated by the sickness chance variable. If a person is 
discriminated against they will start to lose some of their income. This discrimination can 
occur due to having donated their information, choosing to be informed of the results of 
genetic testing, or both. Finally, if a cure is found, the negative effects of the affliction 
Boolean variable will be changed and the negative effects of the discrimination Boolean 
variable will be changed. Despite this, there will be a slight income loss in order to 
represent paying for the cost of the cure. Overall, there is a complex, combined effect of 
many variables and decisions in determining the results of each treatment.  
  To separate the effects of the variables, we created an experiment design that tests 
individuals’ willingness to disclose their information given differing levels of some of the 
variables listed above. Specifically, four variables were defined to have a high value and 
a low value, which resulted in sixteen total rounds for the experiment. Depending on the 
round, there could be a high or low value for each of the following variables: monetary 
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incentive to donate, chance of falling sick if already afflicted, individual impact to the 
cure chance, and chance of discrimination. Every participant played each of these sixteen 
possibilities, which were presented in a random order that changed each session.  
5.1.2 Augmenting the Emotional Decision 
One issue with this experiment was having the participants be emotionally 
invested in their decisions so that they would not simply try to earn the most money 
possible. Instead of trying to take money out of the picture, we decided that adding an 
investment decision along with the donation decision would help us to determine whether 
they perceived themselves to be at risk. 
After deciding whether or not to donate their information and whether or not they 
wanted to be informed about their health status, participants were brought to a screen that 
asked them whether they would like to make an investment. If the participant became 
sick and a cure was not found in that treatment, they would lose their investment and 
therefore have an income loss. However, if the participant was not sick or a cure was 
found in the treatment, they would keep their investment and their income would 
increase. Participants could additionally use information from their donation and 
informed decisions in order to help them with their investment decision. For example, if a 
participant has a marker for the disease, they are at higher risk for becoming sick. 
Therefore, for someone who expected to be healthy, they could increase the amount of 
money they earn, but they took the risk that there could be a loss of income if they 
became sick. Finally, they could choose not to make an investment at all, in which case 
there would be no corresponding increase or decrease of income. 
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This additional variable, known as the investment variable, helped to describe 
whether or not participants believed they were at risk. Those who were afraid of falling 
sick would not invest any money, preventing a loss of additional income. Those who did 
not feel any risk, or at least a minimal risk, of falling sick would invest money, 
potentially increasing their income. 
Participants were not told the values for any of the probabilities associated with 
the variables in the experiment. The values for the probabilities also had a slight random 
influence. For example, there was a baseline 25% chance that a cure would be found, but 
that number was not made public to the participants. Therefore, for each successive trial, 
participants would not be able to correlate their monetary payoffs. It was probably 
sufficient that the values were simply not stated, but this was an extra precautionary 
measure to help create an emotional decision. One exception to this was that participants 
were told that donating their information would increase their chance of discrimination 
by 20% and that choosing to be informed about their health status would increase their 
chance of discrimination by 20%. The baseline discrimination was always set at 0%, but 
this value was not explicitly stated. Therefore, if a participant donated their information, 
their discrimination chance would become 20%, if they chose to be informed, it would 
increase by an additional 20% to a maximum of 40%. At this point, the discrimination 
multiplier, one of the high or low independent variables, was multiplied to give the final 
discrimination chance.   
In order to ensure that participants understood the consequences of their 
decisions, a table was attached to the end of the instructions handout, with which they 
were provided, that described the monetary consequences of various events in the 
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experiment. This is attached in Appendix 8.3.2.1, but an example is that when there is an 
incentive to donate, donating information would increase a participant’s income by $0.80. 
5.2 Experiment Methodology 
5.2.1 Subject Recruitment 
Our target population was 100 University of Maryland students ages 18-24. In 
order to select the participants for this portion of the study, we used two listservs to 
which team MAGIC members were a part of: the University of Maryland Honors 
Listserv, and the same randomized listserv that was generated for the survey portion of 
the study. This listserv was a randomized list of 5,000 undergraduate students and 3,000 
graduate students from the University of Maryland, College Park. An email was sent to 
this list stating that we required 100 participants for a hypothetical game theory based 
simulation. The times and locations of each session were stated in the email. Participants 
were provided with a link that would allow them to sign up to one of the sessions of the 
study through the use of Google Forms. Additionally, Dr. Gao, a professor in the School 
of Business, informed his undergraduate students of the study and participants were 
recruited from his class. Dr. Gao offered his students extra credit in his class for their 
participation in the experiment. There were no factors other than student status that could 
eliminate participants from the study. 
5.2.2 Decision Tree for One Round 
There are several possible outcomes that can occur when playing each treatment 
of the experiment. Each treatment starts with every participant having an income of 
$8.00. Based on the decisions made throughout the treatment, this value can increase or 
decrease. At the beginning of each treatment, participants are informed about the relative 
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values of several variables. The first variable is the affliction risk, which can be either 
high or low. The next variable is the chance of falling sick, which represents how likely it 
is a participant will become sick given that they have the disease. If they do not have the 
disease, the participant will not become sick. The percent chance that a cure is found is a 
function of how many participants donate their information during that specific round. 
The amount that each participant contributes to increasing the chance of a cure can be 
high or low. Finally, they are told whether they will be paid $0.80 for donating their 
information. 
At the beginning of the session, during the instructions, participants are told how 
these variables can affect their monetary income. For example, if they fall sick and cure 
is found, they will not lose as much money as if they fall sick and a cure is not found. 
They are also told that if they donate their information, there is an increased chance that 
they could be discriminated due to loss of confidentiality. After making a decision on 
whether or not to donate their hypothetical genetic information, participants could be 
taken to the “informed choice” screen. If participants decided to donate their information, 
they were able to make a decision about whether or not they wanted to be informed about 
their marker status. They are also told that if they chose to be informed, there was a 20% 
increased chance of discrimination. If participants decided not to donate their 
information, they would skip over the decision to be informed. 
The final screen that presents a decision asks whether or not they would like to 
invest their income. They are told that there are three outcomes that can occur from their 
investment decision. If no investment is made, the investment does not impact the income 
for the round. If an investment is made and they do not become sick or a cure is found, 
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they will earn $1.20. If an investment was made and they become sick and a cure is not 
found, they will lose $1.20. 
Based on the information provided, participants were able to make three 
decisions: whether to donate their information, whether they would like to be informed 
about their results, and whether they would like to make an investment of income 
knowing that there could be potential loss of income in certain cases. These three 
variables, regressed against the five high and low variables, allowed us to determine how 
participants viewed the risks involved with each decision and the potential benefits they 
could receive. 
5.2.3 z-Tree 
The experiment was written using a program called z-Tree (Zurich Toolbox for 
Readymade Economic Experiments), a software package developed at the University of 
Zurich’s Department of Economics and intended to aid in the development of economic 
experiments (Fischbacher, 2007). z-Tree allows a developer to design an experiment that 
links many participants, or clients, to a central controlling computer, or host. z-Tree is 
popular for designing experiments because it has a large number of built-in features 
necessary for any kind of experiment with subjects: keeping track of money earned, 
resetting the game for multiple rounds, the inclusion of practice rounds, easy 
communication between the host and clients, and more. We chose to use z-Tree for the 
experiment for its flexibility. Since z-Tree handles connecting many participants to each 
other and keeping track of money, it allowed the developers on the team to spend their 




A z-Tree program is separated into several distinct parts which can be combined 
in order to make any kind of economic experiment. First, there is the Globals table. This 
table keeps track of any variables that should be the same for all participants. For 
example, since every participant plays the same round at the same time, the round 
number is stored in the Globals table. Second, there is the Subjects table. This table keeps 
track of any variables that are unique to each individual participant. For example, in 
many experiments, participants earn a small amount of money every turn. This amount 
can be different per participant and should be stored in the Subjects table. 
In order to interact with the variables, z-Tree has a customizable screen that the 
experiment developer creates. Each decision in our experiment is a different version 
screen in z-Tree. This allows each decision to use and set the variables necessary in the 
experiment. Screenshots of the z-Tree program are available in Appendix 8.3.2.2. 
5.2.4 Risks, Confidentiality, and Benefits 
The two risks anticipated in participating in the experiment are fatigue due to the 
hour long session, and anxiousness or unease due to the treatments presented. The fatigue 
was somewhat compensated due to the fact that each round only lasted roughly three 
minutes, allowing for participants to have a short break between each round. In order to 
keep participants at ease about discussing hypothetical personal health issues, they were 
told many times at the start of the session that no information of their own would be 
recorded at any time during the session. 
The participants did not provide any personal information during the experiment 
at all. They were asked to show their student ID’s in order to enter the behavioral lab to 
match with their assignment of session time period. They were also asked to sign their 
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names on the consent form. There are no other uses or needs for participants’ personal 
information before, during, or after the experiment. Demographic information was taken 
only to ensure a reasonable population set. 
The only anticipated benefits of the experiment for the participants were the 
monetary rewards provided for participation. There were no anticipated benefits for the 
researchers other than data for research. We hope to be able to use this information to 
determine what factors influences an individual’s willingness to disclose personal health 
information. This information could then be used to propose legislative measures that 
would allow the general populace to become more comfortable sharing their personal 
health information. 
5.2.5 Procedures 
On the day of the experiment, each of the students was asked to arrive 10 minutes 
before their assigned session time. The location used was the R.H. Smith Business School 
Behavioral laboratory, which contains computers for each of the students to use during 
the experiment. Each student was asked to sit at a computer and fill out the consent form 
and demographic survey on the desks. These computers were separated by partitions so 
that participants could not see what others were writing or typing on screen. Each 
computer already had the program, z-Tree, running without any additional setup. The 
proctors of the experiment, the students on Team MAGIC, read the instructions, risks, 
and benefits aloud to the entire group. All of the documents pertaining to the performing 
the experiment are available in Appendix 8.3.2. 
At this point, the session proctors walked all of the participants through a packet 
of screenshots and explained all of the visual elements of the program. This allowed for 
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all of the participants to step through the entire game before they were asked to do it 
alone. Instructions were read aloud from a script, attached in the appendix, in order to 
ensure that all participants received the same information within the session and between 
sessions. 
Once the instructions were completed, participants were instructed to start the two 
practice simulations, providing them with a chance to understand how each of their 
decisions affected their net income at the end of the round. Both of these practice rounds 
were timed and were no different from the 16 main rounds. Data from these rounds were 
not used in any of the analysis of the experiment and participants were told that these 
rounds would not count towards determining how much money they would earn for their 
participation. Participants were allowed to proceed at their own pace through both 
practice rounds but were required to finish within the time limit, just as in the real rounds 
in the experiment. Both of these practice rounds had different variable values than the 
rounds the participants played later in order to prevent participants from simply copying 
these rounds. However, the main difference was that these rounds did not count towards 
their reward for participation. 
Once the experiment started, each participant had the allotted time of thirty 
seconds to re-read the instructions, thirty seconds to decide if they would donate their 
personal health information, thirty seconds to decide to be informed of the results of 
testing, and thirty seconds to invest. They were free to complete the decisions as quickly 
or slowly as they pleased within this time limit. These time limits were selected after 
completing the pilot study. During the pilot study, participants noted that one minute was 
too much time as it simply dragged out each treatment. Additionally, the majority of the 
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participants made their decision within five to ten seconds, showing that no additional 
time was required. Finally, it was hypothesized that providing too much time would 
result in participants attempting to learn the system and earn income rather than making 
decisions that they perceived ask minimizing risk.  
At the end of each round, the program started the next round at the same time for 
all of the participants so that each of the participants finished the session together. Once 
the experiment finished, each participant was given the amount of money that they earned 
in the experiment based on a randomly selected round from the 16 rounds that were 
played. Participants were clearly told during the instructions that during each round they 
could earn up to $10.00. However, one of the sixteen rounds would be randomly chosen 
at the end of the experiment and participants would receive their income only for that 
round. They were also provided with a $10.00 reward for participation alone. Therefore, 
based on the decisions that were made during the experiment, participants could earn 
anywhere between $10.00 and $20.00. Once the participants received the money that they 
earned in the experiment, they were free to leave.  
There were seven different sessions during which the experiment was conducted. 
Each of the sessions had between ten and sixteen participants, with a maximum 
occupancy of eighteen participants. During each session, all of the participants played 
two practice treatments and the full sixteen-treatment experiment. One possible 
difference between the seven sessions is that the cure percentage had a different 
maximum value when there were a different number of participants. However this was 
not a significant impact as the “impact to cure” value was too small to create large 
changes in the cure chance. 
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5.2.6 Pilot Sessions 
 Two pilot sessions of the experiment were run in the week before the final data 
collection began. The purpose of the pilot sessions was to determine if the instructions 
were clear, to make sure the software ran as expected, and to allow the researchers to 
rehearse their roles for the main sessions. These pilot sessions were run following the 
same procedures as the main sessions outlined in the previous section, except with 
different subject recruitment and an additional feedback phase at the end of the 
experiment. 
 Subjects for the pilot study consisted of friends of researchers, and were given 
pizza for their participation instead of money. Upon completion of the pilot study, the 
subjects answered questions by the researchers in order for the researchers to gain a clear 
understanding of how the subjects felt during the experiment. The question and answer 
afterwards proved to be very valuable for modifying the instructions and software for the 
main sessions. Some of the changes based on this questioning were: 
• Instead of displaying the instructions at the beginning of all sixteen rounds and 
both practice rounds, only display during the practice rounds and the first real 
round. 
• Make the wait screen more descriptive when other players are finishing the round. 
• Combining several summary screens into one screen at the end of each round. 
Additionally, the pilot study showed that z-Tree had an unexpected amount of lag 
between each screen displayed to the participants, which was frustrating to them. This 




5.3 Experiment Results 
5.3.1 Experiment Demographics 
 The experiment in total had 94 respondents that completed the demographics 
survey. There was one participant who did not turn in their demographics survey and so 
their information was not used in any of the analysis of the results. In Appendix 8.2.4 of 
this document, several pie charts are shown that represent the overall demographics 
distribution of our experiment participants. There was an almost even split along gender 
lines with 49% male and 51% female participants. There was a large distribution of races 
with roughly 30% Asian, 15% African American, 2% Latino, and 53% Caucasian. The 
religious views of the participants showed that the majority were Christian, Jewish, or 
unaffiliated with small representations of other religions. The majority of the participants 
were Democratic with the remainder being split between Republican and independents. 
More than half of the participants had a family income level of greater than $100,000 and 
more than three quarters of the participants had a family income level of greater than 
$50,000. Finally, 85% of the participants were undergraduate students with the remainder 
were undergraduates having an associate’s degree before coming to the university. There 
was one participant who stated that they had a doctorate degree, but this is likely to be a 
false report by the participant.  
 The experiment sample was fairly similar to the university’s demographics. Males 
were underrepresented slightly (49% sample versus 52% university), whites were 
underrepresented slightly (53% versus 57%), African Americans were overrepresented 
slightly (15% versus 13%), and Asians were overrepresented substantially (30% versus 
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15%). Data was only compared to released demographic information from the university. 
This data is shown in Appendix 8.2.4. 
The experiment sample deviated more from national percentages. Males were 
marginally underrepresented (49% sample versus 49.2% nationally), whites were 
underrepresented substantially (53% versus 72%), African Americans were slightly 
overrepresented (15% versus 12.6%), and Asians were significantly overrepresented 
(30% versus 4.8%) (2010 Census Data). 
5.3.2 Experiment Correlation Tables 
 Each of the independent variables was correlated with the decisions made during 
the experiment. These correlations help to establish the existence of relationships 
between the dependent and independent variables in the study. From the tables available 
in Appendix 8.2.5, the impact to cure, incentive, impact to discrimination, and religion 
unaffiliated are all significantly correlated with the donation decision and the informed 
decision. None of the other variables included in the correlation are significant with any 
of the decisions made during the experiment.  
5.3.3 Game Analysis 
 In order to analyze the results of the experiment, random effect logistic 
regressions were run for each of the dependent variables: the decision to donate, the 
decision to be informed, and the decision to invest. This model was chosen because each 
dependent variable was binary and there were repeated observations for the same subject, 
so the data were not all independent as is the assumption for a simple logistic regression. 
Fixed effects models were also run (without the demographic variables); however, the 
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results are almost identical so we focus our analysis on the random effects model. These 
results can be seen in Appendix 8.2.8. 
The decision to invest was split into two regressions due to the fact that 
participants had differing amounts of information when making the investment decision. 
Some players had chosen to be informed, which could only happen for individuals who 
had chosen to donate that round, and therefore knew their marker status. Meanwhile, 
other participants chose not to be informed and did not know their marker status or did 
not make a decision during the time allotted. Therefore, two investment regressions were 
created, one for investment decision when the marker status was known and another for 
the investment decision when the marker status was unknown. The table that contains the 
regression coefficients for all four of the experiment regressions can be found in 
Appendix 8.2.7 at the end of this document. In this table, the stars after the regression 
coefficients represent the significance of each of the variables. One star is a significance 
level of 90%, two stars is a significance level of 95%, and three stars is a significance 
level of 99%.  
 Since some of the subjects received extra credit for participating in the 
experiment, we had to determine if this discrepancy provided any statistical difference to 
the subjects’ responses. We ran two sample t-tests for each of the four regressions: one 
test for students receiving extra credit and one test for everyone else. No significant 
differences were found between the two samples, indicating that receiving extra credit 
did not have the additional affect on changing the participants’ decisions. 
When looking at the regression results, only two of the demographic variables 
were significant across the four regressions, and even then, they were only marginally 
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significant. The unaffiliated religion demographic had a negative association for the 
donate decision and the decision to be informed, indicating that on average, people who 
report their religion as unaffiliated are less likely to donate their information and are less 
likely to choose to be informed of their results of genetic testing. The total family income 
demographic had a negative association for the investment decision when the marker 
status was unknown, indicating that on average, the higher the participant’s family 
income, the less likely they are to invest when they don’t know their marker status. 
 Each of the treatment variables was significant for at least one of the regressions. 
The impact to cure had a strong positive association for the donation decision, the 
investment decision when the marker status was known, and the investment decision 
when the marker status was unknown, indicating that on average, as an individual’s 
potential impact towards finding a cure increases, people will donate and invest more 
regardless of marker status. The sickness chance had a negative association for the 
investment decision when the marker status was known and a strong negative association 
for the investment decision when the marker status was unknown, indicating that on 
average, when the chance of a participant falling sick increases, the less likely they are to 
donate or to invest regardless of marker status. The incentive had a strong positive 
association for both the donation decision and the investment decision when the marker 
status was unknown, indicating that on average, when there was an incentive to donate, 
people tended to donate more and invest even without knowing their marker status. The 
impact to discrimination had a strong negative association for each of the donation 
decision, the decision to be informed, and the investment decision when the marker status 
was unknown, indicating that on average, when the chance of discrimination increased, 
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people were less likely to donate or to invest. The “marker present” marker status had a 
strong negative association for the investment decision, indicating that on average, when 
people knew their marker status (regardless of whether they had the marker or not), they 
were less likely to invest. 
5.4 Experiment Discussion 
5.4.1 Demographics 
5.4.1.1 Unaffiliated Religion 
 The variable that represents participants who are not religiously affiliated is 
significant for two of the decisions that participants make: whether to donate their 
information and whether to be informed about their marker status once they have chosen 
to donate. In both cases, the regressions have negative coefficients. That is, people who 
are religiously unaffiliated are less likely to donate, but if they do, they are less likely to 
choose to be informed of their marker status. In this study, religiously unaffiliated means 
atheist, agnostic, or unaffiliated religion, based on the available choices in the 
demographic survey.  
 A person’s decision on whether or not to donate has a lot to do with their overall 
generosity. In treatments where specific variables have been found to decrease donation 
rates, personality traits like generosity or altruism play a large part in determining 
whether a person donates. In general, studies have found that people who do not affiliate 
with a specific religion are less generous. They are less likely to donate money to the 
poor (Regnerus et al., 1998), are less generous towards anonymous strangers 
(Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008), and show less empathy and altruism towards others  
(Smith, 2003). Since the act of donating in this experiment necessarily increases an 
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individual’s risk to being discriminated, but increases the chance of a cure being found, 
we can assume that those who choose to donate even in harsh treatments are doing so 
through generosity towards the other participants in the session. The correlation found 
makes sense then, since religiously unaffiliated people, who are often less generous than 
the rest of the population by elimination, choose to donate less often.  
 Based on the literature we read, we were not expecting the unaffiliated religion 
variable to have an association with the decision to be informed. Indeed, we have no 
explanation for why this association occurs, either supported by literature or by reasoning 
through it. 
5.4.1.2 Family Income 
 We found that in general, students from families with higher incomes are less 
likely to invest their income when they do not know their marker status for the disease. In 
our experiment a participant who does not know their marker status when investing has 
either not donated their information or decided to not be informed of their marker status. 
This unwillingness is likely a reflection of the financial literacy the participant has 
developed from being in a household with financially successful parents. Children often 
model their financial patterns based on what they observe in their family (Clarke, Heaton, 
Israelsen, & Eggett, 2005); this certainly applies to investment practices. When a 
participant in our study was presented with a scenario where they did not know their 
marker status, and by extension, their chance of being sick, they tended to invest more 
conservatively, i.e., not invest their income. Additionally a student will more successfully 
implement sound financial decisions the more they are exposed to those decisions at 
home (Clarke et al., 2005). We can conclude that higher income at home leads to an 
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increase in financial literacy of college students, which translates to this negative 
correlation we observed when choosing to invert without knowing the marker status. 
5.4.2 Treatment Variables 
5.4.2.1 Impact to Cure 
The value of the impact to cure was a very significant positive factor in 
determining whether a person was willing to donate. This makes sense because the more 
likely it is that a cure is found, the more advantageous it is for the individual to donate. 
The participants make the decision to donate before they know if they have the disease. 
Therefore, if they end up having the disease they have a higher chance of survival due to 
the higher cure chance. If they did not have the disease, they hedged their risk. The 
associated increase in cure chance also increased the likelihood that the participants will 
invest regardless of whether or not they know their marker status. This is because they 
will make money if they were not sick or if they were sick but the cure is found. Not 
surprisingly, the impact of the donation does not influence the decision to be informed 
about the disease status since that decision occurs after the donation decision and the 
effects of knowing marker status do not impact the likelihood that a cure is found. 
5.4.2.2 Sickness Chance 
The sickness chance itself for the participant surprisingly did not have any impact 
on the willingness to donate, but was significant in the investment decision. It was also 
insignificant in the decision to be informed. When making the decision to donate genetic 
information, participants must weigh the risks and benefits of their decision. For 
example, donating could result in an increased income, but at the same time, it increases 
the risk for discrimination. 
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Initially, it was expected that an increased sickness chance would cause 
participants to be more likely to donate. This is due to the fact that by donating, the cure 
chance increases and finding a cure would negate any negative sickness impacts. 
However, by donating, participants increase their chance of discrimination by 20%. This 
changes the decision because they increase their risk of a negative effect by a known 
amount, whereas the cure chance is dependent on all of the other participants. 
Additionally, the perception of the sickness chance changes drastically if players believe 
themselves to be at low risk of affliction. In this case, players believe that they won’t be 
afflicted and therefore they cannot become sick. Therefore, the impact to cure that their 
donation decision has is not important for eliminating potential risk. Due to all of the 
different effects of the donation decision, the sickness chance did not have a significant 
impact to the decision. 
The sickness chance did not have a significant impact on the decision to be 
informed. This is a result of the interactions between the variables: the decision to be 
informed allows for the marker status to be known and changes the discrimination 
chance. The difference between a high and low sickness chance has no impact on the 
decision to be informed or any of its results. 
The sickness chance had a significant influence on the investment decision when 
the marker status was known and when the marker status was not known. The investment 
decision effectively is an assessment of each participant’s risk level. The variables that 
influence the investment decision are the sickness chance and the cure chance. Therefore 
if participants have a high sickness chance, they would not want to make an investment, 
eliminating the risk of losing money. Alternatively, if there is a low sickness chance, 
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participants would not perceive as much risk in making an investment and would try to 
maximize their income.  
5.4.2.3 Incentive 
 Giving participants additional profit just for donating their information is 
significantly correlated with two decisions: whether to donate and whether to invest when 
their marker status is unknown. The profit incentive is strongly positively correlated in 
both cases. This correlation means that when there is an incentive, people are more likely 
to donate and choose to invest their income when they do not know their marker status. 
The first regression is self-explanatory: when people are given money for donating, they 
will donate more often than when they are not given money to donate. In treatments 
where a participant may usually not feel the need to donate, the promise of an additional 
$0.80 is enough to change their minds. 
It is initially more difficult to comprehend why a participant would associate an 
incentive for donating with investing their income when their marker status is unknown. 
Interestingly, this phenomenon can be explained by the attempt to maximize profits. 
When a participant sees that the incentive variable is high and they choose to donate, they 
have taken the first step towards reaching the maximum income in a treatment: $20. In 
order to get this maximum payoff, they also have to invest their income, not get sick, and 
not be discriminated against. After making a decision to donate, participants are given the 
choice of whether or not they want to be informed about their marker status. This 
decision cannot increase their profits itself or through any of its effects, causing the 
incentive to not be significantly correlated. Additionally, this effect can be a reaction to a 
perceived reduction of risk involved in the investment. When there is an incentive to 
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donate, the participant may assume that many of the other participants will donate in 
order to get the incentive, increasing the chance of a cure being found. This cure will 
guarantee that an investment will pay off, encouraging the participant to invest in the first 
place. 
 The incentive does not influence the decision to invest because the incentive has 
already played its role in the treatment. Therefore, when a participant makes their 
investment decision when they know their marker status, the decision is independent of 
the incentive. However, this changes when the participant does not know their maker 
status. In this scenario, the majority of the risk regarding their investment decision is 
hidden due to the fact that they don’t know their marker status. As previously stated, 
participants know that they can only earn the maximum $20 if they choose to donate and 
choose to invest while not becoming sick or being discriminated. Therefore, when the 
risk of losing their investment is partially hidden, participants will invest, hoping that 
they will earn the maximum income despite the presence of any risks. The key difference 
between the two types of investment decision is the knowledge of the marker status. 
When the marker status is known, there is more knowledge about the risks involved and 
participants decide more conservatively. When they do not know their marker status, the 
decision simply becomes a chance to maximize profits.  
5.4.2.4 Discrimination Impact 
 The variable that represents the discrimination impact is strongly significant in 
three of the four regressions: the donation regression, informed regression, and the 
investment regression when no marker status was available. The only regression where 
there was no significance was the investment regression when the marker status was 
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available. In each of the regressions where this variable was significant, the coefficient of 
the variable was negative, meaning that if the discrimination impact value increased, the 
likelihood that the player would donate their information, choose to be informed, or make 
an investment decreased. Additionally, each of the coefficients had a moderate 
magnitude. 
 These trends can be explained by examining the risks that are involved with each 
of the decisions in the game. When choosing to donate their information, the participants 
were told that there would be an increased chance of discrimination if they donated their 
information. Therefore, in order to prevent increasing the risk of being discriminated 
against and thereby increasing the chance of a loss of income, participants would choose 
to not donate their information. The decision to be informed increases the chance of 
discrimination the same amount as the decision to donate their information. By the same 
thought process, if a participant decides to be informed about their health status, they 
increase the risk that they will have a loss of income. As a result, participants will 
eliminate this risk by choosing to not be informed about their health status when there is 
an increased chance of discrimination. 
 The effect the discrimination impact has on the investment decision can be 
explained by realizing that participants are trying to maximize their profit in each round. 
Technically, only the affliction variable and the cure variable affect the investment 
decision. However, when a participant does not know their marker status, they have less 
total information about the scenario. In this case, participants could perceive that there is 
a high risk of having the disease because their marker status is unknown. However, they 
are told that there is a high overall discrimination impact, making their chance of 
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discrimination more likely than if the discrimination impact were low. In order to prevent 
any further loss of income that may occur due to their health status and whether or not 
they were discriminated against, participants would not make an investment. 
 The investment decision changes entirely with respect to the discrimination 
impact variable when the participant’s marker status is known. As stated previously, 
discrimination does not actually play a role in the calculation of investment success. 
Therefore it would be expected that the discrimination impact would not have a 
significant effect on whether or not an investment is made. This is seen when the marker 
status is known; in this scenario, participants know how likely they are to be afflicted by 
the disease. If they do have the marker, they will not invest regardless of the 
discrimination impact, but if they do not have the marker, they likely will invest in order 
to maximize the income for the treatment. 
5.4.2.5 Has Marker 
 The variable that represents whether or not a participant has a marker for the 
disease is strongly significant only in the investment regression when the participant 
knows their marker status. The donation decision and the decision to be informed are not 
significant because the knowledge of the marker status does not occur until after these 
decisions are made. When a participant has the marker for the disease, they know that 
they are at high risk for being afflicted by the disease, thereby causing them not to make 
an investment. Alternatively, when a participant does not have the marker for the disease, 
they know with 100% certainty that they will not be afflicted by the disease, thereby 
ensuring that they will see a return on their investment. This is supported by the 
significant result in this regression. Finally, when the maker status is unknown, 
	  
	  92	  
participants do not have any additional information about their risk of affliction. At this 
point, participants would choose to make an investment purely based on their ability to 
maximize their income. Therefore it is expected that this variable would not be 




















6.1 Summary of Study Findings  
6.1.1 The Survey 
 At the conclusion of the survey, we gained some insights into the complexity of 
the genetic information disclosure choice.  Our findings show that many different 
personal traits and situational events influence someone’s decision on whether or not to 
disclose personal genetic information. The first study in our research project asked survey 
respondents about different personal traits regarding demographics, generalized traits, 
genetic information sharing beliefs, health status variables, and trust in institutions. Each 
of these traits and the constructs of which they are composed were treated as an 
independent variable and regressed against willingness to disclose information. The 
dependent variables in the first study were the willingness to disclose information to three 
different institutions: government, health professionals, and insurance or pharmaceutical 
companies. Respondents were asked how willing they would be to donate their genetic 
information to these three institutions. The final dependent variable was a respondent’s 
willingness to be informed about their health status, asking if the respondent would like 
to know the results of a genetic test if they donated their information.  
There were four groupings of regressions created for the survey. The first three 
groupings regressed each of the independent variables against the willingness to disclose 
to three institutions. These first three groupings were student responses, parent responses, 
and student responses with parent predictors only. The final regression group regressed 
each of the independent variables against a student or a parent’s choice of being informed 
about their health status.  
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 Our survey results are applicable to students ages 18-24 and parents of such 
populations. Students had significant positive associations between issue involvement, 
perceived benefits, and trust in government and their willingness to disclose their genetic 
information to the government.  They had significant negative associations with their 
income, race (African-American), personal genetic privacy concerns, and social stigma 
with their willingness to disclose their genetic information to the government.  Students 
had significant positive associations with perceived benefits and trust in health 
professionals with their willingness to disclose their genetic information to health 
professionals.  They had significant negative associations with their race and personal 
genetic privacy concerns with their willingness to disclose their genetic information with 
health professionals.  Students had significant positive associations with perceived 
benefits, positive health and emotions, and trust in insurance and pharmaceutical 
companies with their willingness to disclose their genetic information to insurance and 
pharmaceutical companies.  They had significant negative associations with their race, 
warm-hearted altruism, personal genetic privacy concerns, and perceived risks with their 
willingness to disclose their genetic information to insurance and pharmaceutical 
companies. 
 Parents had a significant positive association with their trust in the government 
and their willingness to disclose their genetic information to the government.  They had 
no significant negative associations with their willingness to disclose their genetic 
information to the government. Parents had significant positive associations with number 
of diseases, positive health and emotion, negative health and emotion, and trust in health 
professionals and their willingness to disclose their genetic information to health 
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professionals.  They had a significant negative association with personal genetic privacy 
concern with their willingness to disclose their genetic information to health 
professionals.  Parents had significant positive associations with warm-hearted altruism 
and negative health and emotions with their willingness to disclose their genetic 
information with insurance and pharmaceutical companies.  They had negative 
associations with information privacy and personal genetic privacy concern with their 
willingness to disclose their genetic information to insurance and pharmaceutical 
companies. 
 Students with parent predictors had no significant positive associations with their 
willingness to disclose their genetic information with the government.  They had a 
significant negative association with social stigma with their willingness to disclose their 
genetic information to the government.  Students with parent predictors had a significant 
positive association with trust in health professionals with their willingness to disclose 
their genetic information to health professionals.  They had no significant negative 
associations with their willingness to disclose their genetic information with health 
professionals.  Students with parent predictors had no positive associations with their 
willingness to disclose their genetic information with insurance and pharmaceutical 
companies.  They had significant negative associations for personal genetic privacy 
concerns and social stigma with their willingness to disclose their genetic information 
with insurance and pharmaceutical companies. 
 It was possible to interpret our survey results through a number of theoretical 
lenses. The impact of income on disclosure to the government was explained by 
increased antipathy towards the government as income levels rise (Peters et al., 2004). 
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The impact of historical institutionalized discrimination against African-American 
explained the impact of race on disclosure of genetic information. The impact of warm-
hearted altruism on disclosure to insurance and pharmaceutical companies was explained 
by a disbelief that insurance and pharmaceutical companies would be well intentioned 
with genetic information. The influence of issue involvement on disclosure was explained 
by the idea that greater understanding of genetic information would decrease fears of the 
unknown. The relationship between personal genetic privacy concerns and disclosure was 
explained by fears that the current safeguards were not sufficient to protect the identities 
of genetic information. The impact of perceived benefits and number of diseases on 
disclosure was explained by a self-serving reasons for disclosure, such as cures for their 
own illnesses.  Social stigma effects on disclosure can be explained by fears of 
embarrassment if information leaked to the public.  Positive health and emotions might 
be related to disclosure on the basis of the belief that disclosure could lead to decreased 
health care costs.  The impact of negative health and emotion on disclosure to health 
professionals was explained by the fact that disclosure could be used to improve health. 
6.1.2 The Experiment 
 The second study sought to determine the situational effects that would influence 
someone’s decision to donate their personal genetic information. A game theory based 
experiment was developed that allowed participants to earn money based on the decisions 
they made. There were five independent variables: the likelihood of being afflicted by a 
disease, the incentive to donate, the likelihood of becoming sick after being afflicted by a 
disease, the overall impact to discrimination, and the impact to cure. All of the variables 
except affliction had a high or low value that was dependent on the treatment. In addition 
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to the treatment independent variables, each participant completed a demographic survey. 
These demographics were used as independent control variables in the regression 
analysis. The dependent variables that were measured were the decisions made by the 
participants: whether or not to donate their information, whether they want to be 
informed about their health status, and whether or not to invest some of their income. 
Based on these three decisions, there were four logistic regressions performed: decision 
to donate, decision to be informed, decision to invest with known marker status, decision 
to be informed with unknown marker status.  
 After completing the four logistic regressions, each of the four treatment variables 
that changed was determined to be significant in at least one of the four regressions. 
Impact to cure was determined to be significant for decision to donate and for the 
investment with unknown marker status. This shows that when people feel they can make 
a difference in contributing to a cure, they are more likely to donate. Next, sickness 
chance was only significant for the investment decisions, showing that people were trying 
to leverage their risk when making investments. Incentive clearly has a significant effect 
on the decision to donate as participants would earn money for making a decision when 
there is no additional risk. This could have major implications for policy actions. The 
impact to discrimination served only to increase the risk of losing money to 
discrimination; this effect is shown in that participants are much less likely to donate or 
be informed, and they appear to try and leverage risk when they have limited information. 
Finally, when participants are informed about their marker status, they are much less 
likely to invest their income.  
 Overall, there are a couple of simple rules to which the average participant 
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appeared to abide. First, try to maximize income when there is no additional risk 
involved. Second, try to minimize risk by making decisions that do not increase 
discrimination. Third, when there is inherent risk involved, such as when the 
discrimination risk and sickness chance are high, make decisions that will minimize risk 
later in the treatment. All of these basic rules can help to identify suggestions for future 
health policies.  
6.2 Suggestions for Future Health Policy 
 Our findings offer a number of useful implications that could help inform policy 
at local, state and national levels. In the experiment, people were shown to be negatively 
influenced by discrimination risk. Whenever participants were at a high risk for 
discrimination, they were much less likely to donate their information, much less likely to 
choose to be informed, and much less likely to invest when their marker status was 
unknown. As a result, future health policy needs to address the issues involved with 
discrimination. Currently, health policy addresses who is allowed access to information 
and when that information is allowed to be shared, but more extensive policy is required 
in order to make sure that this information is used in the correct way by institutions such 
as Insurance and Pharmaceutical Companies.  
Additionally, the survey results show that Personal Genetic Privacy Concerns 
negatively influences willingness to disclose for all populations; while this factor does 
not negatively influence willingness to disclose to all institutions for the two generations, 
it is nonetheless an important factor to at least one institution for each population. There 
have recently been several cases of online information privacy violation in many different 
domains. Additionally, it has been recently shown that de-identified genetic information 
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from databases can be re-identified (Malin 2004). As a result, future legislation needs to 
address two important issues: one, the alleviation of public concerns through messaging 
that privacy concerns are being examined in the development of policy, and two, the 
physical nature by which information is stored. All of these factors suggest that a 
delocalized database system with several layers of security access may be the best 
solution. Regardless of the solution that is chosen, both the threat of discrimination and 
the threat of privacy need to be addressed as major concerns in future systems of genetic-
based personalized healthcare. 
6.3 Future Work 
After spending three years researching and designing our studies, implementing 
them, and executing the data analysis, we see several aspects of the research that can be 
improved in the future, as well as robust opportunities for further work. In the 
experiment, the risk level for each participant could be modified with low and high risk to 
determine how participants would change their decisions. If the affliction risk were to be 
changed for each participant, there would be measurably different results. Our 
experiment found that the risk level for participants was not a significant factor in any of 
the decisions made. This result is to be expected because all of the participants had the 
same risk level. In order to more fully understand people’s perception of risk, it would be 
beneficial to test other variations of risk in the experiment. 
 An improvement on the implementation of the survey would be to develop a 
method that would increase parent response rates. In our experiment, we had 85 parents 
respond compared with a student response rate of 379. We incentivized parent responses 
by rewarding the students for their parent’s responses, but this clearly did not have as 
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much of an effect as we had intended. It may have been necessary to shorten the parent 
survey by eliminating repetitive questions in each construct. This could have caused less 
confidence for each of the parent construct averages, but it may have increased the 
response rate. Additionally, a different method of incentive could have been used in order 
to get parents to respond to the survey. For example, the $5 participation reward could 
have been increased to $7.50 where $5 went to the parent who responded and $2.50 went 
to the student linked to that parent response. 
 A major issue with the survey was that it was possible for the same user to 
complete the survey more than once. This led to a massive data set for which most of the 
responses were not meaningful. The issue stems from the fact that Qualtrics did not have 
a method of restricting participation once the link was emailed to our large listserv. This 
hopefully will have been fixed before any other surveys are used with Qualtrics again.  
6.4 Conclusion 
The field of health and medicine has an unprecedented opportunity ahead of it 
that can significantly improve the development of future treatments through analysis of 
genetic data. A critical precondition to this is the development of large and representative 
collections of genetic information. Motivated by the need to understand if and under what 
conditions individuals would be willing to disclose their personal genetic information, we 
designed our research to shed some light on these questions. We believe much further 
work remains to be done in order for society to fully comprehend the policy infrastructure 
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8.1 Survey Appendices 












8.1.2 Construct Definitions and Measurement Items 
Construct Code Description # Survey Items 
7 
I usually trust people until they give me 
a reason not to trust them 
8 
I usually give people the benefit of the 
doubt 
9 
My general approach is to trust new 
acquaintances until they prove I should 
not trust them 
Trust in People TIP Trust and 
reliability in 
people 
104 I generally trust strangers 





I take proactive steps to protect my 
personal health or financial information 
62 I am an affectionate and tender person 
63 
I am generally a sincere and truthful 
person 
64 
If I could help save somebody’s life, I 
would do everything possible 
65 
I enjoy doing small favors every day 
for the people I care about 
66 
Helping others is one of the most 
important aspects of life 
67 
I enjoy working for the welfare of 
others 
68 
My family tends to do what we can to 
help those less fortunate than ourselves 
Warm-Hearted 
Altruism 




I agree with the old saying, “It is better 
to give than to receive.” 
70 
How frequently have you personally 
been the victim of what you felt was an 
improper invasion of privacy? 
71 
How much have you heard or read 
during the last year about the use and 




II Prior experience or 
interest in relevant 
issues 
110 
I often hear about cases in which 








Compared with other subjects on my 
mind, the privacy of my electronic 





I am concerned about threats to the 
privacy of my electronically stored 
personal genetic health information 
today 
   
6 
All things considered, I believe the 
privacy of my electronic personal 
genetic health information is seriously 
threatened 
10 
The electronic/digital storage format is 
a safe environment in which to 
exchange genetic health information 
with others 
11 
The digital storage format is a reliable 
environment in which to conduct 









Organizations handle personal genetic 
health information submitted by 
patients in an electronic format in a 
competent fashion 
93 
I believe my genetic information can 
benefit medical advancement in a 
significant way 
94 
Researchers and health officials need 
access to genetic information to 
effectively produce treatments 
96 
Personalized genetic information will 
greatly improve the current health care 
system 
97 
Medical discoveries depend greatly on 




PB Medical and health 





Predicting serious diseases from 
genetic information will be an 
invaluable tool in the future of 
medicine 
78 
My genetic information can be used to 
discriminate against me 
Perceived Risks PR Employer and 
insurance 
discrimination as a 




I am afraid that knowledge of my poor 
health would affect my employer's 
view of me 
118 Social avoidance / pity Social Stigma SS Perception of 
social opinions 
regarding issues 134 





People will see others in a less 
favorable way if they come to know 
that he/she has a genetic disease 
136 
It is advisable for a person to hide from 
people with a genetic disease 
137 
People tend to like less those with a 
genetic disease 
  related to health 
138 
It is a sign of weakness or inadequacy 
to have a genetic disease 
38 I am happy about my health right now 
40 I feel ecstatic about life right now 
41 
My health state has provoked a 
profound devotion for life in me 
Positive Health 
and Emotions 
PHE Positive health 
status and 
emotions 
55 My spirits are high today 
37 
Right now I feel sad about something 
that has happened to my health 
39 
I have an intense loathing for my 
present state of health 
42 
Right now other things in my life will 
have to wait as I focus on my health 
43 
My current health state is a real 
inconvenience 
46 At present I feel extreme dread 
48 
I feel everything needs to be 
approached with caution right now 
49 
I am extremely displeased with my 
present health state 
50 
I feel disgust for my current state of 
health 
52 
I feel furious at my present state of 
health 
54 
I feel very deep sorrow because of my 
health 
56 Health problems are tiresome to me 
57 








My state of health has taken me 
unawares 
25 
I believe that the government, in 





integrity of the 
government 
26 
If I required help, the government 




The government, in general, is 
interested in my well-being, not just 
their own 
28 
The government is truthful in dealings 
with me 
29 
The government would keep 
commitments 
30 The government is sincere and genuine 
   
92 
I believe that the government is a 
reliable institution to conduct medical 
studies that include personal and health 
information 
31 
I believe that health professionals, in 
general, would act in my best interest 
32 
If I required help, health professionals 
would do their best to help me 
33 
Health professionals, in general, are 
interested in my well-being, not just 
their own 
34 
Health professionals are truthful in 
dealings with me 
35 
Health professionals would keep 
commitments 
36 
Health professionals are sincere and 
genuine 




integrity of health 
care professionals 
89 
I trust my doctor's advice regarding my 
health 
13 
I believe that pharmaceutical 
companies, in general, would act in my 
best interest 
14 
If I required help, a pharmaceutical 
company would do its best to help me 
15 
Pharmaceutical companies, in general, 
are interested in my well-being, not just 
their own 
16 
Pharmaceutical companies are truthful 
in dealings with me 
17 
Pharmaceutical companies would keep 
commitments 
18 
Pharmaceutical companies are sincere 
and genuine 
19 
I believe that insurance companies, in 












If I required help, a insurance company 




Insurance companies, in general, are 
interested in my well-being, not just 
their own 
22 
Insurance companies are truthful in 
dealings with me 
23 
Insurance companies would keep 
commitments 
24 
Insurance companies are sincere and 
genuine 
88 
I would trust a pharmaceutical 
company with my medical records 
   
91 
I believe that insurance companies' first 
priority is their customer's interests and 
health 
Decision to be 
Informed   
Decision to be 
informed of 
hypothetical 
genetic testing 151 
Unless you specifically choose NOT to 
be informed, if testing reveals that you 
are at risk for a genetic disease, you 


















8.1.3 Student Sample Summary Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
Value Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent  
0 187 49.3 49.3  
1 186 49.1 98.4  
Missing 6 1.6 100  
Gender_Male 
Total 379 100.0    
0 357 94.2 94.2  
1 22 5.8 100.0  
Race_Black 
Total 379 100    
  
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Age_S 372 15 68 24.33 6.932 
Income_S 373 1 10 6.13 2.559 
Trust in People, Students 374 1 7 4.2386 1.18130 
Info Privacy Student 374 1 7 4.7032 1.30174 
Warm Hearted-Altruism 
Student 
374 2 7 5.5314 .96739 
Issue Involvement 
Student 
374 1 7 3.6854 1.12303 
Personal Genetic Privacy 
Concern Student 
374 1 7 4.0330 1.55232 
Perceived Benefits 
Student 
374 1 7 4.7652 1.10041 
Perceived Risk Student 374 1 7 4.0227 1.46821 
Social Stigma Student 374 1 7 3.7656 1.11861 
NumDiseaseFamily_S 379 0 13 1.8997 2.06007 
Positive Health and 
Emotions Student 
374 1 5 3.0214 .72735 
Negative Health and 
Emotions Student 
374 1 5 1.7104 .78436 
Trust in Government, 
Students 
374 1 7 3.7120 1.32575 
Trust in Health 
Professionals, Students 
374 1 7 5.2284 1.07689 
Trust in Healthcare 
Industry, Students 
374 1 7 3.2995 1.23174 
Willingness to Disclose - 
Government Student 
374 1 7 3.9064 1.86956 
Willingness to Disclose - 
Health Professional 
Student  
374 1 7 4.8752 1.71291 
Willingness to Disclose - 
Insurance and 
Pharmaceutical Student 
374 1 7 3.4594 1.60435 
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8.1.4 Parent Sample Summary Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics 





0 53 62.4 62.4  
1 32 37.6 100.0  Gender_Male 
Total 85 100.0    
1 2 2.4 2.4  
2 1 1.2 3.5  
3 2 2.4 5.9  
4 54 63.5 69.4  
5 26 30.6 100.0  
Age 
Total 85 100.0    
0 376 99.2 99.2  
1 3 .8 100.0 
 
Race_Black 
Total 379 100.0    
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev 
Income_P 85 1 10 7.06 2.397 
Trust in People, Parents 85 2 7 4.1000 1.11883 
Info Privacy Parent 85 3 7 4.9588 1.21795 
Warm Hearted-Altruism 
Parent 
85 3 7 5.3868 1.03251 
Issue Involvement Parent 85 1 7 3.8196 1.21450 
Personal Genetic Privacy 
Concern Parent 
85 1 7 4.5922 1.36991 
Perceived Benefits Parents  85 1 7 4.5976 1.19463 
Perceived Risk Parents 85 1 7 4.1000 1.49164 
Social Stigma Parent 85 1 7 3.7686 1.18022 
NumDiseaseFamily_P 85 0 10 .4248 1.28957 
Positive Health and Emotions 
Parent 
85 1 5 2.9706 .74543 
Negative Health and 
Emotions Parent 
85 1 4 2.0344 .92220 
Trust in Government, Parents 85 1 6 3.4908 1.46426 
Trust in Health Professionals, 
Parents 
85 1 7 5.0723 1.19190 
Trust in Healthcare Industry, 
Parents 
85 1 6 3.0933 1.18738 
Willingness to Disclose - 
Government Parent  
85 1 7 3.3255 1.88560 
Willingness to Disclose - 
Health Professional Parent 
85 1 7 4.5373 1.85028 
Willingness to Disclose - 
Insurance and Pharmaceutical  
Parent 
85 1 7 2.9412 1.54960 
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8.1.6 Overall Demographics Table 
Demographic Student Parent 2010 US Census 
Gender 
Male 50.1% 37.1% 49.2% 
Female 49.9% 62.4% 50.8% 
Age 
18-24 63.4% 1.1% 9.1% 
25-34 29.6% 2.3% 13.3% 
35-44 4.3% 2.4% 13.3% 
45-54 1.9% 63.5% 14.6% 
55-64 0.3% 30.6% 11.8% 
65-74 0.3% 0% 7.0% 
Over 75 0% 0% 6.1% 
Marital Status 
Married 14.5% 75% 49.8% 
Divorced 1.3% 4% 10.6% 
Separated 0.3% 0% 2.2% 
Widowed 0.3% 1% 6.0% 
Never Married 82.1% 5% 31.4% 
Race 
White 64.4% 48% 72.4% 
Black or African American 5.8% 3% 12.6% 
Asian 25.3% 28% 4.8% 
Native Hawaiian or Other 
Pacific Islander 
0.5% 1% 0.2% 
Spanish/Hispanic, Latino 5% 5% 16.3% 
Religion 
Christian 44.9% 37% 76.0% 
Jewish 6.3% 12% 1.2% 
Muslim 3.7% 4% 0.6% 
Buddhist 4% 6% 0.5% 
Hindu 4% 3% 0.3% 
Unaffiliated 30.1% 20% 15% 
Other 1.3% 1% 1.3% 
Unknown 4.2% 2% 5.2% 
Political Party 
Democrat 45.1% 34.1%  
Republican 15.8% 25.9%  
Independent 25.9% 25.9%  
Other 11.6% 14.1%  
Education 
Some high school, no 
diploma 
0.3% 1.2% 8.5% 
High School Graduate 7.2% 8.2% 28.6% 
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Some college, but no degree 37% 14.1% 21.0% 
Associate degree in college 3.5% 7.1% 7.6% 
Bachelor’s degree 28.4% 30.6% 17.7% 








Less than $10,000 8.3% 4.7% 7.1% 
$10,000 to $14,999 1.1% 1.2% 5.4% 
$15,000 to $24,999 11% 2.4% 10.6% 
$25,000 to $34,999 5.1% 5.9% 10.4% 
$35,000 to $49,999 8.8% 7.1% 13.8% 
$50,000 to $74,999 15.5% 16.5% 18.3% 
$75,000 to $99,999 14.7% 12.9% 12.4% 
$100,000 to $149,999 18% 21.2% 12.7% 
$150,999 to $199,999 9.1% 8.2% 4.7% 
















8.1.7 Student Willingness to Disclose Correlations 
Variable Reliability 
Willingness 
to Disclose – 
Government  
Willingness 
to Disclose - 
Health 
Professional   
Willingness 















Professional   






0.948 .660*** .581*** 1.000 0.099* -0.015 -.105** 
Gender Male 1.000 0.065 -0.053 0.099* 1.000 0.044 -0.045 
Income 1.000 -0.065 0.045 -0.015 0.044 1.000 -.102** 
Race Black 1.000 -.148*** -.141*** -.105** -0.045 -.102** 1.000 
Trust in 
People 
0.817 0.100* 0.061 0.081 -0.031 0.009 -0.067 
Information 
Privacy  














0.895 -.216*** -.181*** -.199*** -0.039 -0.077 0.024 
Perceived 
Benefits  




0.491 -0.066 -0.095 -.186*** 0.057 -
.158*** 
0.019 

























0.955 0.047 0.028 .337*** .109** 0.060 -0.003 
 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 





























Professional   





0.948 0.081 -.093* -.117** -0.081 -.199*** .246*** -.186*** 
Gender Male 1.000 -0.031 -0.009 -.196*** 0.013 -0.039 .119** 0.057 
Income 1.000 0.009 0.008 0.085 -.096* -0.077 0.064 -.158*** 
Race Black 1.000 -0.067 -0.022 -0.054 -0.041 0.024 -.145*** 0.019 





1.000 .210*** .406*** .315*** 0.067 .199*** 
Warm Hearted-
Altruism  
0.898 .110** .210*** 1.000 .106** 0.096* .119** 0.050 
Issue 
Involvement  
0.535 -.128** .406*** .106** 1.000 .465*** 0.016 .341*** 
Personal Genetic 
Privacy Concern  
0.895 -0.085 .315*** 0.096* .465*** 1.000 -.121** .318*** 
Perceived 
Benefits  
0.835 0.052 0.067 .119** 0.016 -.121** 1.000 0.043 
Perceived Risk  0.491 -0.072 .199*** 0.050 .341*** .318*** 0.043 1.000 




N/A 0.073 0.079 0.095* 0.058 -0.096* 0.090* 0.027 
Positive Health 
and Emotions  
0.686 .176*** 0.032 .300*** -0.009 0.053 0.043 -0.070 
Negative Health 
and Emotions  
0.945 -.095* -0.031 -.252*** .181*** .163*** -.168*** .151*** 
Trust in 
Government 
0.939 .252*** -0.081 -0.064 -.114** -.102** .220*** -0.056 
Trust in Health 
Professionals 




0.955 .133** -.133*** -0.091* -.218*** -0.078 0.055 -.238*** 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 



































Professional   





0.948 -0.057 -0.015 0.075 0.035 .204*** 0.061 .337*** 
Gender Male 1.000 0.055 -.115** -0.013 0.054 .125** -0.069 .109** 
Income 1.000 -.116** 0.040 0.085* -.217*** -0.042 0.097* 0.060 
Race Black 1.000 0.032 -0.076 0.043 .104** -0.014 -0.058 -0.003 
Trust in 
People 
0.817 -.122** 0.073 .176*** -0.095* .252*** .145*** .133** 
Information 
Privacy  




0.898 -.121** 0.095* .300*** -.252*** -0.064 .303*** -0.091* 
Issue 
Involvement  





0.895 .295*** -0.096* 0.053 .163*** -.102** -0.087* -0.078 
Perceived 
Benefits  
0.835 -0.016 0.090* 0.043 -.168*** .220*** .264*** 0.055 
Perceived 
Risk  
0.491 .257*** 0.027 -0.070 .151*** -0.056 -.106** -.238*** 












0.945 .156*** -0.008 -.196*** 1.000 -0.029 -.315*** 0.091* 
Trust in 
Government 








0.955 -0.016 -.105** 0.057 0.091 .380*** .122** 1.000 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 




8.1.8 Parent Willingness to Disclose Correlations 
Variable Reliability 
Willingness 
to Disclose - 
Government   
Willingness 
















Government   










0.946 .601*** .535*** 1.000 -0.125 -0.080 0.111 0.008 
Gender_Male 1.000 0.012 -0.209* -0.125 1.000 0.022 -0.149 0.012 
Income 1.000 0.040 0.196* -0.080 0.022 1.000 -0.058 0.170 
Race Black 1.000 -0.011 -0.044 0.111 -0.149 -0.058 1.000 -0.103 
Trust in People 0.725 0.011 0.102 0.008 0.012 0.170 -0.103 1.000 
Information 
Privacy  0.365 -.232** 0.048 -.353*** 0.077 .288*** -0.020 -0.006 
Warm Hearted-
Altruism  0.914 -0.030 .332*** 0.059 -0.101 0.208* -0.103 .225** 
Issue 
Involvement  0.502 -0.203 -0.081 -.234** 0.136 0.092 0.046 .220** 
Personal Genetic 
Privacy Concern  0.895 -.226** -.233** -.334*** 0.185 0.045 0.010 0.014 
Perceived 
Benefits 0.876 0.058 0.157 -0.171 0.128 0.087 -0.075 -0.177 
Perceived Risk 0.570 -0.198* -0.043 -0.196* 0.062 -0.133 -0.056 -0.052 




N/A -0.102 0.206* -0.005 -0.120 .224** 0.063 0.213* 
Positive Health 
and Emotions  0.695 -0.007 0.212 -0.032 0.162 .287*** 0.094 0.187* 
Negative Health 
and Emotions  0.954 0.029 -0.090 .215** 0.042 -0.205* 0.084 -0.033 
Trust in 
Government 0.943 .554*** 0.165 .238** 0.124 -0.209* 0.004 -0.142 
Trust in Health 




0.940 .251** 0.098 .302*** 0.050 -.239** 0.147 -0.140 
 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 























Government   










0.946 -.353*** 0.059 -.234** -.334*** -0.171 -0.196* -0.185* 
Gender_Male 1.000 0.077 -0.101 0.136 0.185* 0.128 0.062 0.129 
Income 1.000 .288*** 0.208* 0.092 0.045 0.087 -0.133 -.216** 
Race Black 1.000 -0.020 -0.103 0.046 0.010 -0.075 -0.056 -0.008 
Trust in 
People 0.725 -0.006 .225** .220** 0.014 -0.177 -0.052 -0.118 
Information 




0.914 .362*** 1.000 0.040 0.060 0.095 -0.069 -0.187* 
Issue 





0.895 0.193* 0.060 .332*** 1.000 0.113 .290*** .224** 
Perceived 
Benefits 0.876 .265** 0.095 0.102 0.113 1.000 0.165 0.107 
Perceived Risk 0.570 0.110 -0.069 .347*** .290*** 0.165 1.000 0.177 












0.954 -.341*** -.417*** .228** 0.138 -0.011 0.108 .275** 
Trust in 
Government 0.943 -.238** -0.194 -.250** -0.151 0.059 -0.145 0.032 
Trust in Health 




0.940 -.253** -0.069 -.216** -0.021 -0.028 -.227** 0.053 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 

























Government   
0.968 -0.102 -0.007 0.029 .554*** .227** .251** 
Willingness to 
Disclose - Health 
Professional  
0.962 0.206* 0.212* -0.090 0.165 .471*** 0.098 
Willingness to 
Disclose - Insurance 
and Pharmacy 
0.946 -0.005 -0.032 .215** .238** 0.089 .302*** 
Gender_Male 1.000 -0.120 0.162 0.042 0.124 -0.156 0.050 
Income 1.000 .224** .287*** -0.205 -0.209* 0.167 -.239** 
Race Black 1.000 0.063 0.094 0.084 0.004 -0.112 0.147 
Trust in People 0.725 0.213* 0.187* -0.033 -0.142 0.042 -0.140 
Information Privacy  0.365 .256** 0.174 -.341*** -.238** .253** -.253** 
Warm Hearted-
Altruism  0.914 .234** 0.158 -.417*** -0.194* .463*** -0.069 
Issue Involvement  0.502 0.139 0.155 .228** -.250** -0.034 -.216** 
Personal Genetic 
Privacy Concern  0.895 0.007 0.186* 0.138 -0.151 -0.112 -0.021 
Perceived Benefits 0.876 -0.038 -0.082 -0.011 0.059 .245** -0.028 
Perceived Risk 0.570 0.131 -0.111 0.108 -0.145 -0.006 -.227** 
Social Stigma  0.761 -0.172 0.001 .275** 0.032 0.053 0.053 
Number of Diseases 
in Family N/A 1.000 0.059 -0.101 -.324*** -0.022 -.261** 
Positive Health and 
Emotions  0.695 0.059 1.000 0.022 -0.013 0.088 0.068 
Negative Health 
and Emotions  0.954 -0.101 0.022 1.000 0.108 -.375*** .353*** 
Trust in 
Government 0.943 -.324*** -0.013 0.108 1.000 .269** .554*** 
Trust in Health 
Professionals 0.948 -0.022 0.088 -.375*** .269** 1.000 0.213 
Trust in Healthcare 
Industry 0.940 -.261** 0.068 .353*** .554*** 0.213* 1.000 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 






8.1.9 Student Willingness to Disclose with Parent Predictor Correlations 
Variable Reliability 
Willingness 
to Disclose - 
Government  
Willingness 
to Disclose - 
Health 


















Professional   





0.948 .660*** .581*** 1 .063 .048 -.013 .055 
Gender Male  1.000 .010 -.126 .063 1.000 0.022 -0.149 0.012 
Income  1.000 .010 .147 .048 0.022 1.000 -0.058 0.170 
Race Black  1.000 -.033 -.081 -.013 -0.149 -0.058 1.000 -0.103 
Trust in People  0.725 .124 0.201* .055 0.012 0.170 -0.103 1.000 
Information 
Privacy  0.365 .163 .109 -.025 0.077 
.288**
* -0.020 -0.006 
Warm Hearted-
Altruism  0.914 .114 .294*** .000 -0.101 0.208* -0.103 .225** 
Issue 




0.895 -.068 -.016 -.154 0.185 0.045 0.010 0.014 
Perceived 
Benefits   0.876 .131 .222** .151 0.128 0.087 -0.075 -0.177 
Perceived Risk  0.570 .087 .110 .055 0.062 -0.133 -0.056 -0.052 




N/A .068 0.096** .054 -0.120 .224** 0.063 0.213* 
Positive Health 
and Emotions  0.695 .003 .098 .011 0.162 
.287**
* 0.094 0.187* 
Negative Health 
and Emotions  0.954 -.165 -.121 .100 0.042 -0.205* 0.084 -0.033 
Trust in 
Government  0.943 .070 -.068 .036 0.124 -0.209* 0.004 -0.142 
Trust in Health 




0.940 -.105 -.151 .090 0.050 -.239** 0.147 -0.140 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 




























Professional   





0.948 -.025 .000 .011 -.154 .151 .055 -.149 
Gender Male  1.000 0.077 -0.101 0.136 0.185* 0.128 0.062 0.129 
Income  1.000 .288*** 0.208* 0.092 0.045 0.087 -0.133 -.216** 
Race Black  1.000 -0.020 -0.103 0.046 0.010 -0.075 -0.056 -0.008 
Trust in 
People  0.725 -0.006 .225** .220** 0.014 -0.177 -0.052 -0.118 
Information 




0.914 .362*** 1.000 0.040 0.060 0.095 -0.069 -0.187* 
Issue 





0.895 0.193* 0.060 .332*** 1.000 0.113 .290*** .224** 
Perceived 
Benefits   0.876 .265** 0.095 0.102 0.113 1.000 0.165 0.107 
Perceived 
Risk  0.570 0.110 -0.069 .347*** .290*** 0.165 1.000 0.177 












0.954 -.341*** -.417*** .228** 0.138 -0.011 0.108 .275** 
Trust in 








0.940 -.253** -0.069 -.216** -0.021 -0.028 -.227** 0.053 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 






























Professional   





0.948 .054 .011 .100 .036 .172 .090 
Gender Male  1.000 -0.120 0.162 0.042 0.124 -0.156 0.050 
Income  1.000 .224** .287*** -0.205 -0.209* 0.167 -.239** 
Race Black  1.000 0.063 0.094 0.084 0.004 -0.112 0.147 
Trust in 
People  0.725 0.213* 0.187* -0.033 -0.142 0.042 -0.140 
Information 




0.914 .234** 0.158 -.417*** -0.194* .463*** -0.069 
Issue 





0.895 0.007 0.186* 0.138 -0.151 -0.112 -0.021 
Perceived 
Benefits   0.876 -0.038 -0.082 -0.011 0.059 .245** -0.028 
Perceived Risk  0.570 0.131 -0.111 0.108 -0.145 -0.006 -.227** 












0.954 -0.101 0.022 1.000 0.108 -.375*** .353*** 
Trust in 








0.940 -.261** 0.068 .353*** .554*** 0.213* 1.000 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 




























1.000 1.000 -0.049 -0.022 0.099* -0.015 -0.008 0.063 
Race Black 1.000 -0.049 1.000 -0.045 -0.022 0.024 -0.028 0.032 
Gender 
Male 
1.000 -0.022 -0.045 1.000 -0.009 -0.039 0.045 0.055 
Information 
Privacy  



















N/A -0.033 -0.076 -
.115** 








0.945 -.122** .104** 0.054 -0.031 .163*** -0.005 .156*** 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 





Number of Diseases 
in Family 




Decision to be 
Informed 
1.000 -0.033 0.051 -.122** 
Race Black 1.000 -0.076 0.043 .104** 
Gender Male 1.000 -.115** -0.013 0.054 
Information Privacy  0.556 0.079 0.032 -0.031 
Genetic Information 
Privacy Concern 
0.895 -0.096* 0.053 .163*** 
Electronic Genetic 
Privacy Concern  
0.847 -0.019 0.066 -0.005 
Social Stigma  0.766 -.110** -0.088* .156*** 
Number of Diseases 
in Family 
N/A 1.000 -0.024 -0.008 
Positive Health and 
Emotions  
0.686 -0.024 1.000 -.196*** 
Negative Health and 
Emotions  
0.945 -0.008 -.196*** 1.000 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 







































1.000 1.000 0.066 0.031 .304*** -0.084 -0.158 -0.052 
Race Black 1.000 0.066 1.000 -0.149 -0.020 0.010 -0.078 -0.008 
Gender 
Male 
1.000 0.031 -0.149 1.000 0.077 0.185* 0.044 0.129 
Information 
Privacy  0.365 











0.909 -0.158 -0.078 0.044 -0.170 -0.136 1.000 -0.065 
Social 
Stigma  















-.218** 0.084 0.042 -.341*** 0.138 0.091 .275** 
 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 


















Decision to be 
Informed 
1.000 0.179 -0.039 -.218** 
Race Black 1.000 0.063 0.094 0.084 
Gender Male 1.000 -0.120 0.162 0.042 
Information Privacy  
0.365 
.256** 0.174 -.341*** 
Genetic Information 
Privacy Concern 0.895 
0.007 0.186* 0.138 
Electronic Genetic 
Privacy Concern  
0.909 -0.202* -0.133 0.091 
Social Stigma  1.000 -0.172 0.001 .275** 
Number of Diseases 
in Family N/A 
1.000 0.059 -0.101 
Positive Health and 
Emotions  0.695 
0.059 1.000 0.022 
Negative Health and 
Emotions  0.954 
-0.101 0.022 1.000 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 

















8.1.12 Student Linear Regression 





Gender Male  -.052 (.176) -0.231 (0.166) 0.044 (.156) 
Income  -.073 (.034) ** -0.014 (0.032) -0.039 (0.030) 
Race: Black  -.894 (.366) ** -0.689 (0.347) ** -0.576 (.325) * 
        





Trust in People  -.043 (.077) -0.039 (0.071) 0.022 (.067) 
Information Privacy  -.016 (.074) 0.011 (0.071) -.011 (.066) 
Warm-hearted Altruism  -.134 (.099) -0.049 (0.095) -.196 (.088) ** 
        
Genetic Information 





Issue Involvement  .174 (.093) * 0.072 (0.088) .124 (.083) 
Personal Genetic Privacy 
Concern  -.194 (.067) *** -0.140 (0.063) ** -.163 (.059) *** 
Perceived Benefits  .348 (.082) *** 0.371 (0.078)*** .329 (.072) *** 
Perceived Risks  -.019 (.064) -0.044 (0.061) -.119 (.058) * 
        





Social Stigma  -.151 (.082) * -0.104 (0.078) -.007 (.073) 
Number of Diseases  .023 (.042) 0.043 (0.040) -.010 (.038) 
Positive Health and 
Emotions  .110 (.126) 0.180 (0.119) .230 (.111) ** 
Negative Health and 
Emotions  -.125 (.119) 0.085 (0.115) .125 (.107) 
        





Student Trust .493 (.069) *** 0.433 (0.084)*** .366 (.066) *** 
        
Constant 2.568 (.920) *** 1.567 (.908) * 1.794 (.830) ** 
R^2 0.283 0.232 0.233 
Adjusted R^2 0.253 0.2 0.2 
***. Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 











Gender Male  -.035 (.391)  -0.391 (0.377) .044 (.331) 
Income  .112 (.085) 0.032 (0.08) .016 (.073) 
Race: Black  .071 (.989)  -0.097 (0.943) .787 (.847) 
        





Trust in People  .063 (.178) -0.003 (0.169) -.053 (.152) 
Information Privacy  -.271 (.188) -0.181 (0.178) -.303 (.160) * 
Warm-hearted Altruism  .132 (.208) 0.249 (0.212) .431 (.180) ** 
        
Genetic Information 





Issue Involvement  .029 (.185) -0.102 (0.174) -.121 (.159) 
Personal Genetic 
Privacy Concern  -.124 (.146) -0.271 (0.141) * -.315 (.124) ** 
Perceived Benefits  .147 (.163) 0.227 (0.158) -.097 (.137) 
Perceived Risks  -.071 (.136) 0.078 (0.130) -.007 (.118) 







Social Stigma  -.200 (.166) -0.265 (0.162) -.159 (.141) 
Number of Diseases  .051 (.093) 0.151 (0.088) * .039 (.078) 
Positive Health and 
Emotions  -.040 (.268) 0.577 (0.255) ** -.011 (.228) 
Negative Health and 
Emotions  .052 (.240) 0.390 (0.234) * .505 (.222) ** 
        





Parent Trust 0.720 (.136) *** 0.649 (0.182) *** .173 (.156) 
        
Constant 1.149 (1.935) -.785 (1.714)  3.563 (1.573) ** 
R^2 0.404 0.442 0.364 
Adjusted R^2 0.274 0.321 0.225 
***. Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 





8.1.14 Student Regression with Parent Predictors 





Gender Male (P) -.057 (.485) -.310 (.393) .282 (.442) 
Income (P) -.092 (.104) -.043 (.084) .032 (.096) 
Race: Black (P) -.728 (1.196) -1.028 (.965) -.447 (1.104) 
        





Trust in People (P) .283 (.223)  .204 (.179) .107 (.205) 
Information Privacy (P) .288 (.232) -.147 (.185) .004 (.212) 
Warm-hearted Altruism 
(P) -.025 (.264)  .065 (.222) .077 (.244) 
        
Genetic Information 





Issue Involvement (P) -.015 (.254) .133 (.206) .104 (.237) 
Personal Genetic Privacy 
Concern (P) -.149 (.185) -.013 (.151) -.335 (.167) ** 
Perceived Benefits (P) .257 (.207)  .272 (.169) .256 (.187) 
Perceived Risks (P) .244 (.175)  .139 (.141) .236 (.164) 
        





Social Stigma (P) -.530 (.221) ** -.269 (.176) -.370 (.200) * 
Number of Diseases (P) -.058 (.121)  .156 (.097) -.035 (.109) 
Positive Health and 
Emotions (P) .190 (.357) .139 (.288) .212 (.323) 
Negative Health and 
Emotions (P) -.074 (.318) .187 (.264) .341 (.309) 
        





Parent Trust .076 (.175) .761 (.205) *** .164 (.212) 
        
Constant 2.390 (2.455) -1.266 (1.88) 1.146 (2.216) 
R^2 0.19 0.396 0.159 
Adjusted R^2 0 0.255 -0.039 
***. Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 




8.1.15 Binary Logistic for Student and Parents 
Demographic Variables STUDENT PARENT 
Income -.106 (.088) .106 (.196) 
Race: African American -.972 (.706) 
19.685 
(21088.755) 
Gender -.290 (.438) 1.023 (.936) 
      
Generalize Traits STUDENT PARENT 
Information Privacy .398 (.171) ** .997 (.481) ** 
      
Genetic Information Sharing Beliefs STUDENT PARENT 
Genetic Information Privacy Concerns -.196 (.151) -.458 (.481) 
Electronic Genetic Information Privacy 
Concerns -.012 (.195) -.428 (.387) 
      
Health Status Variables STUDENT PARENT 
Social Stigma .384 (.224) * -.083 (.435) 
Number of Diseases in Family -.154 (.089) * .366 (.350) 
Negative Health and Emotions -.507 (.240) ** -.392 (.495) 
Positive Health and Emotions .290 (.315) -.056 (.646) 
      
Constant 1.585 (1.880) 2.986 (3.771) 
***. Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 














8.2 Experiment Appendices 




















The percentage chance that a participant will 
become sick during a treatment. This variable was 
always set to 50% 
Incentive The amount of money that could be received for 
donating information, this variable was either 
$0.00 or $0.80 
Sickness 
Chance 
The percentage chance that a participant would 
become sick if they have the disease. This 
variable was either 30% or 70% 
Impact to 
Discrimination 
Discrimination chance would be multiplied by 
this variable, causing a higher or lower chance of 






Impact to Cure The amount that the cure chance would be 
increased by if a participant chose to donate their 
information. This variable was either 2% or 3% 
Discrimination 
Chance 
The total percentage chance that a participant 
would be discriminated. Different decisions made 
by the participant would increase the value of this 
variable. This variable was multiplied by Impact 




Cure Chance The percentage chance that a cure would be 
found. This variable was identical for all 
participants in each treatment. 
Affliction Yes or No, does the participant have the disease? 



















8.2.3 Summary Statistics 
Variable Value Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
0 668 44.4 44.4 
1 838 55.6 100.0 
Donate 
Total 1506 100.0   
-1 719 47.7 47.7 
0 323 21.4 69.2 
1 464 30.8 100.0 
Informed 
Total 1506 100.0   
0 473 31.4 31.4 
1 1033 68.6 100.0 
Invest 
Total 1506 100.0   
0 358 23.8 23.8 
1 1148 76.2 100.0 
Marker 
Total 1506 100.0   
0 745 49.5 49.5 
1 761 50.5 100.0 
Sickness Chance 
Total 1506 100.0   
0 48 51.1 51.1 
1 46 48.9 100.0 
Gender 
Total 94 100.0   
0 81 86.2% 86.2 
1 13 13.8 100.0 
Race Black 
Total 94 100.0   
0 66 70.2 70.2 
1 28 29.8 100.0 
Race Asian 
Total 94 100.0   
0 76 80.9 80.9 
1 18 19.1 100.0 
Religion 
Unaffiliated 
Total 94 100.0   
0 69 73.4 73.4 
1 25 26.6 100.0 
Political 
Independent 
Total 94 100.0   
1 5 5.3 5.3 
2 1 1.1 6.4 
3 2 2.1 8.5 
4 5 5.3 13.8 
5 11 11.7 25.5 
6 10 10.6 36.2 
7 10 10.6 46.8 
8 20 21.3 68.1 
9 16 17.0 85.1 
10 14 14.9 100.0 
Income 
Total 94 100.0   
Education 3 3 3.2 3.2 
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4 76 80.9 84.0 
5 12 12.8 96.8 
6 2 2.1 98.9 
8 1 1.1 100.0 
 

















8.2.5 Experiment Correlation Tables 













donate 1.000 .a .a .202*** .131*** -0.030 .272*** -.211*** 
Informed .a 1.000 .a .a 0.002 0.039 -0.045 -0.068* 
Invest With 
Marker 
.a .a 1.000 .a 0.070 -.111** -0.012 -0.050 
Invest Without 
Marker 
.202*** .a .a 1.000 .092*** -.130*** .145*** -.141*** 
Impact to Cure .131*** 0.002 0.070 .092*** 1.000 -0.009 -0.009 0.009 
Sickness 
Chance 
-0.030 0.039 -.111** -.130*** -0.009 1.000 -0.009 0.009 
Incentive .272*** -0.045 -0.012 .145*** -0.009 -0.009 1.000 0.009 
Impact to 
Discrimination 
-.211*** -0.068* -0.050 -.141*** 0.009 0.009 0.009 1.000 
Affliction Risk -0.017 0.066* .098** .078** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Marker 0.019 0.027 -
.153*** 
0.017 0.048* 0.007 -0.002 0.005 
Gender Male 0.008 -.112*** 0.060 0.028 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.004 
Race Black -0.018 -0.047 0.047 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Race Asian -0.029 0.011 0.054 -0.052* -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.003 
Religion 
Unaffiliated 
-.069*** -.116*** -0.051 0.051 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 
Political 
Independent 
-0.012 0.013 0.009 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.004 
Income 0.004 -.084** -0.037 -.103*** 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.002 
Education -0.026 0.034 0.015 .068** -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 0.006 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 















donate -0.017 0.019 0.008 -0.018 -0.029 -.069*** 





0.060 0.047 0.054 -0.051 
Invest Without 
Marker 
.078** 0.017 0.028 0.030 -0.052* 0.051 
Impact to Cure 0.000 0.048* -0.004 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 
Sickness 
Chance 
0.000 0.007 -0.004 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 
Incentive 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 
Impact to 
Discrimination 
0.000 0.005 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.002 
Affliction Risk 1.000 0.000 -0.003 .093*** -.138*** 0.000 
Marker 0.000 1.000 -0.036 0.001 -0.025 -0.013 
Gender Male -0.003 -0.036 1.000 -0.025 -.169*** 0.012 
Race Black .093*** 0.001 -0.025 1.000 -.260*** -.194*** 
Race Asian -.138*** -0.025 -.169*** -.260*** 1.000 .096*** 
Religion 
Unaffiliated 
0.000 -0.013 0.012 -.194*** .096*** 1.000 
Political 
Independent 
.074*** 0.044* -0.007 0.039 -.131*** -.112*** 
Income -.228*** -.051** .248*** -0.037 -.282*** 0.017 
Education .183*** 0.029 .195*** -.069*** .192*** .072*** 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 






Independent Income Education 
donate -0.012 0.004 -0.026 
Informed 0.013 -.084** 0.034 
Invest With 
Marker 
0.009 -0.037 0.015 
Invest Without 
Marker 
0.011 -.103*** .068** 
Impact to Cure 0.004 0.002 -0.006 
Sickness 
Chance 
0.004 0.002 -0.006 
Incentive 0.004 0.002 -0.006 
Impact to 
Discrimination 
-0.004 -0.002 0.006 
Affliction Risk .074*** -.228*** .183*** 
Marker 0.044* -.051** 0.029 
Gender Male -0.007 .248*** .195*** 
Race Black 0.039 -0.037 -.069*** 
Race Asian -.131*** -.282*** .192*** 
Religion 
Unaffiliated 
-.112*** 0.017 .072*** 
Political 
Independent 
1.000 -.122*** -.134*** 
Income -.122*** 1.000 -.267*** 
Education -.134*** -.267*** 1.000 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 




8.2.6 Experiment Crosstabulations 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total  
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
donateMaxImpact * donate 1506 100.0% 0 .0% 1506 100.0% 
donateMaxImpact * 
informedSelected 
787 52.3% 719 47.7% 1506 100.0% 
donateMaxImpact * 
InvestWithMarker 
455 30.2% 1051 69.8% 1506 100.0% 
donateMaxImpact * 
InvestWithoutMarker 
1029 68.3% 477 31.7% 1506 100.0% 
geneExpressionChance * 
donate 
1506 100.0% 0 .0% 1506 100.0% 
geneExpressionChance * 
informedSelected 
787 52.3% 719 47.7% 1506 100.0% 
geneExpressionChance * 
InvestWithMarker 
455 30.2% 1051 69.8% 1506 100.0% 
geneExpressionChance * 
InvestWithoutMarker 
1029 68.3% 477 31.7% 1506 100.0% 
profitIncentive * donate 1506 100.0% 0 .0% 1506 100.0% 
profitIncentive * 
informedSelected 
787 52.3% 719 47.7% 1506 100.0% 
profitIncentive * 
InvestWithMarker 
455 30.2% 1051 69.8% 1506 100.0% 
profitIncentive * 
InvestWithoutMarker 
1029 68.3% 477 31.7% 1506 100.0% 
discriminationverallMultiplier 
* donate 
1506 100.0% 0 .0% 1506 100.0% 
discriminationverallMultiplier 
* informedSelected 
787 52.3% 719 47.7% 1506 100.0% 
discriminationverallMultiplier 
* InvestWithMarker 
455 30.2% 1051 69.8% 1506 100.0% 
discriminationverallMultiplier 
* InvestWithoutMarker 




donateMaxImpact * donate Crosstabulation 
  donate 
  
Value 
0 1 Total 
.02 386 374 760 donateMaxImpact 
.03 282 464 746 
Total 668 838 1506 
     
donateMaxImpact * informedSelected Crosstabulation 
informedSelected   
.00 1.00 Total 
.02 144 206 350 donateMaxImpact 
.03 179 258 437 
Total 323 464 787 
     
donateMaxImpact * InvestWithMarker Crosstabulation 
InvestWithMarker   
.00 1.00 Total 
.02 57 145 202 donateMaxImpact 
.03 56 197 253 
Total 113 342 455 
     
donateMaxImpact * InvestWithoutMarker Crosstabulation 
InvestWithoutMarker   
.00 1.00 Total 
.02 204 343 547 donateMaxImpact 
.03 138 344 482 
Total 342 687 1029 
     
geneExpressionChance * donate Crosstabulation 
donate   
0 1 Total 
.3 326 434 760 geneExpressionChance 
.7 342 404 746 
Total 668 838 1506 
     
geneExpressionChance * informedSelected Crosstabulation 
  informedSelected Total 
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 .00 1.00  
.3 173 230 403 geneExpressionChance 
.7 150 234 384 
Total 323 464 787 
     
geneExpressionChance * InvestWithMarker Crosstabulation 
InvestWithMarker   
.00 1.00 Total 
.3 45 180 225 geneExpressionChance 
.7 68 162 230 
Total 113 342 455 
     
geneExpressionChance * InvestWithoutMarker Crosstabulation 
InvestWithoutMarker   
.00 1.00 Total 
.3 143 382 525 geneExpressionChance 
.7 199 305 504 
Total 342 687 1029 
     
profitIncentive * donate Crosstabulation 
donate   
0 1 Total 
0 439 321 760 profitIncentive 
10 229 517 746 
Total 668 838 1506 
     
profitIncentive * informedSelected Crosstabulation 
informedSelected   
.00 1.00 Total 
0 118 190 308 profitIncentive 
10 205 274 479 
Total 323 464 787 
     
profitIncentive * InvestWithMarker Crosstabulation 
InvestWithMarker   
.00 1.00 Total 
0 45 141 186 profitIncentive 
10 68 201 269 
Total 113 342 455 
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profitIncentive * InvestWithoutMarker Crosstabulation 
InvestWithoutMarker   
.00 1.00 Total 
0 222 341 563 profitIncentive 
10 120 346 466 
Total 342 687 1029 
     
discriminationverallMultiplier * donate Crosstabulation 
donate   
0 1 Total 
.8 252 494 746 discriminationverallMultiplier 
1.2 416 344 760 
Total 668 838 1506 
     
discriminationverallMultiplier * informedSelected Crosstabulation 
informedSelected   
.00 1.00 Total 
.8 172 279 451 discriminationverallMultiplier 
1.2 151 185 336 
Total 323 464 787 
     
discriminationverallMultiplier * InvestWithMarker 
Crosstabulation 
InvestWithMarker   
.00 1.00 Total 
.8 63 210 273 discriminationverallMultiplier 
1.2 50 132 182 
Total 113 342 455 
     
discriminationverallMultiplier * InvestWithoutMarker 
Crosstabulation 
InvestWithoutMarker   
.00 1.00 Total 
.8 120 343 463 discriminationverallMultiplier 
1.2 222 344 566 





8.2.7 Random Effects Logistic Regression 
Variables Donate  Informed Invest with Marker Invest 









Incentive 0.143 (0.0137)*** 0.000 (0.026) 0.013 (0.032) 0.105 (0.019)*** 
Impact to 
Discrimination -2.882 (0.334)*** 
-1.814 
(0.640)*** -0.736 (0.718) 
-2.455 
(0.454)*** 
Marker     -1.230 (0.369)***   
Affliction 
Risk -.0974 (0.208) 0.557 (0.676) 0.548 (0.366) 0.252 (0.348) 
Gender_Male 0.0749 (0.213) -1.083 (0.685) 0.394 (0.384) 0.267 (0.355) 
RaceBlack -0.320 (0.299) -0.738 (0.948) 0.657 (0.558) -0.018 (0.489) 
RaceAsian -0.225 (0.244) -0.134 (0.803) 0.703 (0.484) -0.626 (0.414) 
Religion 
Unaffiliated -.490 (.255)* -1.606 (.852)* -0.591 (0.525) 0.222 (0.432) 
Political 
Independent -0.180 (0.229) -0.251 (0.736) -0.070 (0.410) -0.209 (0.382) 
Income -0.030 (0.048) -0.072 (0.153) -0.050 (0.088) -0.148(.082)* 
Education -0.100 (0.181) 0.080 (0.574) -0.392 (0.333) 0.507 (.349) 
Constant 2.035 (1.045)* 2.092 (3.023) 2.725 (1.926) 1.710 (1.810) 
     
Observations 1490 779 456 1034 
Number of 
Subjects 94 92 77 93 
Subject FE no no no no 
Period FE yes yes yes yes 
***. Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 








8.2.8 Fixed Effects Logistic Model 





Impact to Cure 65.25 (13.51)***  20.91 (25.85) 56.93 (31.94)* 61.15(18.89)*** 
Sickness Chance -0.324  (0.314) .961 (.6222) -2.020 (.773)*** -1.905(.455)*** 
Incentive 0.133 (0.0142)*** .005 (.028) .0145 (.037) .103(.0201)*** 
Impact to 
Discrimination -2.812 (0.352)*** 
-1.694 
(.695)** -.263 (.853) 
-2.534 
(.486)*** 
Marker     -1.392 (.424)***   
Lagged Sickness -.064 (0.130) .088 (.249) .599 (.312)* .239 (.180) 
Lagged Number 
of Donations -0.003 (0.023) .022 (.045) .008 (.0559) -.045 (.0305) 
     
Observations 1352 438 296 833 
Number of 
Subjects 91 55 47 79 
Subject FE yes yes yes yes 
Period FE yes yes yes yes 
     
 
***. Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
















8.3 Study Documents 
8.3.1 Survey Documents 
8.3.1.1 Student Survey 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Team MAGIC would like to thank you for agreeing to participate in our Gemstone 
Survey! In this survey, you will be asked how you feel regarding genetic information 
sharing. You will respond to a series of statements that measure your behavior regarding 
your personal information and personal demographic information. 
 
The healthcare industry is moving towards personalization of medicine where specific 
genetic information can be interpreted to assist health care professionals to treat illnesses. 
Furthermore, other benefits to healthcare by sharing your genetic information include an 
increase in scientific knowledge and assistance in finding cures. However, sharing 
genetic information can allow for genetic discrimination, job loss, and insurance 
discrimination. 
 
SECTION 1 – Individual Characteristics  
Please respond to the following questions using the scale provided: 
 
 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Compared with 
other subjects 
on my mind, 
personal 
privacy is very 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
3. I am concerned 
about threats to 
my personal 
privacy today 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
GENETIC INFORMATION PRIVACY CONCERN 
 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 




subjects on my 
mind, the 






1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I am 
concerned 
about threats 








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. All things 
considered, I 
believe the 











7. I usually trust 
people until 
they give me a 
reason not to 
trust them 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I usually give 
people the 
benefit of the 
doubt 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. My general 




prove I should 
not trust them 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements: 
 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 



















storage format is 
a reliable 
environment in 





































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 




patients in an 
electronic format 





TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS 
 
13. I believe that 
pharmaceutical companies, 
in general, would act in my 
best interest 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. If I required help, a 
pharmaceutical company 
would do its best to help 
me 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. Pharmaceutical companies, 
in general, are interested in 
my well-being, not just 
their own 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
16. Pharmaceutical companies 
are truthful in dealings 
with me 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. Pharmaceutical companies 
would keep commitments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. Pharmaceutical companies 
are sincere and genuine 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
19. I believe that insurance 
companies, in general, 
would act in my best 
interest 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20. If I required help, a 
insurance company would 
do its best to help me 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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21. Insurance companies, in 
general, are interested in 
my well-being, not just 
their own 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
22. Insurance companies are 
truthful in dealings with 
me 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23. Insurance companies 
would keep commitments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24. Insurance companies are 
sincere and genuine 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
25. I believe that the 
government, in general, 
would act in my best 
interest 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
26. If I required help, the 
government would do its 
best to help me 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
27. The government, in 
general, is interested in my 
well-being, not just their 
own 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
28. The government is truthful 
in dealings with me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
29. The government would 
keep commitments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
30. The government is sincere 
and genuine 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
31. I believe that health 
professionals, in general, 
would act in my best 
interest 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
32. If I required help, health 
professionals would do 
their best to help me 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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33. Health professionals, in 
general, are interested in 
my well-being, not just 
their own 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
34. Health professionals are 
truthful in dealings with 
me 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
35. Health professionals would 
keep commitments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
36. Health professionals are 
sincere and genuine 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
The next question is intended to determine how your health is affecting you personally. 
Read each statement and indicate how each item expresses how you feel using the scale 
provided; do not dwell on the statement – it is better to respond immediately. There are 









37. Right now I feel sad about 
something that has happened to 
my health 
1 2 3 4 5 
38. I am happy about my health right 
now 1 2 3 4 5 
39. I have an intense loathing for my 
present state of health 1 2 3 4 5 
40. I feel ecstatic about life right now 1 2 3 4 5 
41. My health state has provoked a 
profound devotion for life in me 1 2 3 4 5 
42. Right now other things in my life 
will have to wait as I focus on my 
health 
1 2 3 4 5 
43. My current health state is a real 
inconvenience 1 2 3 4 5 
44. At the moment I often think how 
others will respond to me 1 2 3 4 5 
45. In the future I will make sure I 
know how to look after myself 1 2 3 4 5 
46. At present I feel extreme dread 1 2 3 4 5 
47. Recent experience has warned me 
to be more cautious about my 
health 











48. I feel everything needs to be 
approached with caution right now 1 2 3 4 5 
49. I am extremely displeased with my 
present health state 1 2 3 4 5 
50. I feel disgust for my current state 
of health 1 2 3 4 5 
51. My health has made me think 
carefully about life 1 2 3 4 5 
52. I feel furious at my present state of 
health 1 2 3 4 5 
53. I am amazed at my state of health 1 2 3 4 5 
54. I feel very deep sorrow because of 
my health 1 2 3 4 5 
55. My spirits are high today 1 2 3 4 5 
56. Health problems are tiresome to 
me 1 2 3 4 5 
57. My present health problems fill 
me with dread 1 2 3 4 5 
58. My state of health has taken me 
unawares 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Please respond to the following questions using the scale provided: 
 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
59. Overall, I tend to be a 
cheerful person.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
60. I am not what I would call 
a warm-hearted person 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
61. When people hurt me, I 
usually hold a grudge for 
a long time 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
62. I am an affectionate and 
tender person 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
63. I am generally a sincere 
and truthful person 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
64. If I could help save 
somebody’s life, I would 
do everything possible 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
65. I enjoy doing small favors 
every day for the people I 
care about 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
66. Helping others is one of 
the most important 
aspects of life 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
67. I enjoy working for the 
welfare of others 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
68. My family tends to do 
what we can to help those 
less fortunate than 
ourselves 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
69. I agree with the old 
saying, “It is better to 
give than to receive.” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How frequently have you personally been the victim of what you felt was an improper 
invasion of privacy? 
70. Very 
Infrequently 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very frequently 
How much have you heard or read during the last year about the use and potential 
misuse of health information collected electronically? 




SECTION 2 – Factors Influence Genetic Information Sharing  




 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
72. I would ignore signs that a 
significant other is cheating on 
me to maintain a relationship 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
73. I wait as long as possible to hear 
test results if I am worried that 
they could be bad 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
74. I generally ignore criticism and 
hope that the problem will go 
away 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
75. I would rather someone tell me 
that I have completed a task well 
instead of telling me how they 
truly feel 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
76. I generally do not look at bills if 
I am worried about being able to 
pay them 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
77. If I knew something bad that 
affected a friend, I would want 
them to know 





 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
78. My genetic information can be 
used to discriminate against me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
79. I generally share sensitive health 
information with friends 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
80. I am reluctant to share good 
news with someone when I know 
they have recently suffered a 
setback 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
81. When given two options, I 
generally take the less risky path 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
82. I am comfortable sharing health 
information with my employer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
83. I am afraid that knowledge of my 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
poor health would affect my 
employer's view of me 
84. I believe that insurance 
companies have the right to deny 
coverage for people with pre-
existing medical conditions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
85. I would fear losing my insurance 
coverage if I were diagnosed 
with a chronic illness or disease 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
86. I believe my employer should 
have access to my genetic 
information. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
87. I would share personal health 
information with a family 
member 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
88. I would trust a pharmaceutical 
company with my medical 
records 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
89. I trust my doctor's advice 
regarding my health 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
90. I generally seek second opinions 
when my doctor gives me a 
diagnosis or treatment plan 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
91. I believe that insurance 
companies' first priority is their 
customer's interests and health 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
92. I believe that the government is a 
reliable institution to conduct 
medical studies that include 
personal and health information 





 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
93. I believe my genetic 
information can benefit medical 
advancement in a significant 
way 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
94. Researchers and health officials 
need access to genetic 
information to effectively 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
produce treatments 
95. Society's contribution to genetic 
information will benefit me in a 
significant way 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
96. Personalized genetic 
information will greatly 
improve the current health care 
system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
97. Medical discoveries depend 
greatly on people's willingness 
to share their genetic 
information 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
98. I would be willing to place 
myself in some personal 
jeopardy if it benefits a close 
family member's health or 
general wellbeing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
99. I would be willing to sacrifice 
personal gain or put myself at 
risk to aid a close friend 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
100. Predicting serious diseases 
from genetic information will 
be an invaluable tool in the 
future of medicine 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
My Attitudes towards Information Privacy 
 
 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
101. I generally avoid making 
purchases online 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
102. I am concerned about identity 
theft 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
103. I will freely give away 
information to telemarketers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
104. I generally trust strangers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
105. I do not worry about invasion of 
privacy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
106. I take proactive steps to protect 
their personal health or 
financial information 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
107. I bank online 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
108. I do not think about corporate 
or governmental tracking of 
internet traffic 





I often consider myself at risk of genetic discrimination. 
109. Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A great deal 
I often hear about cases in which computer security is a concern. 
110. Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A great deal 
I often consider the benefits of sharing genetic information. 
111. 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A great deal 
I often consider the risks of sharing genetic information. 
112. Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A great deal 
I often consider hereditary conditions at which I am at risk. 
113. 




If you were tested and found to be at high risk for a genetic disorder with serious 
complications, indicate the extent to which you would be concerned about each of the 
following: 
 
In the work place: 
 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
114. Being denied promotion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
115. Being forced to retire 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
116. Being offered fewer 
opportunities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
117. Increased surveillance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
118. Social avoidance / pity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Financial impacts: 
 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
119. Being denied insurance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
120. Increased insurance premiums 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Healthcare: 
 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
121. Receiving altered medical advice 
from healthcare professionals 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Socially with family: 
 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
122. Having family members watch 
me closely for changes in my 
health (i.e. symptoms of disease) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
123. Having family members distance 
themselves from me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
124. Having family members put 
pressure on me regarding my 
decisions about education 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
125. Having family members put 
pressure on me regarding my 
decisions about marriage 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
126. Having family members put 
pressure on me regarding my 
decisions about having children 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Socially with friends: 
 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
127. Having friends watch me closely 
for changes in my health (i.e. 
symptoms of disease) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
128. Having friends distance 
themselves from me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
129. Having friends put pressure on 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
me regarding my decisions about 
education 
130. Having friends put pressure on 
me regarding my decisions about 
marriage 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
131. Having friends put pressure on 
me regarding my decisions about 
having children 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Government: 
 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
132. Being denied the privilege of 
adoption 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
133. Being prohibited from donating 




 Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following: 
 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
134. Having a genetic disease carries 
social stigma 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
135. People will see person in a less 
favorable way if they come to 
know that he/she has a genetic 
disease 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
136. It is advisable for a person to 
hide from people with a genetic 
disease 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
137. People tend to like less those 
with a genetic disease 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
138. It is a sign of weakness of 
inadequacy to have a genetic 
disease 









Willingness to Disclose 
Please think of genetic health information as potentially including such information as the 
results of testing conducted for disease prediction and diagnosis (e.g. Huntington’s 
disease or inherited forms of the breast cancer gene) or results of testing conducted for 
the purposes of finding interactions between diet and genes to maximize quality of life 
and avoid disease (e.g. an increased need for vitamin D which could be linked to 
osteoporosis, cancer and other health conditions). 
 
A pharmaceutical company may be interested in conducting research on patients 
with specific genetic conditions and may be interested in contacting you for 
participation in related health studies. Specify the extent to which you would be 
willing to grant a pharmaceutical company access to your personal genetic 
information for such purposes: 
139. Unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Likely 
140. Not Probable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Probably 
141. Willing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unwilling 
 
An insurance company may be interested in conducting research on patients with 
specific genetic conditions and may be interested in contacting you for participation 
in related health studies. Specify the extent to which you would be willing to grant 
an insurance company access to your personal genetic information for such 
purposes: 
142. Unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Likely 
143. Not Probable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Probably 
144. Willing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unwilling 
 
The government may be interested in conducting research on patients with specific 
genetic conditions and may be interested in contacting you for participation in 
related health studies. Specify the extent to which you would be willing to grant the 
government access to your personal genetic information for such purposes: 
145. Unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Likely 
146. Not Probable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Probably 
147. Willing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unwilling 
 
Health Professionals may be interested in conducting research on patients with 
specific genetic conditions and may be interested in contacting you for participation 
in related health studies. Specify the extent to which you would be willing to grant 
health professionals access to your personal genetic information for such purposes: 
148. Unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Likely 
149. Not Probable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Probably 
150. Willing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unwilling 
 
151. Unless you specifically choose NOT to be informed, if testing reveals that you are 
at risk for a genetic disease, you would be informed about it. 
• I would choose to be informed if I am at risk for a genetic disease 






 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
152. I’m glad my parents 
care so much about 
me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
153. I get along well with 
my parents. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
154. My parents are proud 
of me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
155. I am happy when I 
do well in school 
because I know it 
pleases my parents. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
156. My parents ask me 
about homework and 
projects 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
157. My parents talk to 
me about their 
aspirations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
158. I talk to my parents 
about what I am 
learning in school 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
159. I talk to my parents 
about issues in 
current events 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
160. I talk to my parents 
about my social 
(personal) life in 
school 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
161. My parents call me 
on my cell phone to 
find out about my 
day 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
162. I call my parents on 
their cell phones to 
let them know 
what’s going on 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
163. My parents show 
support for the 
activities I 
participate in. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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 Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
164. I tell my parents 
about where I go 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
165. My parents have met 
my friends 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
166. 
 
I get along well with 
my parents. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
167. When my parents ask 
me to do something, I 
generally listen to them 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
168. My parents have a 
strong influence on my 
values and beliefs 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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SECTION 3 - Demographics  
 
Finally, we need to collect just a couple pieces of demographic information about you. 
This information will be combined with others’ data and only the researchers will have 
access to it.  




170. What is your age? 
□  18-24  
□  25-34  
□  35-44  
□  45-54  
□  55-64  
□  65-74  
□  over 75 
 
171. What is your marital status 
□  Married (except separated) 
□  Divorced  
□  Separated  
□  Widowed  
□  Never Marries 
 
172. What is your race (select the one race you most consider yourself to be): 
□ 1 White 
□ 2 Black or African American 
□ 3 Asian 
□ 4 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
□ 5 Spanish/Hispanic, Latino 
□ 6 Other, please specify: __________________________ 
 
173. What is your religion (select the one religion you most consider yourself to be): 
□ 1 Christian - Protestant 
□ 2 Christian - Catholic 
□ 3 Christian - Mormon 
□ 4 Christian – Jehovah’s Witness 
□ 5 Christian - Orthodox 
□ 6 Christian – Other Christian 
□ 7 Jewish 
□ 8 Muslim 
□ 9 Buddhist 
□ 10 Hindu 
□ 11 Other World Religions 
□ 12 Other Faiths 
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□ 13 Unaffiliated – Religious Unaffiliated 
□ 14 Unaffiliated – Secular Unaffiliated 
□ 15 Unaffiliated – Atheist 
□ 16 Unaffiliated – Agnostic 
□ 17 Don’t Know 
 
 
174. What political party do you best affiliate yourself with? 
□ 1 Democrat 
□ 2 Republican 
□ 3 Independent 
□ 4 Other 
 
175. How would you rate your computer skills? 
□ 1 None 
□ 2 Very little 
□ 3 Average 
□ 4 Quite extensive 
□ 5 Very extensive 
 
176. How often do you use a computer?  
□ Once a month 
□ 2-3 Times a Month 
□ Once a week 
□ 2-3 Times a Week 
□ Daily 
 
177. In general, would you say your health is: 
□ 1 Excellent 
□ 2 Very good 
□ 3 Good 
□ 4 Fair 
□ 5 Poor 
 
178. Do you have a chronic illness? (check all that apply) 
□ No, I don't 
□ Heart Disease/Congestive Heart Failure (CHF)   
□ Diabetes (Sugar)   
□ Asthma   
□ Cancer (any type)   
□ High Blood Pressure/Hypertension   
□ AIDS/HIV   
□ Arthritis   
□ Hypothyroidism   
□ Back problems/surgery   
□ High cholesterol   
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□ Depression   
□ Known genetic disorder (any type)   
□ Other, Please Specify: __________________________ 
   
179. Do you have a loved one (e.g. father, mother, sister, close friend) with a chronic 
illness? (check all that apply) 
□ No, I don't 
□ Heart Disease/Congestive Heart Failure (CHF)   
□ Diabetes (Sugar)   
□ Asthma   
□ Cancer (any type)   
□ High Blood Pressure/Hypertension   
□ AIDS/HIV   
□ Arthritis   
□ Hypothyroidism   
□ Back problems/surgery   
□ High cholesterol   
□ Depression   
□ Known genetic disorder (any type)   
□ Other, Please Specify: ______________________________   
 
180. Which category represents the total combined income of your household during 
the past 12 months?  
□ Less than $10,000 
□ $10,000 to $14,999 
□ $15,000 to $24,999 
□ $25,000 to $34,999 
□ $35,000 to $49,999 
□ $50,000 to $74,999 
□ $75,000 to $99,999 
□ $100,000 to $149,999 
□ $150,000 to $199,999 
□ $200,000 or more 
 
181. What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you 
have received? 
□ 8th grade or less 
□ Some high school, no diploma 
□ High School Graduate or equivalent (For example: GED) 
□ Some college but no degree 
□ Associate degree in college 
□ Bachelors degree (For example: BA, AB, BS) 
□ Master's degree (For example: MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA) 




































8.3.1.2 Consent Form 
Consent Form for Team MAGIC Survey 
 
Project Title 
 Medical and Genetics Information Concerns 






This research is being conducted by Team MAGIC at the 
University of Maryland, College Park.  We are inviting you 
to participate in this research project because you are a 
member of our target sample.  The purpose of this research 






The procedures involve completing an online survey that will 
take about 30 minutes.  You will be responding to a number of 
multiple-choice questions.  There are no right or wrong 
answers.  For example:  You may be asked to indicate your 
level of agreement with statements such as: I believe that 
insurance companies, in general, would act in my best interest. 
 
Potential Risks and 
Discomforts 
 
There are some risks associated with participating in this 
research project.  You will be responding to survey items 
about your perceptions of the use of personal genetic 
information between you and certain institutions.  There are no 
right or wrong answers. However, you may experience 
embarrassment in responding to some of the questions.  You 
may also experience fatigue during the survey. 
 
Potential Benefits  There are no direct benefits to participation. However, possible 
benefits include improving the understanding of the 





The investigators will do their best to keep your personal 
information confidential. To help protect your confidentiality, 
the data collected will be stored on password-protected 
computers accessible only by members of the research team.  
If we write a report or article about this research project, your 
identity will be protected to the maximum extent possible.  
Your information may be shared with representatives of the 
University of Maryland, College Park or governmental 
authorities if you or someone else is in danger or if we are 





The University of Maryland does not provide any medical, 
hospitalization or other insurance for participants in this 
research study, nor will the University of Maryland provide 
any medical treatment or compensation for any injury 
sustained as a result of participation in this research study, 
except as required by law. 
 
Right to Withdraw 
and Questions 
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary.  
You may choose not to take part at all.  If you decide to 
participate in this research, you may stop participating at any 
time.  If you decide not to participate in this study or if you 
stop participating at any time, you will not be penalized or lose 
any benefits to which you otherwise qualify. 
 
If you decide to stop taking part in the study, if you have 
questions, concerns, or complaints, or if you need to report an 
injury related to the research, please contact the investigator, 
Ritu Agarwal at  
4327 Van Munching Hall, University of Maryland, College 




Participant Rights  
 
If you have questions about your rights as a research 
participant or wish to report a research-related injury, please 
contact:  
 
University of Maryland College Park  
Institutional Review Board Office 
1204 Marie Mount 
College Park, Maryland, 20742 
 E-mail: irb@umd.edu  
Telephone: 301-405-0678 
 
This research has been reviewed according to the University of 








Your signature indicates that you are at least 18 years of age; 
you have read this consent form; you are who you claim to be; 
the research has been explained to you; your questions have 
been answered to your satisfaction and you voluntarily agree 
to participate in this research study. You will receive a copy of 
this signed consent form. 
 
































8.3.2 Experiment Documents 
8.3.2.1 Instructions 
Please fill out the consent form and demographics form. We will come around to collect 




Thank you for participating in today’s experiment. I will read through a script to explain 
to you the nature of today’s experiment as well as how to navigate the computer interface 
with which you will be working. I will be using this script to make sure that all sessions 
of this experiment receive the same information, but please feel free to ask questions as 
they arise. 
  
This is an experiment in decision-making. In addition to a $10 participation fee, you will 
have the opportunity to earn more through the course of the experiment and you will be 
paid your earnings and the participation fee privately at the conclusion of the experiment. 
The exact amount you receive will be determined during the experiment and will depend 
on your decisions. If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your 
hand and wait for an experimenter to come to you. Please do not talk, exclaim, or try to 
communicate with other participants during the experiment. Also, please turn all cell 
phones off or on mute for the duration of the experiment. Participants intentionally 
violating the rules may be asked to leave the experiment with only the show-up fee. 
  
All monetary amounts you will see in this experiment will be denominated in Real World 
Monetary Values. At the end of the experiment, your $10 participation fee will be added 
to a randomly chosen scenario income. 
  
In the game that you are about to play, you will make a hypothetical decision about 
whether to donate your genetic information for research purposes. The information would 
be stored in a genetic databank that is being managed by a third party. This information 
would be used to find cures for genetic diseases. However, donation of information also 
makes you vulnerable because the information could be compromised and your genetic 




You will pay the game for 16 rounds. In each round you will begin by earning some 
income, but you may lose the income if certain things happen. For example, if you fall 
sick, you lose money. If your information is compromised and you are discriminated 
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against, you lose some money. You can also make money. If you are suffering from a 
disease and a cure is found for that disease, you will earn some money. There are other 
factors that will also affect your income, including your investments. These will be 
explained in detail later. 
 
At every point in the game you will be given certain information that you may choose to 
use in your decision-making. You will be informed whether you are at high risk for 
getting a disease or not; what the chance of being discriminated against is; what is the 
extent to which your decision to donate your genetic information contributes to a cure. 
All the information that is relevant to your choice will be displayed on the screen.  
  
Within this context, you potentially have three decisions to make. First, you are asked to 
decide whether to donate your genetic information or not. If you choose to donate your 
information, you are further asked if you want to be informed of your health status or not. 
Regardless of how you answer the first two questions, you are given the opportunity to 
increase your earnings by choosing between one of two investments. If you choose option 
A, do not invest, your income will remain the same; if you choose option B, invest, your 
income will increase by $1.20 in case you do not fall sick or if the cure is found, but will 
decrease by $1.20 if you do fall sick and the cure is not found. 
  
After you have completed all 16 rounds, the software will randomly pick one of those 
rounds, and you will be paid based on your earnings for that particular round. 
  
I will now walk you through the game in detail, and will familiarize you with the screens 




This screen in front of you will present you with the two choices – to Donate or Not 
Donate your genetic information. There is also some information shown on this screen. I 
will go through these in turn: 
  
 
 Your starting income is $8.00. From here you can either earn or lose money 
 
◦ You are informed of your risk of having the disease, which can be either 
high or low. In the case that your risk is high, you are roughly twice as 
likely to have the disease as a low risk individual. Your risk level will 




◦ Chance of Falling Sick represents how likely it is you will become sick, 
given that you have the disease. If you do not have the disease, you will 
not fall sick. 
 
◦ If any person falls sick, and a cure is found, they will not lose as much 
money as if a cure has not been found. The loss in income if you fall sick 
is $4.00, and if a cure has been found, your loss of income is $0.80. These 
values represent the loss of income due to missing days at work and 
paying for medication. If a cure is found, you will still have been affected 
for some period of time, but this impact is not as large. 
 
◦ The percent chance that a cure will be found depends upon how many 
people – among those playing the game in this room at the present time – 
choose to donate their information. If more people donate, it is more likely 
that a cure will be found. The Impact to Cure number represents how 
much the chance of a cure being found increases when you donate your 
information. If nobody donates, the cure probability is 25%; if only one 
person donates the cure probability is 25% plus this variable; if only two 
people donate the cure probability is 25% plus twice this variable; and so 
on until the maximum value is reached. 
 
◦ Donation of information means that your information can be 
compromised, as a result of which you could face discrimination (e.g. in 
employment, or finding health insurance). If you donate, there is an 
increase of 20% chance of discrimination. If you are informed about your 
health status there is an additional 20% chance of discrimination. This 
total value is then scaled to match the scenario’s overall chance of 
discrimination. If you are discriminated you will lose $0.80. This loss of 
income represents losing job opportunities.  
  
After you have made a choice, the software will move you to the next screen. If you 
choose to donate your genetic information, you will be asked whether you want to be 
informed if have the disease. 
  
[INFORMED CHOICE SCREEN]  
  
Now look at the informed choice screen. On this screen you should see the question 
asking whether you want to be informed about your health status. If you select yes, you 
will be told if you have a marker for the given disease or not. If you select no, the marker 
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will be “Unknown”. All of the information from the previous screen is carried over to this 
screen. 
  
If you have a marker for a disease, you have a possibility of falling sick. However, if you 
are told you do not have a marker, there is still a chance that you do have the marker and 
can become sick. This represents the fact that not all tests for genetic disease are truly 





Now look at the investment screen. Regardless of how you answer the first two questions, 
you will be given the opportunity to increase your earnings by choosing between one of 
two investments. 
 
◦ If you choose option A, do not invest, your income will remain the same. 
◦ If you choose option B, invest, your income will increase by $1.20 in the 
case you do not fall sick or if the cure is found, but will decrease by $1.20 





Now look at the outcome screen. After all the choices have been made you will learn the 
outcome, and the money earned. This depends on the choices you made, as well as 
chance. A number of screens will inform you of your specific outcome for this round. 
This information will then be summarized at the end, together with your computed 
earnings for this round. 
  
 
◦ Displayed on the final screen will be your “donation” decision and your 
“informed” decision. 
◦ If you chose to be informed, your test results for the gene will be shown, 
otherwise it will display as “Unknown”.  
◦ If relevant, you will be told whether your information was compromised 
and the loss in income you consequently suffered. 
◦ You will be told whether or not you became sick, and if a cure was found. 
◦ Based on these outcomes, you will be informed of how much money you 




At the end of each round, the game will reset, a new round will be presented and you will 
repeat the process. 
  
Please now click the Z-leaf icon. When you open Z-Leaf you may have to click unblock. 
You will now begin two practice rounds. Data from the practice rounds will not be used. 
The 16 rounds that take place after the practice rounds will be used in determining how 
much you will earn for participating. 
 
Below is a summary of the changes in income that can occur during each scenario. 
 
BASE INCOME = $8.00 
Event % Change in Income $ Change in Income 
Investment and NOT Sick %15 $1.20 
Investment and Sick -%15 -$1.20 
Donate and Earn Money %10 $0.80 
Sick and NO Cure -%50 -$4.00 
Sick and Cure -%10 -$0.80 
Discriminated -%10 -$0.80 
 
 
Because you earn $10 for participating and the maximum you can earn for in-game 
























































8.3.2.3 Demographics Survey 







This information will be combined with others’ data and only the researchers will have 
access to it. 
 
 
1. What is your gender? 
□ 1 Male 
□ 2 Female 
 
2. What is your age? 
□ 1  18-24  
□ 2  25-34  
□ 3  35-44  
□ 4   45-54  
□ 5   55-64  
□ 6   65-74  
□ 7  over 75 
 
3. What is your marital status 
□ 1  Married (except separated) 
□ 2  Divorced  
□ 3   Separated  
□ 4   Widowed  
□ 5  Never Married 
 
4. What is your race (select the one race you most consider yourself to be): 
□ 1 White 
□ 2 Black or African American 
□ 3 Asian 
□ 4 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
□ 5 Spanish/Hispanic, Latino 










5. What is your religion (select the one race you most consider yourself to be): 
□ 1 Christian - Protestant 
□ 2 Christian - Catholic 
□ 3 Christian - Mormon 
□ 4 Christian – Jehovah’s Witness 
□ 5 Christian - Orthodox 
□ 6 Christian – Other Christian 
□ 7 Jewish 
□ 8 Muslim 
□ 9 Buddhist 
□ 10 Hindu 
□ 11 Other World Religions 
□ 12 Other Faiths 
□ 13 Unaffiliated – Secular Unaffiliated 
□ 14 Unaffiliated – Atheist 
□ 15 Unaffiliated – Agnostic 
□ 16 Don’t Know 
 
6. What political party do you best affiliate yourself with? 
□ 1 Democrat 
□ 2 Republican 
□ 3 Independent 
□ 4 Other 
 
7. How would you rate your computer skills? 
□ 1 None 
□ 2 Very little 
□ 3 Average 
□ 4 Quite extensive 
□ 5 Very extensive 
 
8. How often do you use a computer?  
□ 1 Once a month 
□  2 Once a week 
□  3 3-4 times a week 
□  4 Once a day 
□  5 Multiple times a day 
 
9. In general, would you say your health is: 
□ 1 Excellent 
□ 2 Very good 
□ 3 Good 
□ 4 Fair 




10. Do you have a chronic illness? (check all that apply) 
□ 1 No, I don't 
□ 2 Heart Disease/Congestive Heart Failure (CHF)   
□ 3 Diabetes (Sugar)   
□ 4 Asthma   
□ 5 Cancer (any type)   
□ 6 High Blood Pressure/Hypertension   
□ 7 AIDS/HIV   
□ 8 Arthritis   
□ 9 Hypothyroidism   
□ 10 Back problems/surgery   
□ 11 High cholesterol   
□ 12 Depression   
□ 13 Known genetic disorder (any type)   
□ 14 Other, Please Specify: __________________________ 
   
11. Do you have a loved one (e.g. father, mother, sister, close friend) with a chronic 
illness? (check all that apply) 
□ 1 No, I don't 
□ 2 Heart Disease/Congestive Heart Failure (CHF)   
□ 3 Diabetes (Sugar)   
□ 4 Asthma   
□ 5 Cancer (any type)   
□ 6 High Blood Pressure/Hypertension   
□ 7 AIDS/HIV   
□ 8 Arthritis   
□ 9 Hypothyroidism   
□ 10 Back problems/surgery   
□ 11 High cholesterol   
□ 12 Depression   
□ 13 Known genetic disorder (any type)   
□ 14 Other, Please Specify: ______________________________ 
  
 
12. Which category represents the total combined income of your household during the 
past 12 months?  
□ 1 Less than $10,000 
□ 2 $10,000 to $14,999 
□ 3 $15,000 to $24,999 
□ 4 $25,000 to $34,999 
□ 5 $35,000 to $49,999 
□ 6 $50,000 to $74,999 
□ 7 $75,000 to $99,999 
□ 8 $100,000 to $149,999 
□ 9 $150,000 to $199,999 
□ 10 $200,000 or more 
	  
	  189	  
13. What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you 
have received? 
□ 1 8th grade or less 
□ 2 Some high school, no diploma 
□ 3 High School Graduate or equivalent (For example: GED) 
□ 4 Some college but no degree 
□ 5 Associate degree in college 
□ 6 Bachelors degree (For example: BA, AB, BS) 
□ 7 Master's degree (For example: MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, 
MBA) 





































This research is being conducted by Gemstone Team MAGIC at 
the University of Maryland, College Park. The purpose of this 
research project is to determine how people make choices 





The procedures involve following a simulation and making decisions 
about sharing personal health information based on the provided 
situation. Decisions made will affect monetary rewards for 
participants. All decisions will be based on hypothetical scenarios 
and no personal healthcare information will be gathered. 
Potential Risks and 
Discomforts 
 
There may be some minimal risks from participating in this research 
study including: fatigue during the experiment, anxiety due to 
different hypothetical disease conditions 
Potential Benefits  There are no direct benefits to you. However, possible benefits 
include monetary gain from this study. We hope that, in the future, 
other people might benefit from this study through improved 





Any potential loss of confidentiality will be minimized by storing the 
data on a password protected computer. Additionally, all data 
collected is hypothetical. 
 
If we write a report or article about this research project, your 
identity will be protected to the maximum extent possible. Your 
information may be shared with representatives of the University of 
Maryland, College Park or governmental authorities if you or 




The University of Maryland does not provide any medical, 
hospitalization or other insurance for you in this research study, nor 
will the University of Maryland provide any medical treatment or 
compensation for any injury sustained as a result of participation in 
this research study, except as required by law. 
Right to Withdraw 
and Questions 
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You may 
choose not to take part at all. If you decide to participate in this 
research, you may stop participating at any time. If you decide not to 
	  
	  191	  
participate in this study or if you stop participating at any time, you 
will not be penalized or lose any benefits to which you otherwise 
qualify.  
 
If you decide to stop taking part in the study, if you have questions, 
concerns, or complaints, or if you need to report an injury related to 
the research, please contact the investigator:  
Ritu Agarwal 
ragarwal@rhsmith.umd.edu 
Van Munching Hall 
Participant Rights  
 
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant or 
wish to report a research-related injury, please contact:  
 
University of Maryland College Park  
Institutional Review Board Office 
1204 Marie Mount Hall 
College Park, Maryland, 20742 
 E-mail: irb@umd.edu  
Telephone: 301-405-0678 
 
This research has been reviewed according to the University of 
Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research involving 
human subjects. 
Statement of Consent 
 
Your signature indicates that you are at least 18 years of age; you 
have read this consent form or have had it read to you; your 
questions have been answered to your satisfaction and you 
voluntarily agree to participate in this research study. You will 
receive a copy of this signed consent form. 
 
If you agree to participate, please sign your name below. 







Signature and Date 
 
DATE 
 
 
 
 
